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Department of Political Science
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action continues to animate discussions on the 
nature of democracy in contemporary societies. Indeed there has been rarely a work of 
serious scholarship about die evolution of modern society that is not informed by the 
writings of this German philosopher. Yet there is a growing realisation that the evolution of 
contemporary societies has been accompanied by fundamental changes that have exerted 
strains on the relevance of Habermas’s political philosophy. This fact has been popularly 
highlighted by that body of mainly French thought that comes under the rubric of 
poststructuralism. As a consequence there has been a suggestion that the tradition of critical 
theory that Habermas represents is irrelevant. The dissertation agrees with the first 
argument: that the changes in contemporary societies have rendered Habermas’s model of 
discursive democracy problematic. However, the conclusion of critical theory being in its 
twilight does not follow from this. The problem that is embedded within Habermas’s oeuvre 
is well noted within the Frankfurt School. In fact, one of its original members anticipated the 
problems currently encountered by a communicative theory of society and puts forward a 
programme of critique that would ensure the continued relevance of Habermas and the 
critical tradition that he belongs to. The dissertation argues that a turn to Adorno’s negative 
dialectics would address some of the debilitating features of Habermas’s theory. 
Specifically, the incorporation of the insights of Adorno's dialectics into the theory of 
communicative action and by extension to the Habermasian public sphere would go a long 
way in realising the goals inherent in Habermas’s political philosophy. This is to say that the 
current exercise stems from the conviction that an Adornian critique of communicative 
ethics, by way of a negative dialectics, offers improvements to Habermas’s model of 
discursive democracy.
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C h a p t e r  1
INTRODUCTION
1.0
The political philosophy espoused by the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas remains one olf 
the most compelling articulations of the democratic framework given its own intemall 
cogency as well as its broad engagements with other philosophical traditions. This is madte 
evident by the fact that there has been scarcely a work in the terrain of social theory that ha.^ s 
had such a broad and lasting impact in contemporary social sciences and humanities as thte 
one that flowed from his prodigious pen.1 Yet even this impressiveness in scope has beein 
astonishingly eclipsed by the ‘unity of perspective’ that runs through his seemingly disparahe
writings. The congruence of his thoughts is evident in his contributions to fields such ass
1
philosophy, sociology, psychology, political science, intellectual history and social theory.'
Despite this, however, it is only quite recently that the English-speaking world has begun t<o 
delve into his writings seriously. The difficulty in the reception of his work in the Englislh 
speaking world has to do more with the specific cultural trajectory of his many interloculolfs 
than anything else. Indeed the works of Habermas assume the reader already has a 
specialised knowledge of a number of philosophers and social theorists in the Germain 
epistemological landscape. They range from the transcendentalism of Kant to the idealism cof 
Hegel, from the hermeneutics of Gadamer to the Marxian writings of Lukacs, from Weber”s 
‘verstehen' sociology to the linguistics of Searle and Austin, from the psychology of Piagcet 
and Mead to the critical tradition of Western Marxism. Moreover Habermas requires us to b)e 
conversant with a whole set of German schools of thought, so encountering him withoiut 
adequate preparation would be almost guaranteed to result in a total sense of bewildermemt 
compounded by confusion. In an era that has been defined by its sceptical approach to gramd 
metaphysical systems or grand discourses, the majestic breadth of Habermas’s work seenns 
like an exception to the rule.
To understand Habermas, one has to grasp the fact that for him, current attempts ;at 
philosophising the world still make us contemporaries of Hegel, however much we woulld
1 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory o f  Jürgen Habermas (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1978) p. ix. Alsso 
Richard Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985) pp. 1-32.
’ Ibid. This point was also made by Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, p. 3.
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have liked to think we have transcended his system. In the Lectures that became the 
Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, Habermas traced the thought trajectories of the 
‘young Hegelians' by noting the common ambivalence that these philosophers had toward 
their former mentor’s system of synthesis. 3 That is on the one hand, these students 
acknowledged the efficacy with which Hegel denounced the one-sided metaphysical 
formulations prevalent in materialist, idealist and pluralist discourses of the time and the 
‘violence of omission’ that they perpetuate. On the other hand, however, they were also 
convinced that Hegel’s system retained a contradiction that even his scheme could not 
surmount. This is demonstrated by ‘the gulf between his claim that the dialectical process, 
which unites thought and history, culminates in the fundamental triumph of reason, and the 
obvious irrationality of the social world’ .4 Therefore we are still contemporaries of Hegel in 
the sense that we are still trying to finish what he started. This label, by Habermas, is 
simultaneously, an oblique reference to the attempt by young Hegelians to retrieve reason 
‘from the abstruse, abstract world of metaphysical concepts’, and to apply it, ‘in the lives of 
finite embodied beings’ . 5 6
For the young Hegelians, therefore, the problem lies in translating Hegel’s philosophy into 
the historical realities of the world/' Hegel’s fault, according to this line of reasoning, was 
that, contrary to the stated aims of his dialectical process, the culmination of his system was 
the outright triumph of reason over history. The aim therefore is to rectify this anomaly by 
historicising reason while simultaneously retaining its links with the principles that undergird 
the Enlightenment. 7 It is this background in Hegelian philosophy that has to be kept in mind 
when sifting through the Habennas oeuvre. Habermas’s version of Critical Theory, in this 
way, becomes a particular strand of theorising that incorporates Hegelian, Marxian as well as 
Weberian themes in an attempt to address some of the aporias that he associated with the 
critical theory of the older generation of the Frankfurt School.
3 Jürgen Habennas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, trails. Frederick G Lawrence (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press 1990) pp.51-74. Also Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth- 
Century Thought, translated by David E Green. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941/1991) pp. 53-  
162.
4 Peter Dews, ‘Habermas and the Desublimation of reason’, In Habermas: A Critical Reader, edited by Peter 
Dews ( Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) p. 3.
5 Ibid.
6 Rudiger Bubncr, ‘Habermas’s Concept of Critical Theory' Habermas Critical Debates by John B Thompson 
and David Held (London: Macmillan Press 1982) pp. 42-43.
7 Habermas refers to this redress as the ‘desublimation of reason'. If we are to use this against Hegel then it 
would be akin to saying the ‘desublimation o f the Spirit'.
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Yet for all its novel approach to the tensions within the ‘old' theorising of the Frankfurt 
School, there is nevertheless a dark and disturbing development on the horizon of the 
conceptual terrain occupied by Jürgen Habermas. This problem is highlighted by the disputes 
surrounding the validity of his main assumptions and tenets. Some claim that the predicament 
is symptomatic of a chronic illness that is in its latter stages. The premises upon which these 
allegations rest range from an alleged ‘deflationary conception of philosophy’ that outlaws 
the role of the metaphysical, to what has been termed the exclusive sociologism in 
Habermas’s critical theory; that is, one that imagines that pathologies of the present can only 
be articulated effectively by sociological theories. A critical theory based on these tenuous 
grounds, the argument goes, will remain blind to our ways of knowing and being in the 
world.s Others differ, pointing out that what besets Habermas’s theory is nothing ‘incurable" 
and that indeed the overall relevancy of his theoretical endeavour is very much intact. 9 The 
jury is still out for a final adjudication on the matter. Significant though, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, is that these disputes also highlight the contrasting evaluations on the 
emancipatory potential (or lack thereof') of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere.
The current dissertation marks its point of departure from the problems associated with the 
Habermasian public sphere and the inherent telos embedded within it: the completion of the 
modernity project. It is a taken for granted fact that the public sphere, derived directly from 
his theory of society, lies at the heart of Habermas’s political philosophy. It is, indeed, the 
crystallisation of an ingenious attempt to redress what, in Habermas's opinion, was a 
monumental failure in the critical theorisation of society by the older members of the 
Frankfurt School as exemplified by the works of its chief theoretician -  Theodor Adorno. 10 
The differences between the two are well documented." From Habermas’s point of view, 
Adorno immerses himself in an epistemological paradox in his stringent critique of 
rationality. This is in the way the latter radically critiques reason using reason’s own 
resources. In so doing, Habermas argues, Adorno contradicts himself. Adorno’s protagonists, 
on the other hand, would insist that Adorno’s critique of the Hegelian scheme of sublating
s Dieter Freundlieb, ‘Rethinking Critical Theory: Weaknesses and New Directions’. Constellations Volume 7, 
No. I (2000) pp. 81-99.
l) Many who hold this view are generally sympathetic with Habennas’s oeuvre and can be categorised within the 
same tradition. These are commentators such as Axel Honneth, Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser to name a 
few. Also of note is Nancy Fraser’s, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social 
Theory. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) pp. 113-143.
111 The ‘Frankfurt School’ is differentiated between first and second and some maintain third generation 
members.
11 The distinctions have been made by Habermas in his various writings, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
being a case in point.
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the particular to the universal can also be applied to Habermas’s rational consensus as the 
culmination of the process of contestation between individual validity claims.
What is less known in the din accompanying all this is the extent of the continuities between 
Habermas’s theory of society and the one that can be discerned from Theodor Adorno's 
social and philosophical critique. The degree of convergence between the two authors is 
primarily seen in the way both accounts are oriented towards the realisation of a rational 
society. Their disagreement, in this way, centres chiefly on the question of how best to 
achieve this shared aim. The dispute, if one can call it that, comes about as a result of their 
contrasting views on prevailing conditions, which, from both points of view are a hurdle to 
the realisation of their goal. Adorno admittedly harbours a more pessimistic evaluation of 
contemporary conditions, the contours of which, for him, are defined predominantly by the 
capitalist enterprise. Employing Marx’s ‘principle of exchange’ simultaneously with the 
Nietzschean critique of reason as just a ‘will to power’, which are then broadly revisited on 
an epistemological matrix defined by a critical evaluation of Hegelian dialectics, Adorno 
developed an evaluation of life in contemporary society as ‘damaged’ and, as such, not worth 
living. 12 The normative undertone of his critical theory finds quintessential expression in this 
formulation as nowhere else in his voluminous and often extremely dense writings. By 
contrast, Habermas claims to show a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of 
prevailing conditions of life. This understanding led him to identify more emancipatory 
potentials in contemporary contexts than Adorno did before him. Put simply, the realisation 
of a rational society, for Habermas, rests on an effective form of resistance against the 
infiltration of ‘systemic logic’ (read positivist reason), which is driven by the non-linguistic 
media of power and money, on the linguistic environs of the lifeworld. 12 These differences 
also bring to light the two philosophers’ diverging conceptions of what a rational society may 
look like.
12 Admittedly the Marxian principle of exchange stems from Georg Lukacs' exposition on it in History and 
Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone, (London: Merlin Press, 
1971). Adorno refers to it as ratio. in Negative Dialectics, translated by E.B Ashton, (London: Routledgc, 
1973/2000).
13 See Jiirgen Habermas, Theory o f  Communicative Action (Volume II), Translated by Thomas McCarthy, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).
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1.1 The Idea of a Rational Society
For Habermas, a rational society is one that is premised on a clear demarcation between its 
two components, the ‘system’ and the ‘lifeworld’ and their respective dynamics. The 
‘system’ in this scheme of things is comprised of the structural arrangements that ensure the 
material survival of society. Regulated by instrumental reason, or what Habermas, following 
Weber, called ‘purposive rationality’, this sphere is the site of strategic actions. By contrast, 
the ‘lifeworld’, a concept he borrowed from Dilthey, is supposedly guided by a 
communicative reason that is attuned to rational consensus. By conceiving society as made 
up of systems and lifeworld, Habermas alludes to the two different ways of integration in 
capitalist society -  those of systemic and social integrations. As such, the lifeworld becomes 
the site of intersubjective actions based on a linguistic framework provided by what 
Habermas sees as the telos of a universal pragmatics -  undistorted communication.
At first glance, Adorno’s conception of what a rational society should be is somewhat more 
ambiguous than the one propounded by his erstwhile assistant at the Institute. This is because 
Adorno, unlike Habermas, did not come up with a positive formulation of what modern 
society needs to protect itself from regressive tendencies. In fact he associates positive 
identification of a rational society with Hegel's positive affirmation through negation; that is, 
it can only come about via an illegitimate deployment of reason to seek identity. What he 
offers instead is a negative conception of utopia that comes as a result of a relentless critique 
of modernity. In this way it is much easier to get an index of what a rational society must not 
be, from Adorno. Yet in spite of this, the convergence between the two holds. Like 
Habermas, Adorno views the hegemonic status of positivism in the terrain of epistemology as 
constituting a problem for the realisation of the goal of his critical theory. Positivism, for 
him, breeds conservative dispositions within the populace. The transformation of the current 
status quo, therefore, is contingent on the determinate negation of positivistic and 
conservative tendencies, exemplified in his time with equating the concrete with the rational, 
in comprehending social life. This would entail a more sustained form of critique than the 
one offered by Hegel. 14 It is in this way that a dialectics based on negativity is to work 
against the imperialism of positivism in the terrain of knowledge and the concomitant apathy 
of conservativism in the field of emancipatory politics. By continuously bringing to light the 
limitations of positivistic thought through a searing critique of the status quo, this new
14 Hegelian philosophy exhibits both conservative and revolutionary impulses as evinced by his equating the 
real with the rational, see Philosophy o f  Right, translated by T M Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) p. 10.
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dialectical orientation hopes that the rational force of reason will be brought to bear on the 
sediments of irrationality that impinges from within.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
The current thesis has two interlinking objectives in mind. Firstly the thesis aims to 
investigate Habermas’s concept of the public sphere in light of its currency as well as its 
efficacy in dealing with contemporary issues. This entails a hermeneutic interrogation of his 
communicative theory as well as how this is manifested in his political oeuvre. The thesis, 
therefore, starts from the supposition that the overall structure of Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action and its manifestation in the public sphere, still offers the best way 
forward io the political realisation of human autonomy. In fact Habermas sees his work as 
salvaging the ‘project of modernity’: a project that hinges on the Enlightenment ideals of 
emancipation, freedom and liberty. For this to happen, the philosophic tradition that emerges 
as a result of Enlightenment thinking must transform itself, if it wants to maintain its 
currency, into a reconstructive science. It needs, in other words, to be ‘a comprehensive 
theory of rationality that focuses on the centrality of communicative action and discourse’ . ' 5
The appreciation of Habermas’s two-tier theory of society as a definite improvement in 
critical thinking in the way it delineates different forms of reason in different spheres is, at 
the same time, tempered by the conviction that some fundamentals of his theory have to 
change in light of our contemporary challenges. This change necessitates a return to some of 
Adorno’s novel insights into what ails society. The specific dynamic that I wish to engage 
with is the uncritical way in which Habermas sees his public sphere as a mechanism 
generating justifiable outcomes. In other words, human autonomy follows automatically from 
fair and equal deliberations. To provide an appropriate critique of this, one has to examine 
the foundation on which Habermas’s theoretical edifice rests: universal pragmatics.
It is the view of this essay that the adoption of a universal pragmatics to guide the discourse 
in the lifeworld, and by extension the public sphere, is inadequate in the face of the reifying 
incursions of identity thinking or ‘purposive rationality’ in the lifeworld. To paraphrase, 
contemporary historical conditions suggest that the dynamics of communicative action are
15 Richard Bernstein, ‘What is the Difference That Makes a Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty', The 
Philosophy o f  Science Association, Volume 2 (19X2) p. 333.
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inadequate to stem the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld'. This is evinced by the social malaise of 
the times as well as the entrenchment of ‘old' problems associated with class disparities. 16 
The intrinsic links between the lifeworld on one hand and the public sphere on the other will 
necessitate a direct engagement with Habermas’s theory of Communicative Action and its 
two-tier system of society. Only thus may we effectively address the inadequacies of the 
public sphere. The main reason for this is provided by the fact that the theoretical impetus of 
rational discourse in the political public sphere is propelled by the dynamic interplay within 
the ‘lifeworld’ as well as between this sphere of symbolic reproduction and the ‘system’.
The thesis therefore ultimately revolves around the argument, already highlighted above, that 
the inadequacy of Habermas’s public sphere and its linkage to the idea of freedom stems 
from the fact that the world has been reified to an extent that surpasses Habermas’s own 
estimation of it. That is, Habermas has mistakenly underplayed the degree of encroachment 
of positivist thought in the lifeworld, resulting in the continuing vulnerability of his 
theoretical edifice to functionalist impulses. Indeed the two-tier theory of society is grounded 
in the normative belief that the colonization of the lifeworld has not yet reached a critical 
stage. This is clearly evinced in his suggestion of building sensor-like barriers to protect the 
autonomy of the lifeworld from systemic encroachments. 17 Universal pragmatics in this 
sense becomes a mechanism to secure the parameters of the lifeworld. The thesis proposes, 
however, that if we are to start from the supposition that the lifeworld has already been 
reified by identity thinking, the function of universal pragmatics immediately becomes 
aporetic. In light of this, we need to institute a critique of instrumental reason within the 
lifeworld in order to clear away any sediments of positivist thought that might affect the rules 
of engagement within this sphere.
Towards this end, the thesis sets out to correct some of these ‘weaknesses’ perceived to be 
endemic in Habermas’s political philosophy as delineated by his notion of the political public 
sphere. The thesis argues that the political realisation of the ‘project of modernity' that 
Habermas vehemently defends lies in dealing effectively with this issue. This is primarily 
done via a return to Adorno. In fact, the argument that the lifeworld has been reified by 
systemic impulses is an Adornian one. Starting from the Dialectic o f Enlightenment as a 
disclosing critique of enlightenment and Minima Moralia as ‘reflections from a damaged
16 An incisive analysis of contemporary social malaise and the need to ground thinking in an ethic that would 
act as corrective to Habermas’s ‘discourse ethics’ is offered by Jay Bernstein’s Adorno: Disenchantment and 
Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
17 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, p. 364.
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life’, Adorno has never shirked from critiquing what he perceived as the greatest threat to 
freedom and therefore justice: identity thinking18. Freedom or redemption is a rallying call 
that can be heard throughout his disparate writings.14 In fact, a life without freedom has 
become, for him, the chief symbol of our era. He immortalises this event by remarking that, 
‘[Ojur perspective of life has passed into an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life 
no longer’.20
The second objective of the thesis, directly emerging out from the first, is based on the hopes 
to rehabilitate Adorno in light of the historical contingencies of our epoch. To be sure this 
attempt is not novel. Fredric Jameson’s Late Marxism in 1990 is symptomatic of the nuanced 
hermeneutic that has emerged in regard to Adorno’s oeuvre.“1 Although faulted by many in 
its interpretation of Adorno’s negative dialectics as the quintessential form of Marxism for 
the 1990s, the era which was defined by the apogee of poststructuralist thought, Jameson 
nevertheless sets the stage for a more sympathetic re-reading of Adorno. This culminates in 
the spring-summer special edition that the journal New German Critique on the different 
aspects of Adorno's work that still have so much to offer to contemporary theorising.22
1.2.1 Historical Conditions.
The current attempt therefore takes very seriously the view that the theoretical weaknesses 
inherent in Habermas's theory of society render his political philosophy ill-equipped to face 
the challenges of the new millennium. These challenges are contextualized within an 
emerging global order that at face value seems bent on reintroducing a form of abstraction 
that would inevitably wreak ‘violence’ on those that fall outside its optical gaze. Indeed, by 
attempting to construct a framework where everyone becomes associated in a ‘global
,s Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic o f  Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, translated by Edmund 
Jephcott, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). This seminal text will be referred to as the Dialectic from here 
onwards.
19 He argued that, ‘[T]he only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint o f redemption’. See 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from damaged Life. Translated by E F N Jephcott (London:
NLB, 1974) p. 247.
20 Ibid, p. 15.
21 Frcdrie Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the persistence o f the dialectic, (London: Verso, 1990).
Compare this with the more pessimistic assessment of Adorno in Fredric Jameson Marxism and Form: 
Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories o f Literature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 58.
22 See issues in New German Critique, no. 56, (1992).
15
village’, the neoliberal order runs the risk of an abstraction that will, by necessity, perpetuate 
the violence on the particular and non-conformity.
The new development and its universalist impulse is a troubling one, to say the least, for 
people already on the margins of this political and economic matrix. It is as if we are being 
told to conform once again to the conceptual categorization that comes with a new order. 
Others who have dared to differ have been at best demonized or, at worst, forced to conform 
via the use of economic sanctions and military might. In this way the slogan of ‘Might is 
Right’ becomes a simple variation of the positivist belief in the correspondence between 
concepts and their material exemplifications (objects). Conceptual thought, a way of thinking 
that has been criticised for its repressive stance against any form of ‘difference’, seems to 
have regained lost ground in the aftermath of the perceived demise of the ‘Left’. In Adornian 
parlance, a new idealism seems to be on the horizon: an idealism that symbolizes that 
universalism is destined to triumph against the particular once again. This will, amongst 
other things, render context-dependent moral and ethical considerations problematic. The 
sense of disempowerment that accompanies this seems to have already encapsulated the spirit 
of the age.
The suggestion for a return to Adorno has a few implications. These implications in turn 
become my working hypotheses in the course of this project. They are as follows:
1. that Habermas misrepresented key motifs in Adorno’s social philosophy on the way 
to articulating a theory of Communicative Action
2. that a reappraisal of Adorno has shed new light on his oeuvre and its continued 
contemporary relevance
3. that contemporary conditions are but an apotheosis of the environment that was 
blisteringly critiqued by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic o f Enlightenment
4. that the ‘linguistic turn’ in Habermas does not, as he claimed, constitute a step 
forward out of the epistemological paradox that he perceived to be inherent in the 
Dialectic o f Enligh ten ment.
In light of these implications, my hypothesis is that the turn to a universal pragmatics is a 
turn in a different direction, so much so that Habermas risks getting ensnared within 
paradoxes that were the products of an ill-advised abandonment of the central thesis of
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Dialectic o f Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics as well as Aesthetic Theory.23 This 
hypothesis is driven by the belief that despite their differences, Adorno and Habermas still 
have much in common. Indeed the feasibility of the current endeavour stems from the fact 
that upon closer examination, the differences between the works of Habermas and those of 
Adorno are not such that they constitute ‘incommensurable language games’. In fact the 
continuities are such that they warrant a closer examination of the possibility of a 
‘hermeneutical fusion’ in their philosophical outlooks. In Kantian terms, the conditions of 
possibility of the project stem from a shared concern, between these philosophers, for reason 
to be more reflective of its powers and limitations. The dissertation is guided by the belief 
that the weaknesses in Habermas’s theory of communicative action, and by extension his 
political philosophy, will benefit immensely from a new form of hermeneutics inspired by a 
return to Adorno.
1.3 An Outline of the Chapters.
The overall structure of the thesis revolves around its main thematic argument that 
Habermas's notion of the public sphere is fraught with weaknesses. There is no other ideal 
place to start with than the Dialectic if we are to have a historical sense of the philosophical 
problems Habermas was trying to overcome as it is here that Habermas locates the rupture 
between him and his theoretical forebears. Chapter 2 therefore starts the discussion by 
examining some of the basic motivations that drove the authors of the Dialectic to display 
such a pessimistic view of social reality. In so doing the chapter will tease out some of the 
Dialectic's seminal arguments, restating its central motifs as well as their antecedents. It will 
then go on to highlight the two different paths taken by Habermas and Adorno as a result of 
their interpretation of the arguments inherent within this seminal paper: Habermas’s path led 
to a deontological approach based on intersubjectivity while Adorno’s led to a searing 
critique of subjectivity based on a dialectics that eschews any form of idealistic ‘closure’ in 
the process of knowledge production.
Chapter 3 outlines the path that Habermas took, by giving an account of the theoretical 
contours of his approach and the traditions that it drew from. In this way the connection will
23 Gillian Rose notes the continuity inherent in Adorno's writings. So while the main framework of re­
examining Habermas will be from Negative Dialectics, pertinent motifs from Adorno’s other works will also 
be used, see Gillian Rose, ‘Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno’, The American Political Science Review, 
Volume 70, No. 2 (June 1976) pp. 598-599.
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be made between Habermas’s critique of the Dialectic and the emergence of his 
communicative theory of society. For Habermas, the Theory o f Communicative Action is the 
culmination of an attempt to identify the only viable ‘exit’ from the theoretical cul-de-sac 
that, in his view, the Dialectic ended in. He locates this 'way out’ within the linguistic 
structures of speech acts. By dividing society up into two components regulated by 
linguistified and de-linguistified social processes of integration, Habermas hopes to achieve 
two overlapping objectives: First, to rejuvenate a critical theory of society that hitherto was 
mired in the aporias of the philosophy of consciousness while, secondly, delineating a way 
forward in which emancipatory politics can take place without the abject pessimism that 
usually gives way to cynicism as well as nihilistic predispositions in political praxis. This is 
to say the two-tier model of society is Habermas’s rejoinder to the problem of subject-centred 
philosophy and the kind of political practises that ensue from it. The second part of the 
chapter makes the connection between the theory of communicative action and its political 
correlate -  the Public Sphere. One of the obvious advantages of approaching the public 
sphere this way, is that it allows you to examine the trajectory of Habermas’s thoughts from 
his original publication on the subject in 1962, Structural Transformation o f the Public 
Sphere to the publication of Between Facts and Norms.24
Chapter 4 explores in some detail the major suppositions behind Adorno’s adoption of a 
‘negative dialectics’. As such the chapter includes an adumbration of the path that Adorno 
took, by showing the continuity of the arguments of the Dialectic with the central principles 
of Negative Dialectics. Unlike Habermas who, as is seen in chapter 3, moves away from 
subject-centred philosophy, Adorno in Negative Dialectics calls for a new stance for 
processes of cognition, a stance that is rooted in a defiance against the power of subjectivity 
a power whose dynamics are quintessentially shown by Hegelian dialectics. The new 
stance consists of moving away from the affirmation associated with Hegel to more 
negativity. In other words, a negation of negation, for Adorno, culminates in a negative 
dialectics instead of positive affirmation. In identifying the tenets of Negative Dialectics, 
attention will also be paid to its heritage. Given this, an attempt will be made to highlight its 
relevancy as well as its limitations. As such, trajectories of thought from Kant to Hegel as 
well as to other schools of thought such as fundamental ontology and existentialism are 
discussed and evaluated in the way they orbit each other, as though they form a constellation
:4 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
translated by William Rehg, (Cambridge: MIT, 1996).
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in Adorno’s writings. Habermas is by no means the only theorist from the Frankfurt School 
whose disparate writings are held together by a common vision. His mentor, Adorno, is also 
known for this. The latter’s analyses, from the ‘tonal’ music of Schoenberg to his 
philosophical articulation of the universal and the particular as well as his discussion on 
capitalist modernity are held together by a unitary vision that is underpinned by an overriding 
concern for difference or the ‘other’.25 Thus in light of this continuity there is no tension if 
Negative Dialectics is to be used as the principal document while overtures are to be made to 
other key works including Aesthetic Theory’J) and Critical Models21.
Chapter 5 signals the beginning of a critical interrogation of Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action that fonns part of the backbone of the whole dissertation. Specifically, 
the chapter launches an immanent critique against the theoretical moorings of the theory of 
communicative action. An immanent critique is one that is conducted from within; that is, a 
critique based on the tension between the stated objectives of the framework and how it 
actually ‘pans’ out in reality. The main argument in this chapter is that there is a 
discontinuity between the stated aims of the theory of communicative action and how this 
theory turns out in light of our contemporary conditions. On one hand, Habermas’s turn to a 
universal pragmatics spells, for him, the deliverance of philosophy from the problems that 
have accompanied modern thought since Kant. Yet, as we see in this chapter, the 
suppositions behind the rules of language use are problematic when evaluated against the 
emerging pluralities of the social, which is the hallmark of the period associated with 
modernity. This yardstick regulates the tenor of the critique in this chapter. Apparent also in 
chapter 5 is the establishment of the linkages that will set the tone for the next chapter. In 
other words, the chapter, in teasing out the foibles associated with the linguistic turn also, at 
the same moment, starts to work out how these weaknesses are carried over to the internal 
dynamics of the public sphere. The implications, therefore, of the critique in this chapter are 
then re-cast onto the public sphere in the next.
Chapter 6 follows on from the discussion of the previous chapter, this time redirecting the 
critique towards the efficacy, or lack thereof, of the public sphere as a political device that is 
suited to the needs of democracy in the new millennium. This is done by a close examination 
of the fate of ‘freedom’ or autonomy within the public sphere. To be sure Habermas’s
25 Martin Jay Adorno, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) p. 23.
26Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot-Kcntor, (London: Continuum, 1997).
27 Theodor W Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, translated by Henry W Pickford, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998/2005).
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concept of the public sphere continues to exert considerable influence on the political agenda 
of a broad spectrum of positions ranging from democratic movements emerging from the 
ashes of totalitarian regimes to smaller social movements seeking empowerment within the 
interstices of more established democratic environs. Historically this concept stems from two 
interrelated developments: the publication of Habermas’s work on the subject and to a lesser 
extent, the interest in Hannah Arendt’s works on political theory.:s However, its reception 
has not come without criticism, the most telling of which comes from two opposing 
directions. The first of these is the critique mounted by the French intellectuals of the 
postmodern tradition and those who follow in their wake." The second is a sympathetic one 
and is generated internally from within the ranks of Critical Theorists working broadly within 
the contours of the Frankfurt School of thought.30 Chapter 6 tries to navigate between the two 
impulses by arguing for a return to Adorno and his dialectics. The chapter starts off by 
attempting to put to rest one of the most controversial allegations against Negative 
Dialectics: that it is incoherent as a theory of knowledge and incompetent as a political 
philosophy. One of the most common observations directed at Adorno is that his philosophy, 
unlike Marx, is devoid of an addressee. It is akin to a 'message in a bottle’ meant for a future 
assignee who would then reconcile what is in the bottle with the historical conditions of that 
moment. Rejecting this view, the chapter proceeds to problematise the public sphere by 
examining the implications inherent within deliberations that are regulated by discourse 
ethics and the way these affect notions of autonomy in political practice.
The last chapter sums up the whole argument of the dissertation by revisiting the arguments 
in the text and restating the way the current attempt is meant to further the course of critical 
interrogation within our contemporary conditions. It argues for the direct relevance of 
Adorno in an age where, in direct opposition to Habermas’s view, ideologies still dominate
Patchen Markeil, ‘Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habennas on the Public Sphere’, Constellations, volume 
3, No 3 (1997) p. 377.
29 These would include postmarxists such as Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, whose book, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical Democratic Politics (2nd edition), (London: Verso, 2001) p. xiii., 
professes to steer a path that avoids the universalism reminiscent of Habermas’s speech pragmatics and the 
politically disempowered radical atomism of Lyotard, who insisted that the plurality of ‘incommensurable 
language games’ renders any attempt at consensual mediation an abomination in the postmodern epoch for it 
masks a process of subjugation taking place in any rational consensual agreement between differing parties -  
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) p. xxv.
The Frankfurt School is a name that became synonymous with a group of mainly neo-Marxists intellectuals 
of German origin, all members of the ‘Institute of Social Research’, who tied Germany during WWII because 
of their Jewish heritage. Its inner circle of members included Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert 
Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Franz Neumann. Theodor Adorno later joined the institute during its period of 
exile in America.
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our social landscape. It posits some ways in which Critical Theory could appropriate 
Adornian maxims in an attempt to keep itself abreast of the new dynamics of the age, hence 
ensuring its relevance for the future.
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C h a p t e r  2
The Dialectic of Enlightenment as the ‘Archimedean point’ between Adorno and Habermas
2.0
Any discussion on the merits or demerits ofthat tradition of Continental thought that comes 
under the rubric of the ‘Frankfurt School’ will inevitably have to engage with the seminal 
text co-written hy two of its grand theoreticians. Such is the influence that Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic o f Enlightenment continues to exert in contemporary social and 
political analyses that any understanding of current forms of Critical Theory would be 
incomplete without due recourse to it.31 The main aim of this chapter is to delineate the 
original fault-line between Habermas’s Theory o f Communicative Action and Adorno’s 
Negative Dialectics. This is done hy tracing their historical disjuncture back to the Dialectic. 
The text thus becomes the basis from which the respective dynamics of the two paradigms 
are subsequently extrapolated.
The chapter starts with a sketch of the backdrop from which the Dialectic as a critique of 
society emerges (2.1). In true Hegelian fashion, the authors of the book remain steadfast in 
their assertion that the text is a product of its time, so an examination of the social and 
political conditions prevalent at the time goes a long way in the attempt to understand the 
impetus behind the unrelenting critique of society and culture that the Dialectic offers. This 
historical scrutiny of ‘the conditions of possibility’ of the text, to use a phrase from Kant, is 
followed by a discussion of the basic tenets of the book (2.2). Discussion here will revolve 
around themes that, in my view, play a pivotal role in the subsequent ‘break’ that Habermas 
makes from what he sees as aporias associated with the critical theorisation of the first 
generation members of the Frankfurt School.32 These include the nature of conceptual 
thought and nonidentity (2.2.1), the intertwinement of myth and enlightenment and the 
notion of redemption or emancipatory practices. These are the pillars on which the social 
philosophy of Theodor Adorno rests.
" Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic o f  Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, translated by 
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Henceforth will be known as Dialectic. The term 
Critical Theory will be used interchangeably in the entire manuscript with the 'Frankfurt School’ to distinguish 
this ‘school’ from other schools of thought.
n  The members of the Frankfurt School are usually distinguished in generational terms. First generation means 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Pollock, Benjamin and others while theorists such as Habermas, Karl-Otto 
Apel, and Wellmer are known as members of the second generation. Axel Honneth is perhaps the best known of 
the 'third generation’ from that school.
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Habermas's critique of the Dialectic which is based on his assertion of a ‘performative 
contradiction’ inherent in the text’s analysis follows (2.3). The discussions in this latter 
section are primarily derived from a series of lectures that together make up The 
Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity?* One of the more pertinent themes discussed in this 
section is the logical continuity that Habermas establishes between the Dialectic and works 
of what he tenns ‘black’ commentators of the bourgeoisie exemplified by Nietzsche and his 
modem-day followers. These modern day followers include such theorists of the 
poststructuralist tradition like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (2.3.1). This is done in 
order to illuminate the epistemological paradox that Habermas alleges to be inherent in the 
analysis of the Dialectic.
The chapter closes by restating Adorno’s polemic against society in light of the Habennasian 
claim of performative contradiction (2.4). The aim is to show the different considerations at 
play that propel each to different theoretical planes. The section also acts as the precursor of 
the new scholarship that has since emerged to rehabilitate the Dialectic and, by extension, the 
subsequent works of its primary author.34 This re-evaluation is the framework in which 
Adorno's Negative Dialectics is to be understood later on in the thesis. This final round of 
discussion wifi also serve to highlight the affinities between the Theory o f Communicative 
Action and Negative Dialectics as well as their main thematic disjuncture.
2.1 The Background
The ‘Institute of Social Research’, as the Frankfurt School is formally known, came into 
being on February 3, 1923. It was established through a grant that was generously made 
possible by one Felix Weil, whose father was a successful German-born grain merchant who 
plied his trade in Argentina before sickness forced him back to Germany.35 The perception, 
amongst ‘leftist’ intellectuals in Germany, which gave impetus to the establishment of this 
institution, was that of a need for an autonomous research centre that would not sacrifice 
intellectual integrity at the altar of party politics. In Germany itself the problem was one that
33 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
14 In 1992, New German Critique puts out a speeial issue to mark the renaissance in Adornian scholarship. The 
issue was introduced with a piece from Peter Hohendahl sketching the contours of this new philosophical 
landscape. See Peter Hohendahl, ‘Adorno Criticism Today’, New German Critique. No. 56, Special Issue on 
Theodor W. Adorno, (Spring-Summer, 1992), pp. 3-15.
35 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute o f Social 
Research. 1923-1950. (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) p. 5.
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could be located in the interstices of academia and party politics or between theory and 
practice. The Social Democratic Party’s (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)) 
ascension into power and its subsequent split into various factions with differing doctrines 
proved to be a dilemma for intellectuals ‘who still maintained the purity of Marxist theory’.36 
Compounding this fragmentation was what could only be termed as an intellectual tectonic 
shift happening in mainland Europe. Germany was, prior to this, deemed to be the heartland 
of the socialist intellectual and political traditions. However, the Bolshevik revolution 
changed all this with the new centre gravitating towards Moscow. This also meant that 
Marxist doctrines became increasingly identified with Bolshevik socialist practice, to the 
utter consternation of Marxist theoreticians and practitioners alike. Thus for Marxist 
intellectuals such as Rosa Luxemburg, the new directions in which Marxism, as both thought 
and practice, seemed to be heading was justified grounds for increasing reservations and
• • 37suspicion.
As if this was not enough, the ideological limitations imposed by positivist and objectivist 
approaches to defining and comprehending social reality further added to the consternation in 
the 1930s amongst Marxists of specific Hegelian leanings, as it implied that the age of 
speculative philosophy as well as social criticism was indeed on the wane, to be replaced by 
a new horizon defined by the ‘hard’ sciences. Karl Popper was one such intellectual at the 
forefront of this onslaught against non-objectivist approaches to social understanding. What 
troubled these groups of Marxists at the time was what they saw as the inevitable outcome of 
the new approaches to understanding: ‘the paralysis of social criticism’ in that period, leading 
to social and cognitive conformity.38 For Adorno, the tendency of the period to equate the 
‘real’ with the ‘rational’ highlights a conservatism that is inherent in all correspondence 
theories of truth and as such, precluded the emergence of social critique.39 In light of the 
daunting grip conservative variants of thought, such as positivism, have on cognition, the 
task, for Adorno’s critical theory becomes the attempt to break this hold. This would, for 
him, entail an approach that includes a critique of the idealistic assumptions embedded within 
Hegelian dialectics, an adaptation of Nietzsche’s critique of reason as ‘will to power’, and the
16 Ibid., p. 4.
37 Ibid.
,N Robert Hullot-Kentor, ‘Notes on Dialeetie o f Enlightenment: Translating the Odysseus Essay’ New German 
Critique No.56 (Spring-Summer, 1992), p. 101-108. 
v> Ibid., p. 102. See also Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right, p. 10.
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Marxian motifs relating to the alienating character of the capitalist enterprise.40 Indeed the 
intrinsic linkage between reason and power was further brought home, for Adorno, by the 
machinations of a fascist state to stigmatise, exclude and ultimately decimate those it deemed 
foreign. The collusion between the state, technology and capitalism convinced the Frankfurt 
scholar that humanity’s only hope lies in the adoption of a searing critique against the 
regressive tendencies immanent in Enlightenment thought itself.
The new approach to social critique was to be evaluated against a Kantian mantra that 
Adorno adopted; that is, the Enlightenment heralds the emergence of human beings from 
their self-induced immaturity.41 The specific way in which these different and often 
contradictory strands of thought were arranged to create an insightful critique of the malaise 
besetting modernity was pioneered in the Dialectic, co-written with Max Horkheimer, the 
then director of the institute of Social Research. It is to this that we must turn to if we are to 
understand the subsequent position of the Frankfurt School as well as criticism directed 
against it later on by one of its own, Jürgen Habermas.
2.2 Dialectic of Enlightenment as the narrative o f‘retrogressive anthropogenesis’
One of Adorno’s main concerns during the earlier part of the 20lh century is to do with what 
he perceives as the wholesale succumbing of thinking processes to positivism. For him, the 
hegemony of this system of thought, whose quintessential feature lies in the conviction of the 
veridical nature of the methods used in the natural sciences to attain knowledge and its 
indiscriminate use in all areas of social life, has led to the circumvention of the enlightenment 
process. Enlightenment for him, following Kant, is closely interwoven with the idea of 
autonomy. In fact the right kind of life can emerge only in an environment that is conducive 
to the expansion of human potentials to realise themselves. This, for him, has been stunted by 
the totalitarian impulse that informs positivist as well as idealist thought. In a clearly 
Weberian vein, Adorno posits that the dominance of positivism in the field of epistemology 
has a direct correlation to the complete suppression of human agency. In other words what 
makes a society totalitarian is not only its political, economic and cultural systems but also 
the specific type of cognition that drives these processes. The one cannot be divorced from
40 Marx's argument against the alienating eliaracter of capitalism as a social system was appropriated by Adorno 
via Lukcs's reading of it- see especially Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 83-209.
41 Immanuel Kant ‘An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?’ In Practical Philosophy, translated by 
Mary J Gregor (Cambridge 1996) p. 17.
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the other. Hence for Adorno, the preponderance of positivistic reasoning in the seemingly 
different political and economic systems of the United States, Germany and Russia in the 
1930s meant that, ironically, there is very little that lies between capitalism, fascism and 
Stalinism.
The hegemony of totalitarian impulses in both positivistic and idealistic forms of reasoning 
contributed to their scepticism of the proletariat as the agent of historical change. Given this 
loss of faith in an autonomous revolutionary subject of history, and the hegemony of 
positivism in both thought and praxis, Adorno and Horkheimer began reconstructing a 
philosophy of history that was more reminiscent of Weber than of Kant and more like 
Nietzsche rather than Marx. Unlike Kant, they viewed enlightenment knowledge as leading 
away from greater autonomy to the increasing retrogression of the human species. This is 
chiefly because of their belief that knowledge has succumbed to instrumental reason. 
Contrary to the materialist transcendence of Hegelian dialectics advocated by Marx, they 
argue that the improbability of a proletariat uprising lies not so much in a false consciousness 
amongst the working class as in the subsumption of all critical philosophy in a reified 
environment defined by the new conservative orthodoxies.42 In other words the problem 
confronting the belief in the proletariat as the subject of history, for them, lies not at the level 
of consciousness but at how this consciousness was constituted in the first place. To be sure 
there were two interrelated developments that were behind the jettisoning of the proletariat as 
the agent of revolutionary change. The first was the increasing incorporation of the German 
working class with National Socialism while the second lies in what Adorno perceived as the 
complicity between the American working class and the controlling dynamic of the 
institutions of mass culture.43 The Dialectic thus becomes an attempt by Adorno and 
Horkheimer to extrapolate on the root cause of the problems besetting their social world in 
order to clarify the lengths to which one must go if one is to try to begin addressing these 
anomalies.
The Frankfurt School, therefore, was guided from the very beginning by an interest in 
evaluating modem socio-economic and political formations. This interest is guided by an 
appreciation of the dialectic at the root of the Enlightenment process: one that sees the 
specific historical constellation of the Enlightenment as complied in the unfolding of 
machinations of the ‘World Spirit’. This is to say that the members of the school agree that
42 They include both idealism and positivism in this group.
" See chapter on the culture industry in the Dialectic, pp. 94—136.
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Hegel was correct in pointing out that the Enlightenment is to be understood primarily as a 
dialectic; a double-edged process that facilitates processes pertaining to human progress, on 
the one hand, and processes leading to its negation, on the other. These antagonistic 
processes are intertwined, thus progression -  or regression for that matter -  are both 
plausible. Unfortunately, Adorno argues, the influence of the Hegelian Spirit and its 
scientific correlate has pushed this dialectic towards a path of ‘retrogressive 
anthropogenesis’. That is, the underside of modernity seems to have found dominant 
expression in a particular trajectory of the enlightenment dialectic that has gained currency in 
the period of modernity. This, for Adorno, is nowhere as evident as in the rise of fascism in 
Germany, the nature of the ‘culture industry’ in America and the pogroms of Bolshevik rule. 
Eschewing the notion of a harmonious synthesis that lies at the heart of Hegelian philosophy, 
the movement away from Hegel was to have a telling effect on the Dialectic’s analysis, as 
could be discerned by the stringent tone of the text as well as its bleak prognosis.
One of the first lessons of the text is that the history of civilisation is one of ever increasing 
rationalisation and subjugation; progress has been matched each step of the way by 
decreasing human autonomy. This is to say that our own peculiar form of civilisation came at 
a cost to ourselves as sensual beings. The objective, therefore, is to examine the specific 
trajectory that has landed us into such a lamentable state. This was made explicit on the 
preface of the book's 1944 and 1947 editions, where the authors laconically state the 
Dialectic is to be ‘nothing less than to explain why humanity instead of entering a truly 
human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism’.44 Published at the end of the Second 
World War, the book explicates how humanity, instead of reaching the apotheosis envisaged 
for it by Kant and Hegel, has sunk even lower to the horizon of barbaric idiocy .45 By 
implicating reason in its positivistic guise as the sole determinant of a world marked by 
chronic social malaise, the Dialectic was able to put forward its thematic programme. For the 
authors of the Dialectic, instrumental reason with all its positive attributes was a deception 
wrought on humanity facilitating, in its destructive wake, the emergence of the ‘totally 
administered society’.4f’By conveying the progress of Enlightenment thought in this way, the
44 Dialectic, p. xiv.
4^  It is generally agreed amongst scholars of the Frankfurt School that Adorno was the primary author of the 
study based on the fact that the editing of the final manuscript before publication was solely done by him, see 
James Schmidt, Language, Mythology, and Enlightenment: Historical Notes on Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
“Dialectic of Enlightenment”, Social Research, Volume 65, No.4, (Winter 1998) p. 811.
46 The concept of the ‘totally administered society' is an exemplification of the Weberian influence in the works 
of these self-confessed neo-Marxists starting from Georg Lukacs.
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authors of the Dialectic hope to bring to light its ambivalence as to the final destiny of 
humankind. In order to salvage the enlightenment for humanity, reason needs to be rearmed 
with a self-reflective mechanism. Before this, however, reason needs to be made aware of its 
role in our current demise. This can only come by a critique directed at reason itself. That is, 
as reason becomes the handmaiden of power dynamics, the only avenue available for the 
redemption of the promise of the Enlightenment is to cast suspicion on the internal logic of 
reason itself. Reason as ‘identity thinking" must therefore undergo a process of determinate 
negation in order to expose its limitations. 47
So how did reason become enlightenment’s nemesis? To answer this question, Adorno and 
Horkheimer did a historical excavation of the emergence of reason through a reinterpretation 
of a character in the literature of the ancient Greeks. Western rationality, according to the 
Dialectic, first emerged as an instinctual mechanism of self-preservation against the 
perceived threat posed by the unknown of nature. In an ingenious rereading of the Homeric 
Odyssey, Adorno and Horkheimer were able to delineate the concomitant costs associated 
with the "enlightenment" that emerged as a direct consequence of this predominantly 
occidental mindset. This became the basis of their preference for a dialectical understanding 
of the enlightenment, eschewing any argument that sees the enlightenment as a uni-\inear 
progression to an ideal.4X The conventional wisdom inherent in the Enlightenment tradition 
of pitting enlightenment thought against myth is rendered problematic by their analysis.44 
Indeed they assert that myth is already enlightenment by its success in demarcating human 
thought from mimetic understanding, while their evaluation of the latter shows how it reverts 
back to mythology. That is, Adorno and Horkheimer went against the tradition of 
enlightenment thought by positing the genesis of western rationality as rooted not in a clear 
separation of enlightenment from myth but in their intertwinement. This thesis finds its 
exemplar in their inteipretation of Homer’s chronicle of Odysseus.
According to the Dialectic, the adventures of Odysseus as he returned from Troy to Ithaca 
represent a narrative of the emergence of human consciousness; a narrative that also
47 See chapter 4.
^Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer ‘Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’, translated by Robert Hullot- 
Kentor., New German Critique No. 56 (Spring-Summer, 1992) p. lit). 1 am using this newer translation of the 
first Excursus in the Dialectic instead of the original one in the book itself. Any other reference from the book 
will be acknowledged as from the Dialectic. Ironically the understanding of enlightenment in dialectical terms 
is shared by the great antipodes Hegel and Nietzsche.
47 The opposition between enlightened thought and myth is well described by Jiirgen Habermas in The 
Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 107.
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highlights the impetus that drove that process as well as its consequences. 50 The guile and 
astuteness showed by Odysseus in extricating himself and his men in situations of peril 
became the basis for the thematic statement, put forward by the authors of the book, that 
humanity’s survival strategies are intrinsically related to its own self-preservation. That is 
‘[B]y calculating his own stake, he negates the power to which he has put himself in 
jeopardy. Thus he repossesses his forfeited life’ . 51 In so doing, a new type of engagement 
with nature gradually comes to light in the Dialectic. It seems that in order to subsume the 
challenges that nature affords us, we need to engage strategically with them. In order to do 
so, we need a new way of understanding them, a new reason, that would ensure that we are 
not overwhelmed by nature’s forces. The only way to do this is to ensure that this form of 
comprehension is driven by the need to dominate totally what is being comprehended. 
Indeed, Odysseus’s triumphs in the land of the lotus-eaters as well as in the cave of the 
Cyclops, Polyphemous, from the sorcery of Circe as well as the bewitching allure of the 
Sirens, are made possible only by the employment of strategic reason (cunning). This 
reason can only dominate in order to understand what is in front of it. Hence nature is 
transformed into a world of objects to be dominated and manipulated by a reason that seeks 
understanding through suppression. As the Dialectic points out, this became the archetype of 
social behaviour that still is applicable today. This is nowhere so obvious as exemplified in 
bourgeois colonists’ behavioural patterns; ‘[T]he seafarer Odysseus cheats the natural deities 
just as does the civilised traveller of a later date who offers the natives coloured beads in 
exchange for ivory’ . 53
Exhausting the requisites of strategic reason the Dialectic moves on to account for its toll on 
humanity. It does this by arguing that the triumphs wrought by Odysseus in the face of 
adversity were not without consequences. Thus Odysseus managed to prevail against the 
forces of external nature only through a self-discipline that is premised on a systematic denial 
of his inner nature and longings. This is nowhere made clearer than when Odysseus ties 
himself to the mast of his ship and orders his men not to untie him under any circumstances. 
This is so that he may be able to hear the songs of the temptresses while at the same time 
avoiding the fate that accompanies this transgression. As the Dialectic puts it, ‘[I]n his
so Theodor Adorno & Max Horklicimer, Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment, p. 112.
51 Ibid, p. 116.
52 Adorno refers to this as identity thinking. For a ease of Odysseus being the representative of the bourgeois 
individual see ibid p. 109.
53 ibid., p. 114.
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bounds, this listener is drawn to the Sirens as anyone else. Yet he has found an arrangement 
by which, in succumbing, he does not succumb to them’ . 54 The price of living, therefore, is a 
continuous struggle against both outer (mythical powers) and inner (desires) nature. 
Wiggershaus explains this succinctly by observing that the 'mythical powers have been 
outwitted; but the victims are then sacrificed to the identical self in a different form -  they 
are internalised as renunciation’ . 55
All in all, the Dialectic puts forward the argument that the Odyssey is a narrative that outlines 
the systematic subjugation of external nature through a process of objectification by identity­
thinking and explains how this process necessitates a voluntary repression of inner nature. 56
The man of cunning survives only at the price of his own dream, which he 
bargains off by demystifying himself just as he demystified the external powers.
He can never have it all, he must always wait, have patience, do without; he may 
not eat of the lotus or the cattle of holy Hyperion, and when he steers between 
Scylla and Charybdis he must calculate how many of his men will be torn from 
his boat. He just pulls through: such is his survival; and all the fame that he 
himself and others bestow on him for this just confirms that the title of hero is 
won only by vitiating the urge for total, universal and undiminished happiness.57
The excursus on the Odyssey serves as a primer to the rest of the book. Lines of argument
that range from the self-destruction of the Enlightenment to the reversion of enlightenment
into mythology highlight one of the pillars of the text: that positivistic reason or conceptual
thought comes into its own by subjugating nature through its objectifying gaze. Furthermore,
the conquest of objective nature comes only through the systematic repression of its
subjective counterpart -  the self. This is done by way of a reason that has lost its ability for
self-reflection and hence has become a coercive power in the process. The one-dimensional
way in which reason seeks to conquer its objects is rendered possible, as shown in the
quotation above, through an exchange of incommensurable values: those between the
mastery of nature and the suppression of our inner selves.
Indeed one of the thematic arguments of the Dialectic concerns the 'problematic of 
equivalence’ that is manifested in the exchange principle brought about as Odysseus 
sacrifices something of himself (i.e. his inner nature) in order to conquer the adversities that
54 ibid., p. 123.
’’Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance, Translated by 
Michael Robertson, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) p. 329.
56 Rolf Wiggershaus explains this process by noting that 'Odysseus only managed to establish himself against 
the mythic powers through self-inflicted privation, by renouncing devotion, by hardening himself. See ibid., p. 
329.
57 Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, 'Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’, p. 122.
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nature forces upon him. Like Marx, the Dialectic articulates the exchange principle 
predominantly in terms of a ‘leveller’ of incommensurable values. In a discussion on 
sacrifice, the Dialectic highlights the affinities between this ancient ritual and the process of 
exchange as it occurs in capitalist societies. A sacrifice is usually a religious ritual where an 
offering is made to the gods as a substitution for a life already forfeited.58 Adorno argues that 
due to the incommensurability between the life and the substitute that is being sacrificed in 
its place, there is always, as a rule of thumb, a fraudulent dimension to the process. The same 
applies in the exchange of commodities. For exchange to take place there has to be a 
selective process where the general attributes, what Marx refers to as exchange value, of the 
two objects to be exchanged are identified and valued on the basis of an agreed criterion that 
by its very nature is always arbitrary. For Adorno, Odysseus is the quintessential 
exemplification of the modern homo economicus whose existence is rooted in his ability to 
extend the principle of exchange to all facets of society. Given the fact that Odysseus’s 
cheating of the gods of nature through the use of sacrifice becomes symptomatic of the 
modern trader who excels in expunging the incommensurability between unlike things in the 
name of commodity-exchange, there is really little difference between them. This is to say 
that both sacrifice and the exchange principle are functions of the need for self-preservation. 
Again it is worth quoting Adorno on this:
If exchange is the secularisation of sacrifice, sacrifice itself appears as the 
magical schema o f rational exchange, a human organisation for controlling the 
gods who arc overthrown by precisely the system that honours them.59
The same principle of equivalence that enables the exchange of incommensurable entities in 
the ancient or in the capitalist world (as trade) is the very one that gives thinking its mandate 
to define reality.
As we have just seen, the origin of this way of understanding, according to Adorno, is not 
confined to the modern era but is in fact coeval with the emergence of human consciousness 
itself. That is, just as the use of sacrificial animals is a symbol (substitute) of human frailties 
and plea for forgiveness enabled through a mechanism that involves an effacement of the 
qualitative differences between two variables that lack parity, likewise, in the modern world, 
trade is only made possible by subjugating the actual value of a commodity (i.e. the value of 
the labour that is used to make it) to market mechanisms (exchange principle). The mastery 
of nature, as evident from the concept of sacrifice, is then subsequently extended inwards
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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towards the self as well as outwards to others in our search for control. Indeed, ‘[Wjhat 
human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and 
human beings. Nothing else counts’ . 60 But the attainment of power comes with a price -  
‘estrangement from that over which it is exerted', whether it is nature or fellow humans. 61
Adorno refers to this strategic reason as Identity thinking. For him, identity thinking is a way 
of understanding the world based on an instrumental approach. The world as a consequence 
becomes an object to be understood and manipulated for one’s own benefit. This, for 
Adorno, is rendered possible only through the forced synthesis of objective reality with the 
conceptual apparatus of the mind. As such, things that are foreign are rendered familiar to 
subjective thought by means of the issuance of identities. In this way both positivistic and 
idealistic thought are manifestations of identity thinking. Yet for all its uses, identity thinking 
has always been vulnerable to its own logic. That is, it wilfully suppresses anything that it 
does not understand. In other words, it cannot even pretend otherwise. As an aside, this is a 
clear deviation from Marx’s concept of class conflict, for this re-conceptualisation of conflict 
as one between humans and nature suggests a more primordial origin of this conflict than the 
one suggested by Marx. 62
Identity thinking as an ideational expression of the ‘exchange principle’ subsumes the 
peculiarity of the object under the aegis of a cognitive matrix that employs only generalised 
concepts in order to understand things. For Adorno, the objective nature, or ‘nonidentity’, of 
‘reality’ is always subsumed under its subjective or conceptual component. 63 It is this 
problematic of unequal power between a subject and its object, or more specifically the 
problem associated with nonidentity that the Frankfurt scholar sought to redress as he probed 
into the possibility of disavowing the positive affirmation that is the hallmark of Hegel’s 
dialectics. Emancipation in this way would entail the freeing of our human nature through a 
relentless critique of a reason that seeks to subjugate systematically both external and internal 
nature. For this to happen, Enlightenment must be enlightened about the precarious 
relationship between its reason and repression. That is, reason must admit to the limitations
60 Dialectic, p. 2. According to the authors o f the Dialectic, this line o f thinking resulting in the de- 
differentiation of power and knowledge was introduced by Francis Bacon.
(>l Ibid., p. 6.
62 Herein lies the difference in their conceptions of power.
63 This problem is also evident in Kant, who canvassed the view that reason cannot access an object-in-itself but 
has to make do with defining it based on its generalised attributes.
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of its concepts through which it seeks to capture, literally, social reality. By doing so, reason 
will then become a vehicle that will facilitate what lies ‘outside’ it by lending its voice to it.
2.2.1 The delineation o f a ‘nonidentity’ o f conceptual thought in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.
The realisation of a ‘scourge’ that manifests itself in the distance between a ‘thing’ and its 
conceptualisation has long been a topic of interest among dialecticians. However, the ways 
these philosophers have elected to deal with the issue of nonidentity vary. Hegel, for 
instance, prefers to view it as a residue of a thought process that does not in any way affect 
the ability of the concept to represent an object as it truly is. That is, the nonidentity is not an 
intrinsic part of an object, hence any identity that ensues as a result of a conceptual 
understanding of the object is therefore true. In fact Hegel argues that the only possible 
actualization of the nonidentity in an object is in a state of ‘idle’ existence. 64 Thus the 
nonidentity is rendered inconsequential in the process of conceptualisation. One of the 
immediate consequences of Hegel's articulation of nonidentity as having a transitory 
existence is that it subsequently enabled him to view conceptual identities as stable and thus 
valid categories. By articulating nonidentity in this way, Hegel was able to imbue a 
philosophy of history within his grand philosophical system, one in which historical ‘forms 
of consciousness’ progress in a dialectical manner towards a final ideal state. 65 This is to say 
that for Hegel, history has a telos whose realisation will come about in a final synthesis that 
will see the emergence of an authentic identity or Absolute. In the Hegelian matrix, therefore, 
representation is determined by the dialectical progression of concepts towards a master 
signifier.
The fate of the nonidentity suffers a similar, if not worse, fate in philosophies that adhere to 
the correspondence theory of knowledge and truth. In these schemata, truth (identity) or 
knowledge comes about only through powerful abstractions that unavoidably entail the 
suppression of the ‘nonidentity’. This view lies at the crux of the Dialectic’s contention 
against positivism. To recast this line of reasoning, positivist thought arrogantly presupposes
64 Georg Hegel The Philosophy o f  History, (New York: Cosimo lne., 1X99/2007) p.36. Also see Fred Dallmayr, 
‘The Underside o f Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel’. Constellations Volume 11, No. 1, (2004) p. 
106.
^Robert C Solomon, ‘Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit’ In The Age o f German Idealism edited by Robert C 
Solomon and Kathleen M Higgins, (London & New York: Routledgc, 2003) p. 190.
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that a perfect symmetry between its concepts and nature is attainable. In other words, the 
internal dynamics of positivism is such that nothing is allowed to exist outside it. Yet the 
existence of the ‘nonidentity’ for Adorno means, on the other hand, that the only way for a 
concept to claim total representation of its object is via a violent abstraction that does great 
injustice to the component of the object that escapes conceptualization. This stance is 
encapsulated in his insistence that ‘the whole is the untrue’ . 66 Both examples above have 
been the sources from which Adorno’s critiques against both Hegelian idealism and 
positivistic philosophies sprang from, subsequently finding sublime expression in his 
Negative Dialectics.
To be sure, Adorno’s concept of nonidentity has its roots in the Kantian notion of the chasm 
that exists between a ‘thing in itself and our understanding of it. This comes to Adorno by 
way of Walter Benjamin’s theory of language, whose conclusion was adopted by Adorno and 
Horkheimer even as they shunned the theological underpinnings of Benjamin’s work in this 
area. 67 The Dialectic portrays this chasm as one ensuing directly from the intertwinement of 
myth and enlightenment. 66 Again, the specific phraseology used in this instance to denote the 
link between enlightenment and myth is to underscore the ambivalence of the enlightenment 
process that was extrapolated by Kant. Recasting Marcel Mauss’s anthropological discussion 
of magic and its role in the sustenance of society on a dialectical plane, the Dialectic seeks to 
highlight the fragile nature of modern civilisation through a problematisation of the Kantian 
duality of myth and enlightenment. 66 For Kant, immaturity and enlightenment are polar 
opposites governed by diametrical relations. It therefore follows that humanity’s liberation 
rests solely on its ability to escape from a mythic past that was governed by a self-induced 
immaturity that itself is spawned by the fear to trust one’s own intellect. 70 For the authors of 
the Dialectic, very little has changed as the poles are still intrinsic to the enlightenment 
process. In fact this process has seen the intertwinement of myth and enlightenment in a way 
that was not envisaged by Kant. The fate of human autonomy then hangs in the balance. 
Arguing that ‘myth is already enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology’, the
66 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralin: Reflections from Damaged Life, Translated by E F N Jephcott (London: 
NLB, 1974) p. 50.
h7 For an account o f the Dialectic’s theoretical debt to Walter Benjamin see Martin Jay, The Dialectical 
Imagination, pp. 261-263. A similar viewpoint is expressed by Gadamer in his philosophical hermeneutics: see 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics. Translated and edited by David E Linge, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977) pp. xii-xiii.
<lS Dialectic., p. xviii.
69 Marcel Mauss, A GeneraI Theory o f Magic, translated by Robert Brain (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972).
70 Immanuel Kant, ‘An answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment’, p. 17.
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Dialectic wants to dissolve the dichotomy due to the subterranean relationship it sees 
between the two. It does this by first explaining the thread that holds them together -  the 
principle of immanence.
The principle of immanence is one that lies at the core of identity thinking. Jay Bernstein 
clarifies this principle by noting that it works exclusively on a classificatory scheme. This 
classificatory logic eschews any form of particularity by adopting universal categories of 
representations. In this way,
an item (object, event, property etc.) is neither known nor explained by giving it 
a proper name; rather an empirical item is recognised, and so cognised, only 
when it is classified in some way, when it is shown, via subsumption, to share 
characteristics or features with other items.71
This means that the principle of immanence explains its objects of analysis using conceptual 
categories that suppress the peculiarities of each object and at the same time emphasise the 
commonalities between objects that belong to the same category. In other words it works on 
the idea of repetition; things are analysed by their affinities to other things that fall within the 
same category.7“ The deployment of conceptual reason to hide the particularities of a single 
event or object presupposes the idea of a sovereign subject. This suppression of differences 
between specific objects within a general category, in the area of epistemology, also 
manifests itself in bourgeois thought where all antitheses are erased, ‘especially between 
moral rigour and absolute amorality’ .73 Myth and Enlightenment thought both fall prey to 
this principle in their quest to ‘narrate, record and explain’ . 74 In breaking this duality, the 
Dialectic hopes to highlight the proximity of conceptual thought and myth-making. For 
instance, in the era before science, mythic ritual was the medium by which society tries to 
guard against the unknown (natural forces). The dynamics of this ritual revolves around the 
idea of imitation or repetition: ‘The magician imitates demons; to frighten or placate them he 
makes intimidating or appeasing gestures’ . 75 That is, myth seeks to dominate by way of 
imitation. Indeed, myth becomes enlightenment in the sense that the specific objective of its 
need to dominate is self-preservation. Science continues this practice of guarding against the 
unknown through a more direct route of enslaving nature: by claiming epistemological
71 Jay Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, p. 87. 
12 Dialectic., p. 8.
73 ibid., p. xviii.
74 Ibid.
75 ibid., p.6.
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privilege over it. 7<1 In claiming that its concepts are pure and true, science manages to hide its 
dominating nature and, propagating this untruth, reverts to mythic practices. As the Dialectic 
argues: k[J]ust as myths entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles itself 
more deeply into mythology’ . 77
Exhausting the theoretical exegesis that links myth and enlightenment, the authors of the 
Dialectic then provide an account of what they see as watershed developments in the history 
of the world. These are then portrayed as concrete exemplifications of their theoretical 
account of the subterranean links between enlightenment and myth. In fact the two 
excursuses as well as the chapter on the culture industry in the Dialectic are attempts at 
delineating this relationship. The resulting product is a book or a mimeograph that is quite 
ambivalent in its view on the collective fate of humanity. As a whole, however, the Dialectic, 
for all its pessimism, does suggest how we may be able to transcend the vagaries that 
Enlightenment has bestowed on us. This is by way of its discussion and reinterpretation of 
Mauss’s work on magic and specifically on mana.
For Mauss, mana is associated with the practise of magic in Melanesian societies. It is the 
power behind all forms of magical practises in these societies, the condition of possibility for 
magic. What makes mana important to the Dialectic is the way it becomes an organising 
mechanism of the unknown (in the hands of a consciousness) emerging out of nature. Just as 
Mauss sees magic as blurring the distinction ‘between actor, rite and object’ so does the 
Dialectic perceive magic as a sediment of a phase in human development that took place 
prior to the separation of subject and object; that is before the subject extricated itself from 
nature. At the same time, however, the rituals associated with magic herald the chasm that 
was to emerge later on between subject and object.7* The concept of mana, for the authors of 
the Dialectic, points to an alternative way of relating to nature. By reinterpreting Mauss’s 
account of mana and giving it a somewhat different orientation, Adorno and Horkheimer 
came up with the concepts of mimesis and nonidentity as organising motifs for emancipatory 
politics. 79 For the Dialectic these two notions stand for a mental attitude that engenders a 
status of epistemological symmetry between subject and object. Martin Jay noted that the
7(1 ‘Magic is bloody untruth, but in it domination is not yet disclaimed by transfonning itself into a pure truth 
underlying the world which it enslaves’ ibid., p. 6
77 Ibid., p.8.
s Ibid., pp. 84-86. It is in this way that, in their view, Myth is already Enlightenment.
74 This argument was made by Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the Frankfurt School’, Tcdos 119 (Spring 2001) pp. 
83-87.
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idea of mimesis in the Dialectic was appropriated from Walter Benjamin and was used by 
Adorno and Horkheimer as a way to lament ‘the loss or withering of a primal and inherently
benign human capacity to imitate nature as the dialectic of enlightenment followed its fateful
, 80course .
As such mimetic understanding stands in direct contrast to the enlightenment period where 
the relationship between the subject and object is marked by a correspondence born out of an 
illegitimate subjugation of one by the other.81 Ben Morgan observes that mimesis holds out, 
for Adorno, the hope for ‘envelopment’ between Subject and Object, humans and nature. It 
appears in the Dialectic to denote:
a loose array of physiological, emotional, psychological and aesthetic impulses.
The term and its cognates are important because they help Horkheimer and 
Adorno describe a particular psychological and emotional frame of mind, a pre- 
rational way of relating to the environment and to other people.82
By defining mimesis (and nonidentity) in this way, Adorno wants ‘to demonstrate that
apparently abstract thought processes were in fact unacknowledged emotional response
(,sic) ' . 83 In other words all forms of thought are driven by their somatic character or, to use
Brunkhorsf s phrase, ‘the “undomesticatcd” nature of life' . 84 Hence the idea of mimesis is
also used as a mechanism to counter the hegemony of an abstract thought: a thought that has
shed its entire links to the existential conditions of individuals. 85 This motif was to play a
pivotal role in Adorno’s subsequent writings.
By referring to a period marked by a mimetic quality that ensures that humans were in touch 
with both their inner and outer natures, the authors of the Dialectic were able to come up 
with an index of a transformative theory of modern society based on mimetic impulses. 86
80 Martin Jay, 'Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacouc-Labarthc' in The Semblance o f  Subjectivity: 
Essays in Adorno 's Aesthetic Theory, cd. By Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
1997) p. 30. Jay notes that both Adorno and Horkheimer ‘recognised the sinister potential of mimetic behaviour 
when combined with the instrumental rationality it generally opposed -  a potential realised precisely in the 
mocking Nazi mimicry of the Jews and duplicated in the culture industry at its most repressive -  by and large, 
mimesis served as a honorific term in their vocabulary’ (sec p. 30).
81 This would make this period pre-rational.
82 Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the Frankfurt School’, p. 77. Morgan got this definition from Martin Jay, 
‘Mimesis and Mimetology’, pp. 29-53.
83 Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the Frankfurt School’, p. 82.
84 Hauke Brunkhorst, 'The Enlightenment of Rationality: Remarks on Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic o f  
Enlightenment, Constellations, Volume 7 No. 1 (2000) p. 134.
85 Martin Jay, ‘Mimesis and Mimetology', p. 30.
86 This is in neither a call for a return to a primitive or mythic (pre-rational) past nor is it a reference to a utopia 
where there is consensus between the subjective concept and its object. Mimesis, as can be discerned from its 
use in the works of Adorno, is a psychological attitude. It is interesting to note that, for some commentators, 
what mimesis is for Adorno’s attempt to alter the nature of the subject-object divide can be compared with what
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These impulses, however, are being repressed because of the nature of modern reason and the 
language that it uses to define reality. The Dialectic posits that the link between thought and 
language, and how they both unite to highlight and celebrate the validity of the 'commodity 
form’, must be viewed with suspicion if we are to excavate beyond them for the sources of 
social malaise. This is evinced in the way discussion on the 'Culture Industry’ in the 
Dialectic revolves around the social repression that arises out of a false unity between 
conceptual thought and concrete reality. 87 ‘The concept, usually defined as the unity of 
features of what it subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in 
which each thing is what it is only by becoming what it is not’. In other words, Adorno and 
Horkheimer view thought in its positivist guise as having already lost its critical element, as 
it only asks how best to be of service to the existing order. It does not ask why it should be 
put in a position of conformity in relation to the existing social order. In failing to ask why, 
thought then transforms itself into an apologist for the status quo, losing its truth potential in 
the process. For them, critique loses its truth once it metamorphoses into a position of 
complete servitude in relation to the social order. 89 More importantly, losing this truth about 
itself means that unmediated thought or non-retlexive reason simply leads the way back into 
myth.
Thus the problem of contemporary capitalist societies is one that is linked with the 
hegemonic status of positivist as well as idealistic philosophies and the concomitant 
marginalisation of all other forms of understanding. Furthermore, following Weber, the 
authors of the Dialectic see the emergence of this totalitarian system of thought as being 
compounded by the belief of people who are deluded into thinking that the historical epoch 
in which they find themselves reflects the apogee of enlightenment progress. 90 They 
laconically explain this lamentable situation by arguing that, "Just as prohibition has always 
ensured the admission of poisonous products, the blocking of the theoretical imagination has 
paved the way for political delusion’ . 91 Just as myth already presupposes the desire of 
humans to expand their subjective horizons to the objective world, so does the apotheosis of
the ‘ideal speech situation’ is for Habermas’s communicative rationality. See Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the 
Frankfurt School’, p. 77. 
s7 Dialectic., pp. 94-136.
88 Dialectic., p. 11.
89 Ibid., p. xv.
,0 Weber noted that Modernity was the ear when we become ‘specialists without Spirit and sensualists without 
heart’ while all the more believing that we have reached an unparalleled stage in our development.
1,1 Dialectic., p. xvi.
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objective thought manifest itself in the alienation of people from their inner and outer 
natures. Reason in this way reverts to mythology.
The radical tenor of the critique in the Dialectic has singularly become the talking point 
between its protagonists and antagonists alike. For commentators such as Honneth, the 
seminal publication stands, albeit ambiguously, for a type of critique that seeks to ‘disclose’ 
the nature of enlightenment progress in an atmosphere that is thoroughly saturated with the 
reifying effects of the exchange principle. “ In a situation that is akin to what Dürkheim 
terms ‘anomie’, the disclosing critique becomes justified in seeking a criterion for its attack 
from substantive notions that inform our perception of the right kind of life. Others, like 
Habermas take exception to the Nietzschean moment that resonates right through such forms 
of radicalism; that is, an impulse that leads inexorably to an epistemological paradox or 
‘performative contradiction’. It is to a discussion of these differing positions in relation to the 
arguments within the Dialectic that we now turn. One of the motifs that also emerge from 
here, which will inform their later works is the conviction that a critique of any reigning 
system of knowledge in a society at any given point is also at the same time an indictment of 
all that is wrong with that society. This is given fuller expression in Negative Dialectics.
2.3 The Performative Contradiction of a Nietzschean inspired ‘totalised’ Critique of 
Society: Habermas and the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The indictment that the Dialectic suffers from an epistemological paradox is nowhere made 
clearer than in the lectures of Jürgen Habermas published as The Philosophical Discourse o f 
Modernity. 93 The gist of his argument is that the Dialectic adopts a Nietzschean turn that 
renders its critical intent incoherent. For Habermas, the reduction of reason to power has 
proved to be aporetic as far as the claims and intentions of the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School go. In his polemic against his theoretical forebears, Habermas contends that 
the analytic tone of the Dialectic is symptomatic of a radical strand of critique whose genesis 
can be traced to the ‘nihilistic dark writers of the bourgeoisie’ such as Nietzsche and the
92 Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society’. A fuller account is offered in section 2.4 
below.
93 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, pp. 106-160.
39
Marquis de Sade. 94 Indeed Adorno and Horkheimer discuss these thinkers explicitly in the 
Dialectic.
According to this line of argument, it was Nietzsche who radicalized the counter­
enlightenment discourse by casting doubt on the efficacy of reason itself in what Habermas 
termed the ‘totalizing self-transcendence of the critique of ideology’ . 95 In this way reason, in 
the Nietzschean scheme became subsequently an auxiliary of the ‘will to power'. In 
critiquing the Dialectic, Habermas points to the congruence of its line of thinking and those 
propagated by Nietzsche and his modern day followers, the French poststructuralists. By 
raising the complicity of reason with repression, the Dialectic veers away from conventional 
understanding of enlightenment thinking. 96 For Habermas, like Kant before him, 
enlightenment thinking is understood predominantly as a demystification of myths. This 
demystification process has two interrelated dimensions. The first is based on the intention of 
illuminating the difference between myth and enlightenment reason, hence a contrast. The 
second, following from the first, is the provision of a counter-discourse against the spell of 
myths.
As a contrast because it counters the authority of tradition with the non-eoercive 
coercion of the better argument; as an opposing force to the extent that it breaks 
the collective spell of the mythical powers by means of individually acquired 
insights which gain motivational strength. In this manner, the Enlightenment 
was supposed to contradict myth and thereby escapes from its power.97
In this way modern reason, for Habermas, has been able to defend its role as the guardian of 
the project of modernity. Through a hermeneutic re-reading of the Odyssey, the first excursus 
in the Dialectic, Flabermas alleges that the reason behind the Dialectic’s equating of 
enlightenment reason with myth, is to highlight a subterranean complicity between the 
apparent binary opposites. He notes that in doing so, the authors have rendered it impossible 
‘to place hope in the liberating force of the enlightenment' . 98 Yet he sardonically notes that 
despite extinguishing our hope in enlightenment thought, the authors of the Dialectic ‘still
"Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment’ 
New German Critique No. 26 (Spring-Summer 1982) p. 13. Also see Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity,
p. 106.
"  Jürgen Habermas, ‘Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment’, p. 14.
96 Ibid., p. 14.
97 Ibid.
,s Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 106.
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did not want to relinquish the now paradoxical labour of conceptualisation’.99 Herein, for 
Habermas, lies the contradiction within the text.
The problem as Habermas sees it is that by refusing to concede any rational potential to 
cultural modernity through what for him amounts to a controversial linkage between 
enlightenment thought and regression, the Dialectic falls prey to a ‘performative 
contradiction’. This contradiction comes about in the first excursus where:
[RJeason itself destroys the humanity it first made possible -  this far reaching 
thesis, as we have seen, is grounded in the first excursus by the fact that from the 
very start the process of enlightenment is the result of a drive to self- 
preservation that mutilates reason, because it lays claim to it only in the form of
a purposive-rational mastery of nature and instinct -  precisely as instrumental
100reason.
In other words, for Habermas, reason is the distinguishing feature that separates us from 
nature. Yet by claiming that reason is simply a tool of self-preservation, the Dialectic does 
two things: first it removes the potential of reason to be a tool of progress and, secondly, it 
equates reason with a truncated form of thinking -  instrumentalism. If reason as identity 
thinking is rendered complied with repression and if we at the same time only understand 
things via the conceptual schemes provided by identity thinking, then what we arc left with is 
the question of how to validate our own critique of society.
For Habermas, the inability to differentiate between varying forms of reasoning coupled with 
the conceptualization of reason in a one-dimensional manner (as instrumental or 
technological reason) raises a number of theoretical problems. Chief amongst these is the 
defeatist attitude that is inherent in a theory whose claims are supposedly rooted in 
emancipatory politics. Habermas further suggests that this loss of emancipatory potential 
results from a theoretical misappropriation of nihilistic tendencies embedded within 
Nietzschean philosophy. Nietzsche argues in the Twilight o f the Idols, for example that 
modem day institutions and their rationale are driven by the ‘drive to dominate’ or a will to 
power.101 In fact, this notion of a ‘drive’ or a ‘will’ is a leitmotif that runs through all of 
Nietzsche’s work. In contrast to the principles undergirding the philosophy of consciousness, 
Nietzsche puts forward the notion that man is just a compilation of different drives that seek 
to master or dominate the conditions that he finds himself in at any given time. Negating the
99 Ibid.
m  Ibid., pp. 110-111.
101 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols/The anti-Christ, translated by R.J Hollingdale, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1990) Aphorism 39 pp. 104-106.
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idea of the subject in both the Hegelian sense (as Spirit) and in the Cartesian sense (Cogito) 
or even the subject as the proletarian producer of Marx, Nietzsche canvassed the view that 
the subject is but an ‘ordered plurality of drives which discharges its will in relation to other 
such pluralities’.1(12 If we are to follow this logic then, reason, rather than being a product of a 
thinking subject, is solely generated by the need to dominate when one plurality of drives 
come into contact with another. The end result is a simple conversion of knowledge to 
power. Instead of enlightenment thinking and myth being seen as binary opposites, they are 
conflated or seen as equivalents, since both are deemed to be mere effects of the will to 
power. It is this reduction of reason to power that troubles Habermas. This reductionist 
stratagem will, for him, mean that all subsequent validity or truth claims are exclusively 
determined by existing power dynamics.103 What became valid or otherwise is just a 
reflection of the power constellations in society. Habermas highlights the problematic nature 
of this line of reasoning in his extrapolation of the different forms of reasoning in Knowledge 
and Human Interests. ' 04 In the final analysis the collusion between validity and power in the 
Dialectic renders enlightenment reason inconsequential by robbing it of its ability to 
adjudicate between competing validity claims. In this way Adorno and Horkheimer have 
moved away from their original position to a form of radicalism that cannot be legitimately 
upheld. Furthermore the radical critique of reason in the Dialectic signals a momentous break 
with the Enlightenment tradition towards a study of power politics reminiscent of Nietzsche 
as well as those belonging to the French poststructuralist school. For this latter group, power 
determines truth while truth cowers before power.
In a withering critique directed against the Dialectic, Flabermas alleges that the authors’ 
claim that reason is implicated in social repression cannot be validated, since the only 
criterion of judging it to be so has also been rendered suspect by its linkage with power 
configurations in society. Therefore to launch a radical assault on reason, as is exemplified 
by the Dialectic, will necessarily entail undermining its own critique of society. In short, this 
kind of analysis is self-defeating. The paradox, for Habermas, lies at the very heart of the 
performative contradiction that afflicts the analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer.
IU- Ibid., p. 83.
Ibid., p. 121. See also Habermas, ‘The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment’, p. 18. 
104 Jürgen Habennas, Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972).
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If they do not want to renounce the effect of a final unmasking and still want to 
continue with critique, they will have to leave at least one rational criterion 
intact for their explanation of the corruption of all rational criteria.105
For Habermas, the self-undermining critique of reason can only mean one thing: that the 
authors of the Dialectic can only base their epistemological critique on illegitimate grounds. 
In fact this nihilistic tendency towards modern rationality is also found in other examples of 
neo-Nietzschean scholarship.
2.3.1. Parallels between the Dialectic and the French Poststructuralist school
Habermas, to judge from the discussion above, makes quite a compelling case for the 
presence of an epistemological paradox in the Dialectic. But is this justification enough to 
conflate the analyses of the Dialectic together with Nietzsche and his modern day followers? 
Habermas certainly thinks so. To him, the authors of the Dialectic erred grievously, as far as 
the aims of their Critical Theory go, in appropriating Nietzsche’s self-undermining critique 
of reason. This prevented them from identifying an alternative way out of the aporias they 
had theorised themselves into.106 Habermas argues that, for the authors of the Dialectic, this 
‘will to power’ encapsulates the concept of identity thinking; that is, reason is generated by 
the fear of the unknown.1117 This fear of a perceived perilous environment provided by both 
society and nature in turn breeds a psychological need to dominate as a way of quelling the 
effect fear has. The Dialectic in this way continues to conflate reason with power. This 
pessimistic outlook in the Dialectic, Habermas continues, directly accrues from a triumphant 
drive for mastery on the back of a cognitive matrix informed by Nietzsche.
Habermas sees a similar vein emerging in the works of poststructuralists such as Foucault 
and Derrida in their attempt to radically critique the veracity of reason and the conventionally 
accepted equation between reason, knowledge and truth. Indeed, Habermas maintains that 
there are primarily two ways in which the self-referential critique of Nietzsche is manifested 
in poststructuralist thought. One is exemplified by Foucault, via Bataille, while the other one 
is provided by Derrida via Heidegger. Both are attempts at furthering Nietzsche’s radical
105 Ibid p. 126— 127 (italics in the original).
106 To be sure, suspicion directed at the curative powers o f reason for the problems of humanity has been an 
intrinsic part o f the Enlightenment tradition. For instance, the triumph of reason for Max Weber meant the onset 
of an ambivalent situation where humans become ‘specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart’ while 
all the time imagining erroneously that society has reached a level never experienced before. This condition 
finds its best representation in his metaphorical ‘iron cage’. See Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
o f Capitalism , translated by Talcott Parsons, (London: Allen &Unwin Ltd, 1930) p. 182.
107 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, p. 106.
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critique of reason. The latter does this ‘by way of a destruction of metaphysics’, while the 
former attempts a similar aim ‘by way of a destruction of historiography’.1()S Both pathways 
serve to highlight the extent to which Adorno has veered off the course established by his 
theoretical forebears.
Habermas points out, for instance, that Foucault's Madness and Civilisation, a historico- 
philosophical study in modern psychiatry that traces the history of madness in the 18lh 
century, shares the same theoretical underpinnings with Negative Dialectics^09. The 
relationship is underpinned by the romantic yearning to hear the authentic voice and 
expression of the ‘other’ of reason and not reason’s account of it. Just as Adorno argued that 
there is a facticity beyond the conceptual exemplification of an object that is barred from 
expressing itself, so Foucault believes that:
behind the psychiatrically engendered phenomenon of mental illness, and 
indeed behind the various masks of madness at that time, there is something 
authentic whose sealed mouth need only be opened up.110
Furthermore, Habermas continues, both Adorno and Foucault refer explicitly to the coercive 
power of reason in repressing the object under its conceptual gaze. For the former, 
conceptual thought dismisses the ‘nonidentity of the object so as to dominate it while the 
latter sees reason as holding ‘madness at amt’s length from itself so as safely to gain mastery 
of it as an object cleansed of rational subjectivity'.* 111 This recurrent theme, according to 
Habermas, runs through Adorno’s as well as Foucault’s disparate writings and revolves 
specifically around how certain discourses, including philosophical ones, came to dominate a 
specific epoch in history and in turn become harbingers of definitive regimes of truth and 
untruth.112
In providing us with a way of knowing the world, discourses became our only link to reason. 
This is how, Habermas notes, reason for Adorno became associated only with its
108 Ibid., p. 254.
IIW Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation. (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
1111 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 240.
111 Ibid., p. 239.
112 I have included both fonns of regimes since there is an important qualification to be made here between 
Foucault and Adorno concerning the regimes o f truth or untruth that in my view Habennas glosses over. For 
Foucault, truth is socially constructed via a power matrix, hence all truth regimes are in fact reflections of power 
constellations. For Adorno, the socially mediated ‘fact’ is false since it necessitates the repression of what falls 
‘outside’ it; that is the ‘nonidentity that refuses conceptualisation. Truth for him therefore does not entail power 
but the negation of it.
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instrumentalist version.113 The Nietzschean orientation that Foucault incorporates into his 
work can be discerned from his claim that since we can only think, talk or act by means of 
these discourses, it is logical to assume therefore that individuals are constituted by the 
prevailing discourses in a specific moment in history.114 By arguing in this vein, Foucault, 
like Adorno and Horkheimer, rejects conventional beliefs pertaining to the continuity and 
progress of enlightenment knowledge.115 Moreover, Foucault also challenges the notion of a 
conscious subject and the immutability of truth. In all these, Habermas accuses Foucault’s 
archaeological works of succumbing to the Nietzschean theme of a will to power. Indeed 
Foucault’s account of the formation and displacing of ‘regimes of truth’ is totally contingent 
on power ‘which appears with ever new masks’.116 Everything in this way becomes a mere 
epiphenomcnon to power and change occurs only when power configurations alter.
Discipline and Punish marks Foucault’s ‘genealogical turn’ from his archaeological 
findings."7 To be sure the shift is strictly a shift of emphasis from the study of disciplinary 
regimes and their relationship to knowledge production to an investigation of how knowledge 
is really a product of power structures in society. In the 1970s, Foucault began canvassing the 
view that his earlier ‘archaeological’ works must be reconsidered in light of the Nietzschean 
wi\\ to knowledge. The new ‘turn’ must not be read as decisive break with his former 
writings but as a refocusing of those writings to include notions of power and ‘power effects’ 
in society. His genealogical bearing now explicitly focuses on the material conditions that 
give rise to the emergence of certain discourses in history. Read in this way, Madness and 
Civilisation is a study of the process by which the insane are judged and labelled as such, 
condemned as ‘abnormal’, and put under surveillance by discourses through disciplinary 
institutions. The Birth o f the Clinic becomes the process whereby the clinical ‘gaze’ that 
exerts so much authority on a sick body is then extended to the rest of society, monitoring
113 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 120.
114 The parallel to the Nietzschean argument that individuals are just a profusion or multiplicity of drives is 
quite evident here.
113 Rolf Wiggershaus cites Foucault admitting that a reading of the Frankfurt school in his formative years 
would have immensely benefitted him: ‘If 1 had known about the Frankfurt School in time, I would have been 
saved a great deal o f work. 1 would not have said a certain amount of nonsense and would not have taken so 
many false trails trying not to get lost, when the Frankfurt School had already cleared the way’, see The 
Frankfurt School, p. 4.
11(1 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 253.
117 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The birth o f the Prison, (London: Allen Lane, 1977).
Ils Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, (New York: The Guilford 
Press, 1991) p. 46.
45
and controlling public health. 119 The History o f Sexuality continues the genealogical tradition 
by examining how discourses on sexuality are implicated in power. 120 Discipline and Punish 
highlights the collusion between reason and repression by disseminating the effects of the 
‘panopticon’ as a model of social surveillance that extends to all levels of society. The 
cumulative effect of these disciplinary institutions that house ‘experts’ armed with 
‘discursive knowledge’ is the transformation of society into a ‘carceral archipelago’ where 
the subject is decentred by the dynamics of a knowledge that is generated by power. 
Consequently, what we have are ‘docile bodies’ that, through discourses, are rendered 
malleable to the needs of the institutions. The genealogical turn in Foucault’s work is 
therefore an account of the complicity of reason with power.
Just as Nietzsche before him defined knowledge as simply a ‘will to power’, Foucault now 
sees power/knowledge as the basis of a disciplinary society. The moral implication of this 
move, for Habermas, is disquieting to say the least. Questions of legitimacy are reduced to 
power relationships in society, since the very idea of right and wrong is embedded within 
power dynamics. Moreover, for Habermas, this scepticism concerning the adjudicative 
functions of reason is something that both Foucault and the authors of the Dialectic inherited 
from Nietzsche.
The archaeological and the genealogical phases of Foucault’s work, argues Habermas, are 
interrelated in that the latter presupposes the former. As an archaeologist, Foucault sees 
history as pregnant ‘with the crystallised forms of arbitrary formations of discourses’ . 121 But 
it is as a genealogist that the Nietzschean impulse comes to the fore in Foucault’s writings. It 
is under the genealogical gaze that history dissolves into a plurality of discourses in a state of 
perpetual flux and whose concretised moment is but an effect of reigning power 
configurations.1“' The reduction of every occurrence to power is problematic for Habermas. 
A totalised critique of society, whether as an Adornian determinate negation of reason or in 
terms of a Foucauldian theory of power, suffers from a performative contradiction, because 
they both undermine the basis of their own critique. As Habermas argued, totalising critiques 
need to have a valid criterion from which to launch their critique. 123
l|l) Michel Foucault, The Birth o f  the Clir.ic: An Archaeology o f Medical Perception, (London: Routledge, 
1989).
12(1 Michel Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality, (INew York: Vintage Books, 1980).
121 Jurgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, p. 253.
122 Ibid., pp. 249-253.
123 ibid., pp. 126-127.
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Derrida's critique of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ clearly follows the poststructuralist 
critique that ended up with the ‘death of the subject' in the Cartesian sense. 1-4 His writings 
on Nietzsche’s Dionysian model are a distinguishing feature of his work. Derrida uses this 
Dionysian element to create havoc on the ‘text’ by ‘the joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, 
without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation’ . 125 By insisting 
that the world is a text, Derrida goes on to explicate how meanings are derived within ‘texts’ 
and how these meanings are contingent on certain power constellations. His deconstructionist 
approach to ‘texts’ has a dual role. The first is to illuminate the process by which texts 
produce meanings and truths. The second is to undermine these meanings and truths by 
deconstructing their logical bases through an act of wilful reversal of the process that gave 
rise to meanings and truth in the first place. For Habermas, this reversal ‘inaugurates the 
destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, of all the significations that have 
their source in that [signification] of the logos’ . 126 Derrida’s aim, of course, is to upset the 
balance of power that determines meaning, hence creating instability by showing the 
contingency and localized nature of all forms of meaning and truth. ‘Any orientation towards 
truth’, for Derrida, involves ‘a submission to the metaphysics of presence’ . 1 7 Deconstruction 
then aims at a perpetual deferral of a concretized moment that by necessity signals the 
triumph of a master signifier and the reversion to a philosophy of the subject.
The cumulative effect of these poststructuralist critiques on society is to cast doubt on the 
veracity of enlightenment reason and to render suspect its stated intent. That is, the totalizing 
and systematic thought associated with enlightenment is radically problematised with its 
truth claims coming under a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ . 128 Their critique became in effect 
an epitaph on the ‘project of Modernity’. However the ‘decentred’ subject in poststructuralist 
thought does not come without concomitant costs. There is a strand of feminism, for 
instance, which claims that the deconstruction of subject-centred reason sabotages the 
conditions that will enable resistance against tyranny of any form. Others, like Habermas, 
contend that the totalizing critique of meaning reduces validity claims to issues of power and
124 My discussion of Derrida follows closely that of Peter Dews in Logics o f  Disintegration: Post-Structuralist 
thought and the claims o f Critical theory, (London: Verso, 1987).
125 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (London: Routlcdgc & Kcgan Paul, 1978) p. 292.
126 Jiirgcn Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 164.
127 Peter Dews, Logics o f Disintegration, p. 44.
12s ‘Hermeneutics of Suspicion" is an expression by Paul Ricoeur to denote a type o f critique that is animated by 
the 3 ‘masters of suspicion’ -  Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. See Paul Ricocur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay 
in Interpretation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) p.32.
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as such negates the claim to rightness as a means to adjudicate between competing truth 
claims. He expresses the problem faced by the poststructuralists in this way: ‘[T]he critical 
capacity to take up a “Yes” or “No” stance and to distinguish between valid and invalid 
propositions is undermined as power and validity claims enter into a turbid fusion’. 1^  As 
such, a radical critique of reason that reduces it to an expression of power runs the real risk of 
being an apologist for the status quo. By arguing in this vein, Habermas aims to bring to the 
fore the affinities between the Dialectic and the works of Nietzsche’s modern-day disciples. 
Habermas contends that the incoherent and nihilistic tendencies intrinsic to their analysis can 
only further political acquiesce and social disenchantment in the face of despair.
Yet all this need not be, according to Habermas. Indeed the common thread of the lectures 
that make up the Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity is, according to its author, "to 
identify and clearly mark out a road indicated but not taken: the determinate negation of 
subject-centred reason by reason understood as communicative action’ . 130 Habermas 
concludes that the only way out of this impasse is to turn away from a philosophy of 
consciousness to one based on intersubjective understanding. This is possible because of 
what he sees as the ‘quasi-transcendental’ telos of speech. For Habermas, the performative 
logic of all speech acts is geared towards understanding and not domination. This highlights 
the basis from which Habermas then subsequently makes the ‘linguistic’ turn from subject- 
centred philosophy to a paradigm based on communicative reason. 131 For all its persuasive 
force, Habermas has, however, not quite surpassed the works of his mentor. Amidst the din 
surrounding the general agreement over what the ‘linguistic turn’ has to offer is a growing 
realisation that the work of Adorno needs a second, more careful, appraisal. This stance is 
clearly evident in the reconsideration given to Adorno by Seyla Benhabib, Albrecht Wellmer 
and Axel Honneth. 132 It is to these reconsiderations that we now turn.
124 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 112.
130 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, p. vi. This will be dealt with fully in the next 
chapter.
131 Ibid. From a perspective based on intersubjective understanding, Habermas alleges that the authors of the 
Dialectic got themselves entangled in epistemological paradoxes by putting a Nietzschean twist to their 
coupling of Lukacs’s concept of reification and Weber’s thesis of rationalisation. For an account of the 
Habermasian notion of intersubjective understanding rooted in speech see his essay titled ‘What is Universal 
Pragmatics?’ in Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution o f Society, translated by Thomas 
McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1979)pp. 1-68.
1,2 A simple comparison, for instance, of the recent writings of Honneth in ‘A Physiognomy of the Capitalist 
Form of Life: A Sketch of Adorno’s Social Theory’, Constellations Volume 12 Number 1(2005) and ‘The 
Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic o f Enlightenment in light of current debates in
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2.4 A Hermeneutic of a ‘Damaged’ life as Disclosing Critique: A Tentative First 
Defence of Adorno’s Anti-Positivist stance in the Dialectic.
Axel Honneth, in an engaging discussion of the Dialectic, highlights that one of the primary 
causes of misreading Adorno stems from the tendency to consider his philosophical, 
sociological and aesthetic writings in isolation from each other. 133 To treat his sociological 
writings as a body of self-contained truths about society would liquidate the vital connection 
between his sociological, philosophical and aesthetics oeuvre. 134 This unfortunate tendency is 
in direct contradiction to Adorno’s practice of viewing ‘even his sociological analyses only 
as part of the hermeneutic of natural disaster he had presented’ . 135 Adorno's main aim for his 
sociological writings therefore was to reveal ‘the second, reified nature of historical reality’ 
in order ‘to expose the determining figures of action and consciousness’ . 136 By juxtaposing 
the socio-economic and political dynamics of this period with their interpretation of the 
historical trajectory of the enlightenment as a hermeneutic of a damaged form of life, Adorno 
and Horkheimer were able, like Hegel before them, to put forward the argument that the 
enlightenment has to be understood primarily as a dialectic.
To Honneth this amounts to a ‘disclosing critique’ of society, which is characterised by its 
‘trans-historical’ nature. Honneth takes great pains in distinguishing two forms of social 
criticism and their respective justifications. The first one is an ‘immanent’ form of criticism 
against perceived social maladies. A case in point would be social injustices wrought against 
a shared nonnative horizon. Immanent critique is usually directed at actions that contradict 
the cultural or moral dictates of a society. As such the criterion for critique is derived 
internally from the social fabric of the society in question. A ‘disclosing critique’ on the other 
hand is directed at what he, in a Durkheimian vein, termed ‘pathologies’. These pathologies 
have an ontological dimension in the sense that they may threaten the status of a society’s 
moral standards by posing an insurmountable threat to them. The reifying effect of the 
commodity form under capitalism can be classed as one such example of pathology. Because
social criticism’, Constellations volume 7 number 1(2000) with an older work like The Critique o f  Power: 
Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory, translated by Kenneth Baynes, Cambridge, (MA: MIT Press, 
1991) would highlight the ‘shift’ in his position in regards to Adorno.
1" Axel Honneth, A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life, pp. 5 0 -5 1.
134 ibid. p. 50.
135 Ibid.
136 ibid.
137 Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique o f Society: The Dialectic of Enlightenment in Light 
of Current Debates in Social Criticism, Constellations, Volume 7, Number 1, (2000) p. I 18.
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a ‘disclosing critique’ is directed at a situation that is fundamentally equivalent to 
Durkheim’s idea of ‘anomie’, its appeal to standards outside the particular context under 
critique becomes, for Honneth, justified.138
There are two types of social malady or disorder that can be legitimately made 
the object of social criticism; the second type which in contrast to social 
injustice I term “pathology”, in my view justifies transcending the given value 
horizons by means of world-disclosing critique.1 w
More importantly, recasting the critique in the Dialectic as ‘disclosing’ would clarify 
Adorno’s insistence that life under capitalism is one of mutilated existence or ‘damaged life’. 
Furthermore Adorno seems to realise the epistemological paradox that surrounds the idea of 
a ‘disclosing critique’ that would derive its criterion for critique externally. As Honneth 
notes, the context-transcendent nature of a disclosing critique warrants a different kind of 
approach: that is, ‘because it eschews metaphysical presuppositions, the normative 
judgement is not justified rationally’.140
From the vantage point of a hermeneutic of a ‘damaged life’, the Dialectic becomes not an 
explanatory schema of enlightenment reason gone berserk ‘but the hermeneutic of a failed 
form of life’.141 As it stands in the context of the 1920s to the 1940s, reason, according to 
Adorno and Horkheimer, was complied in the horrors of the Second World War. They were 
convinced ‘that the very concept of that thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, 
the institutions of society with which it was intertwined, already contains the genu of 
regression’.142 Yet contrary to what Habermas has alleged, the authors of the Dialectic had in 
the very next sentence highlighted the disclosing nature of their critique: ‘If enlightenment 
does not assimilate reflection on this regressive moment, it seals its own fate’.143 Read this 
way, one can begin to see that the alleged aporia that lies at the heart of all of Adorno’s 
writings, from the Dialectic to Negative Dialectics, is, in direct contrast to the allegations 
hurled at them, an assertion of the possibility of transforming the capitalist status quo.
1 Treating the Dialectic as a ‘disclosing critique’ would, in Honneth’s view, avert the charge of ‘perfonnative 
contradiction’ levelled against it by Habennas.
IW Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society’, p. 118.
140 Ibid., p.123. Also see Thorsten Bonacker, ‘Disclosing Critique: The Contingency of Understanding in 
Adorno’s Interpretative Social Theory’, European Journal o f Social Theory 9(3), 2006, p. 372. See also 
Adorno, ‘The Actuality o f Philosophy’, in The Adorno Reader, trans. B. Snow, and edited by Brian O’Connor 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) p. 31.
141 Axel Honneth, ‘A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life’, pp. 50-51.
142 Dialectic, p. xvi.
143 Ibid.
144 Adorno’s Minima Moralia has as its subtitles the words: ‘Reflections from damaged Life’. For a synopsis of 
the congruity of Adorno’s oeuvre see Gillian Rose, ‘Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno’, pp. 598-599.
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The guiding principle of this disclosing critique that Adorno employs to interrogate the 
Enlightenment process lies in the Kantian conviction expressed at the very beginning of the 
Dialectic, that ‘freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking’ . 145 To 
understand Adorno therefore one has to grasp the fact that his writings on society come under 
the rubric of a disclosing rather than an immanent critique. The latter is an end in itself while 
the former is a means towards an end. The criticism directed against Dialectic as a form of 
nihilism reminiscent of Nietzsche stems from misconstruing it as the explanatory model 
while the intentions of the authors point to it as a disclosing critique. Honneth observes:
What began as an immanently intended question as to whether a eritique of 
soeiety eould be eonducted consistently if it simultaneously doubted the 
discursive means o f its own arguments soon developed into the generalized 
suspicion that the project o f the Dialectics o f Enlightenment as a whole 
represents a form of critique that cannot be justified theoretically and is, 
moreover, politically dangerous.
This is what differentiates the analysis of Dialectic from that of the poststructuralist critiques 
of reason. In other words the critique of society is undergirded by some moral considerations 
as to what an ideal society should be. Admittedly this form of consideration is missing from 
poststructuralist analysis. For Horkheimer and Adorno the main intention of the Dialectic is 
to highlight the consequences of what they see as reified consciousness emerging as a 
product of the capitalist system. From the point of view of disclosing critique, the logic of 
this socio-economic model means that there is no space possible to imagine what the ‘other’ 
could be since ‘reason itself is reduced to an instrument and assimilated to its functionaries, 
whose power of thought serves only the purpose of preventing thought’ . 147 This lack of space 
to imagine the ‘other’ has in no small way contributed to the longevity of the capitalist 
enterprise. As long as reason is equated with identity thinking or positivistic thought, there is 
no way we are going to salvage our freedom from the clutches of capitalism. Indeed, the 
Dialectic claims that instrumental rationality undermines the zeal to overhaul our present by 
systematically blunting our critical faculty through cognitive and institutional means of 
control exemplified by both reigning epistemological and bureaucratic frameworks. In this 
way, Adorno argues, men are turned into objects, by others and by themselves (self- 
objectification). For him, self-objectification is an anomaly: the consequence of a warped
145 Dialectic., p. xvi.
146 Axel Honneth, ‘ The Possibility of a Disclosing critique of Society’, p. 117. Honneth puts Habermas in this 
category (see note 3).
147 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 123 (aphorism 79). This parallels Weber’s argument on how reason 
leads to the iron cage while all the while deluding people that it is the highest stage o f their development.
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transformation of the subject. The individuality of persons is systematically subverted by 
instrumental reason within a capitalist environment -  ‘The individual is entirely nullified in 
the face of the economic powers’ . 148 Under the ‘exchange principle’ in capitalist societies, all 
peculiarities that arise from the concreteness of an individual are obliterated. In its stead, a 
caricatured abstraction that sways only to the tune of total mastery of inner and outer nature 
stands. Hence for Adorno, the freedom of humankind in the capitalist system is far from 
being reassured. For us to begin the recovery process one must be willing to see the link 
between instrumental reason and our un-freedom. This is the context in which to gauge the 
merit of appropriating Nietzschean impulses within the Dialectic.
To be sure, the Nietzschean dimension that is interwoven into the analyses of the Dialectic 
stems from the belief of the authors that Marx’s critique of economic exchange, essemial as it 
may be in providing insights into the failings of the economic system, nevertheless needs to 
be reworked due to its ‘class biases’ . 144 Economic exchange transforms, as Marx states, 
social relations to a relation between things (objectified relations). In capitalism, the 
calculating and manipulative logic of instrumental reason comes to the fore in social 
intercourse. For Adorno, the transformation of human relations takes place at the level of the 
individual. By looking at exchange relations in terms of class, Marx risks obscuring the 
varying effects of exchange relations on specific individuals. These biases, in Adorno’s view, 
render Marx’s outlook susceptible to a variant of identity thinking that is consistent with an 
abstract classificatory system. This realisation of the complicity of Marx in the logic of 
exchange prompted them to turn to Nietzsche. The ‘turn’ is not defeatist, as it is an attempt at 
an alternative vision of society emanating from an enlightened suspicion towards an 
enlightening process that has succumbed to positivist thought and lost its critical potential. 150
In fact, the Dialectic is littered with passages that evince a nuanced understanding of modern 
rationality by its authors. For them, the yielding of enlightenment to positivism ultimately 
leads to the ‘barbaric’ environment that they lamented in their preface. In other words, the 
enlightenment as dialectic has, through positivism, oscillated towards regression and un-
148Dialectic, p. xvii By the same token, instrumental reason practised by the subject leads to the mastery of 
nature. The Dialectic is able, in this way, to identify the historical errors in Marx’s conception of the 
inevitability of a proletarian revolution. Its insistence on individuality marks a rupture between critical theory 
and both proletariat and party versions of Marxism.
144 Nancy S Love, Epistemology and Exchange: Marx, Nietzsche and Critical Theory, New German Critique 
No. 41 (Spring-Summer 1987) p. 71. See also Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An introduction to the 
Thought of Theodor W Adorno, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1978) pp. 44-48.
IM) Dialectic, p. 32.
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freedom. However, as we have seen, Adorno has always held a door open for resistance 
against this overarching system of domination that bases itself on reified social reality. 
Therefore in order to resist one first has to define the contours of what one is resisting. 
Adorno is of the view that the most effective way of defining what is to be resisted is by 
elevating its retrogressive aspects to an exaggerated level in order to illuminate them. This 
will stimulate the movement for change. Adorno in this way harboured a deeper Marxian 
moment than he is given credit for. Indeed he was paraphrasing Marx when he argued that 
‘out of the construction of a configuration of reality... the demand for its real change always 
follows promptly’ . 151 It is in this context that Adorno’s later work has to be understood. 152
Hence, as Honneth succinctly puts it, Adorno’s sociological pieces cannot be read on their 
own but have to be understood together with his analysis of the deformity of humans’ ability 
to think critically in a (capitalist) system that produces reified consciousness. 153 If we were to 
take his sociological writings in isolation from his philosophical considerations, then we 
would conclude that Adorno has assumed a defeatist attitude in light of reified consciousness 
that emerges as a result of the dynamics of the capitalist system. The interesting point to note 
here is that this analysis marks a shift from Honneth’s earlier treatment of Adorno’s work as 
a sociologically induced explanatory scheme to one that sees Adorno's philosophy of life 
under Capitalism as a ‘hermeneutic project’ . 154 This is but one of the instances where Adorno 
makes a definitive statement about an ‘oppositional’ form of thought and practice emerging 
out of the misery imposed by the vicissitudes of everyday life under the absolutism of 
capitalist hegemony. Time and again we see him making ‘resistance’ seemingly an automatic 
impulse in the face of repression. This is palpably made clear in his bemoaning the 
impossibility of writing poetry after Auschwitz. 155 Indeed, his lament in the face of the 
Holocaust was at the same time a rallying call for resistance against such atrocities against 
humanity.
151 Theodor Adorno, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy', p. 34 quoted in Axel Honneth, A Physiognomy of the 
Capitalist Form of Life , p. 51.
132 I am referring here to Negative Dialectics, Minima Moralia and Against Epistemology. See Gillian Rose, 
‘Negative Dialectics by Theodor W Adorno’, for an account of the continuity in Adorno's early and later 
works.
153 Axel Honneth, ‘A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life', pp. 50-64.
154 Compare the current argument with the one on Adorno in Axel Honneth, The Critique o f Power.
155 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, translated by Samuel and Shicrry Weber, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981) p.
34. Also sec Theodor Adorno, ‘Commitment’, New Left Review, 1/87-88, (Septcmber-Deccmber, 1974) p. 84.
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In Negative Dialectics, Adorno outlines a fonn of resistance based on his concept of 
‘suffering’ . 156 In a move inspired by Freud’s adumbration of how neuroses motivate the need 
to recover, Adorno points to the almost instinctual impulse to free oneself as we become 
aware of our own ‘suffering’ in an environment whose contours are to a very large extent 
defined by capitalism. For him, ‘[T]he physical moment tells our knowledge that suffering 
ought not to be, that things should be different’ . 157 That is, an awareness of the existence of 
suffering unequivocally points to a need for a remedy. Honneth sums up this situation 
succinctly by noting that for Adorno,
the negative feelings of a deformation of reason always bring with them a wish 
to be freed from social pathologies. To this extent ... suffering impulses 
guarantee the subjects’ ability to resist the instrumental demands of the capitalist 
form of life.158
Given the discussion above, we are now faced with a number of questions the most important 
being: how can this awareness of suffering be generated, given the level of the reification of 
consciousness in capitalism alleged by the Dialectic. That is, how do we mount a challenge 
against an instrumental reason that has summarily reduced objects to concepts in the attempt 
to claim mastery over them, thus producing an illusionary social world that arises directly 
from our diminishing capacity to reason?
We can discern the traces of an answer to these questions by looking at Adorno’s work on 
the development of reason. According to him, although Western reason has its roots in fear, it 
nevertheless develops via a process of mimesis. In other words our capacity to reason was 
nurtured at our mother’s breast, so to speak. By imitating the perspectives and practices of 
loved ones, we learn to move away from subject-centred positions to one that embraces the 
viewpoint of the ‘significant others’ in our lives. 159 This is a clear contrast to the 
Habermasian allegation that for Adorno, like Nietzsche, awareness of the self comes as a 
result of one’s mastery over external nature. As Adorno observed in Minima Moralia, ‘[T]he 
human is indissolubly linked with imitation: a human being only becomes human at all by 
imitating other human beings’ . 160 This process is, for Adorno, a primal form of love. Love 
for the other, which is premised on a mimetic procedure that occurs in childhood, becomes 
the underlying basis from which to reach beyond the objectifying conceptual screen that
156 Negative Dialectics, pp. 202-204.
157 Ibid, p 203.
158 Axel Honneth, ‘A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Fonn of Life’, p.61.
159 Ibid, p 62.
1611 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 154 (Aphorism 99).
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prevents us from acknowledging the facticity of the other on its own terms -  the nonidentity 
in thought. In other words, a politics opposed to the status quo is always a historical 
possibility enabled by a realization of one’s suffering, the awareness of which is, even in an 
environment of reified consciousness, always a given in light of the mimetic impulse. 161
The discussion has made it clear that there is more to Adorno than Habermas would have us 
believe. Even Honneth, who once derided Adorno’s social philosophy as an attempt at 
‘pessimistic self clarification [that] cannot commit itself to an idea of historical progress 
which goes beyond total reification’, has had reason to temper his readings of Adorno’s 
work.11’“ A disclosing critique is rather different from a hermeneutics of suspicion in that it 
holds out the hope for a future transformation of society as a result of the overcoming of even 
the most abysmal of aporias. In Adorno's case this will entail a new political practice 
anchored in a different kind of thinking -  nonidentity thinking -  which will allow us to see 
the glimmers of hope, a hope that continuously beckons to us in the midst of our suffering.
2.5 Conclusion: ‘Two Roads diverged in A Wood’.
The rehabilitation of Adorno has somewhat altered the dynamics pertaining to the output of 
the Frankfurt School. One of the factors that gave rise to this more open reception of Adorno 
is the realisation that the Dialectic does not support the supposition that Enlightenment 
thought is manifested only in the processes that gave rise to a new era of barbarism. For the 
authors, ‘what is at stake is not conservation of the past but the fulfilment of past hopes’ . 163 
In this way the Dialectic’s critique of the Enlightenment and its cognitive processes, in 
contrast to what Habermas thinks, ‘is intended to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment 
which liberates it from its entanglement in blind domination. 164
The discussion thus far serves to highlight the fact that Adorno’s and Habermas’s respective 
philosophies represent two distinct yet interrelated paths away from the philosophy of 
consciousness. The latter sees more promise in a communicative reason as a way out of the 
aporias of subject-centred reason, while the fonner sees no way other than to break the spell
161 Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 
125-126.
162 ibid, p. 109. As noted before, a simple comparison between bis account of Adorno in The Critique o f  Power, 
pp. 57-96 with ‘A Physiognomy o f the Capitalist Form of Life', proves this point.
163 Dialectic., p. xvii.
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of positivistic reason using the power of the subject itself. In other words Habermas offers a 
way out from what he sees as the performative contradiction besetting Adorno’s critique by 
turning to a notion of universal pragmatics. For the latter, the problem of contemporary 
society lies in its valorising a form of thought that is rooted in domination. The need for 
enlightenment thought to be reflexive is an oft repeated mantra of Adorno in the context of 
the disempowering effects of living in a mass consumer society, where the intellect is 
deflected from its true task of negating reified forms of life, by being made to be subservient 
to the social order. As he observes in the Dialectic,
[W]hat is at issue here is not culture as a value ... but the necessity for 
enlightenment to reflect on itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayed. What 
is at stake is not conservation of the past but the fulfilment of past hopes.16’
The next chapter will outline the main arguments of Habermas’s Theory of Communicative
Action. This will then be followed by a chapter on Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. The
discussion in both chapters will start from the contours of their respective theories of
society. 166 This is to be followed by an evaluation of their respective attempts to negate the
objectifying gaze of a reason that, by its very own logic, threatens the survival of humans in
their social environments.
165 Ibid.
166 To be sure, Adorno does not offer a comprehensive theory of society that is comparable to Habermas. What 
is being attempted instead is to tease out an index of his critique on society and from there try to construct what 
a theory of society from his perspective would be.
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C h a p t e r  3
From Subjective to Intersubjective Consciousness: Communicative Reason and the 
Politics of Emancipation.
3.0
This chapter traces the major contours of the ‘linguistic turn’ that was made by Habermas 
culminating in the publication of the two volumes of The Theory o f Communicative Action as 
well as how it presupposes the existence of the Public Sphere as a vehicle of emancipation. 
Habermas's theory of communicative action is the end result of an attempt to sketch an 
alternative route out of the philosophy of consciousness without regressing into what he sees 
as the nihilistic tendencies embedded within the Dialectic. The work is widely viewed to be 
his magnum opus, as it crystallises his earlier attempts at formulating a theory of society that 
tries to hold on to the Hegelian notion of a philosophy of history, while at the same time 
acknowledging the contribution made by the different branches of analytical philosophy in 
shaping contemporary life. The links between his theoretical and political positions, as 
highlighted by his concepts of communicative reason in a two-tier model of society and 
public sphere respectively, will in this way be brought closer to home.
The discussion starts with some general remarks on where or how to situate Habermas in the 
tradition of ‘Western Marxism’ (3.1). This is then followed by an adumbration of the 
contexts in which his theory of communicative action emerged (3.2). As would be expected, 
the discussion here will recap on some topical themes introduced in the last chapter as well as 
developing a line of reasoning that will take into account the historical trajectory of his work 
up to the time he wrote his seminal text. It also discusses the ‘communicative shift’ that 
became the guiding principle to his two tier theory of society (3.2.1). The next section 
continues on from the last by fleshing out his communicative theory of social action and 
what this entails (3.3). This discussion then goes on to consider what Habermas means by 
‘colonisation of the lifeworld' and the implication this has on his theory (3.3.1). It will also 
include the reasons why Habermas thinks that his new philosophy surpasses that of the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School and that of Adorno in particular. Finally the last section 
will work out the implications of his two tier model of society on contemporary politics (3.4). 
It is here that his concept of the Public Sphere is reintroduced as a prerequisite to a
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democratic model that is based on deliberative practices (3.4.1).1(1 One argument that this 
chapter makes pertaining to the ‘public sphere’ is that Habermas’s recent understanding of it 
is informed by his two tier model of society. This will be explained in the last subsection 
3.4.2.
With the above in mind, all the discussion in the chapter will be oriented towards the general 
aspects of Habermas’s oeuvre that revolve on his notion of a public sphere. In other words, 
this chapter will try to highlight the salient features of the Habermasian communicative 
oeuvre from the vantage point of his concept of the public Sphere. It goes without saying 
therefore that this selective appropriation will necessitate omitting and glossing over major 
elements of his work.
3.1 Jürgen Habermas and the tradition of Western Marxism
Western Marxism as a definitive school of thought is relatively of recent origin. In fact it was 
not until the mid 1950s that Merleau-Ponty came up with the name to describe a tendency 
within certain circles of Marxists, mostly in the West, to try and ‘balance’ the materialistic 
thrust of orthodox Marxism. This was done by a (re)turn to Hegel’s philosophy and the role 
of ‘ideas’ in the dialectical unfolding of a history that, in turn, leaves its indelible mark on 
these same ideas and corresponding consciousness.16*
The whole process, arguably, started with the publication of George Lukäcs’s History and 
Class Consciousness as well as Marxism and Philosophy by Karl Korsch and gained 
historical momentum through the rediscovery of the ‘early’ works of Marx.164 Hitherto the 
tradition of Marxism was informed largely by the ‘scientific’ works that Marx wrote after 
1844. What is distinctive about these latter works is the stress on the unstable systemic 
tendencies of capitalism as a social system. The discovery of the Paris Manuscripts in 1844 
signalled a shift to philosophy from economics and politics. It also denotes a move from
l<l? An account of the historical and theoretical trajectory of the Hahennasian Public Sphere (from the liberal 
public sphere as an ideal type, and its disintegration to the populist concept of the public sphere that he seemed 
to favour later on) is offered by Peter U Hohendahl , ‘Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture: Jiirgen 
Habermas and His Critics’, New German Critique, No. 16, (Winter, 1979) pp. 89-118.
Ib!< Martin Jay 'The Frankfurt School’s Critique of Humanism’, Social Research, 39:2 (1972, Summer) pp. 285- 
286.
,6<) Ibid.
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backroom vanguard politics to theorization in the halls of academia.170 The main reason for 
this shift is the bleak prognosis on the capabilities of a ‘materialistic’ Marx to transform the 
world in the face of a theoretically lacklustre experiment in socialism by the Bolsheviks in 
Russia. This was further compounded by the internal bickering between various communist 
groups in Western Europe as to the ‘right' way to revolutionary practice and change. It is 
against this backdrop that Western Marxism is to be understood. Indeed given the above 
scenario, the founders of this school turned to a Hegelian fonn of Marxism that propagates 
the view that a ‘correct’ form of society can only stem from a ‘right’ way of thinking.
Trying to situate Habermas’s critical theory within the tradition of Western Marxism is an 
arduous task. This is because of the breathtakingly eclectic way his theory has developed in 
conjunction with the, for want of a better word, ‘engagements’ that Habermas variously 
undertook in the course of his academic career with other schools of thought. These range 
from his contributions to the positivist debate between Adorno and Karl Popper in the 60’s, 
in which he sided with the former, to his engagement with Gadamer on the pitfalls of the 
latter’s ontological hermeneutics in relation to emancipatory politics and practice, as well as 
his exchange with Niklas Luhmann on ‘systems theory’.171 This is not to mention the 
‘borrowings’ from Dilthey and Pierce as well as from the sociological triumvirate of Marx, 
Weber and Dürkheim and later, Parsons.
To say all this however is not to admit to the impossibility of the task. In fact the basic 
contours of his theoretical edifice are still transparent enough for us to see its affinities with 
the tradition of Western Marxism. Perhaps the best way to start this process of situating 
Habermas is to take a closer look at the ensemble of ideas that make up Western Marxism as 
outlined above. For instance, the guiding motifs of the work of Georg Lukäcs, a Hungarian 
Marxist, began a new way of approaching the works of Marx that subsequently became an 
avalanche of epic proportions in the fields of philosophy, politics and sociology. This is by 
way of his moving beyond the materialism of Marx to elaborate on the role ideas play in the 
historical development of societies. As such Lukäcs brings into focus a segment of society 
that hitherto was considered as a mere epiphenomenon of the socio-economic ‘base’ in the
170 With the exception o f Gramsci, all other advocates of the position occupied university chairs in philosophy 
(Korsch, Lukäcs, Adorno etc) —  see Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London: Verso, 
1979) p. 50.
171 For an overview of the Positivist Debate and Habermas’s intervention sec Robert C Holub, Jürgen 
Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere. (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 20-48. For Habermas’s engagement 
with Gadamer see p. 65. His exchanges with Luhman are also outlined by Holub on pp. 106-132.
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orthodox Marxist tradition of the 20lh century. In placing ideas alongside the ‘base’ as co- 
determinants of social change, Lukacs heralded a Hegelian or philosophical twist to the chief 
variant of Marxism at the time.
In ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’ Lukacs attacks the dogmatism that he perceives to be 
inherent in the dominant strands of ‘scientific’ or vulgar Marxism. “ The conservative nature 
of science exemplified by the unproblematic way it equates capitalist reality with objectivity 
meant, for Lukacs, that the historical nature of ‘reality’ is suppressed. A dialectical method 
thus is needed to penetrate through the mirage of capitalist reality to its essence.173 In other 
words, the inner core of contemporary reality can only be ascertained i f ‘facts’ as they appear 
in their current context are ‘subjected to a historical and dialectical examination’.174 What, 
then, is known as ‘Western Marxism’ is based on the re-appropriation of the young 
philosophical Marx, who ultimately believed in the inner truth inherent in the method of 
Hegel’s dialectics. This move has a number of profound implications when compared to 
‘orthodox’ Marxism. In contrast to the unabashed ‘scientism’ of the latter, Western Marxism 
advocates a return to Hegel via the works of the ‘young’ Marx. That is, it espouses a 
philosophically oriented Marxism applied in a materialistic direction as opposed to its 
scientific variant and its related insistence on the immutability of the laws of revolution.175 In 
this way the dialectic as a method of social analysis that places a premium on the 
transformative role of human agency once again occupies centre stage within the pantheon of 
Marxist analyses.
One of the social theorists whose work played a major part in Lukacs’ reconstruction of 
Marxism is the Gentian economic historian and sociologist, Max Weber. In fact Lukacs’ first 
understanding of Marx was through the lens provided by Weber. Weber in his account of the 
challenges facing the modern period is one of the first to clearly highlight the connection 
between rationalization and the ‘disenchantment’ of the world.176 In the hands of Lukacs, this 
link becomes one between rationalisation and reification. For Lukacs, like Marx before him, 
the notion of reification is tied in with the commodity form which, in turn, presupposes the 
existence of a system of exchange via the medium of money. The logic of this system of
l72Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 1-26.
173 ibid, pp. 1-7.
174 ibid, p.7.
17’ David West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy (1st edition). (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) p.55. 
Also Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, pp. 41^t3.
I7<> Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic.
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exchange imposes a form of symmetrical equivalence between qualitatively different 
products through a process of abstraction. 177 What this means is that the ‘commodity form' 
has the tendency to transform relations between people according to the dictates of the 
principle of exchange that undergirds bourgeois society. Cumulatively, this process of 
abstraction, for Lukacs, culminates in a fundamental misrepresentation of social reality. 
Lukacs himself explains it this way:
The essence of commodity-structure has often been pointed out. Its basis is that 
a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus requires a 
‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all 
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation 
between people.178
This abstraction is enabled by a way of comprehension that is encapsulated by what Max 
Weber terms ‘formal rationality': a system of thinking that includes the ‘application of 
technical rules to external reality' . 174 This definition reveals the resemblance between 
Weber’s formal rationality with later re-workings of it such as instrumental reason, 
purposive-rational reason, classificatory thinking, conceptual thought and identitarian logic 
to name a few. Thus societal rationalisation, undergirded by formal rationality, becomes, for 
Lukacs, the penetration of the commodity form and its reifying effects into all areas of social 
life. Combining Marx and Weber in this analysis of capitalist societies enables Lukacs to 
attribute the pathological character of modern life to the dynamics of the ‘commodity form' 
under capitalism. 1X0
Members of the Frankfurt School such as Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer incorporated 
this Lukacsian theme into their works, most notably in the Dialectic. Just as Lukacs reads 
Marx from a Weberian vantage point, so too did the younger theorists of the Frankfurt school 
begin appropriating the works of Weber into their Marxian template using indices established 
by the older representative of Western Marxism. For example, Lukacs’ critique of the 
‘commodity form' becomes a generalized critique of positivistic thought in the hands of the 
Frankfurt Scholars. From this vantage point therefore, the common thread that weaves right 
across the tradition of Western Marxism lies in its inversion of Marx’s discursive itinerary
177 Benhabib notes that ‘The establishment of equivalence among qualitatively different things and human 
activities requires that one abstract precisely from the substantive concrete characteristics that distinguish them 
from one another’, see Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study o f  the Foundations o f  Critical Theory, (New York, 
Columbia University, 1986) p. 183.
178 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 83.
179 David West, Introduction to Continental Philosophy, p.68.
180 Thomas McCarthy's ‘Complexity and Democracy, or the Seduccments of Systems Theory’, New German 
Critique, No. 35, (Spring-Summer, 1985) p. 27.
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that made him move from philosophy to politics and economics. In this way, Western 
Marxism tries to examine the particular ways in which ideas affect praxis and by extension 
society. The whole of Marx’s oeuvre therefore in their hands,
was typically treated as the source material from which philosophical analysis 
would extract the epistemological principles for a systematic use o f Marxism to 
interpret (and transform) the world -  principles never explicitly or fully set out 
by Marx himself.181
By turning back to philosophy, Western Marxism became known for its incorporation of 
Weberian themes concerning the rationalisation of the world with Marxian tenets such as 
reification and emancipation of humanity.182
It is this context that has to be taken into account if we are to situate Habermas within the 
tradition of Western Marxism. The clearest indication of Habermas’s adherence to the tenets 
of Western Marxism is shown in his contribution to the ‘positivist dispute' between Adorno 
and Popper in 1961. In fact the position that Habermas adopts in this debate helps to 
illuminate how he situates himself within the tradition of Western Marxism. In that dispute, 
Habennas basically supports Adorno’s position by highlighting the limitations of 
positivism.183 To be sure, Popper also showed in that debate an ambivalent attitude to the 
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle’s affirmation of the possibility of knowledge 
verification.184 For him the epistemological standing of a body of knowledge depends on its 
being able to be falsified. In other words it is philosophically sound to build knowledge up 
based on his falsification thesis rather than on the idea of verification as mandated by the 
Vienna Circle. The main difference that separates Adorno from Popper, though, is a 
methodological one. Popper saw no problems in using the methods of the natural sciences to 
investigate social phenomena, while Adorno, like Habennas after him, sought a separate
18Sgrounding of the human and social sciences away from positivistic methods.
181 Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, p. 52.
I8~ David Ingram notes that for Habermas , Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness, defines to a great extent 
the importance of Max Weber to ‘Western Marxism’. See David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic o f  
Reason, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p. 60.
IMPeter U Hohendahl, ‘The Dialectic o f Enlightenment Revisited: Habennas’ Critique o f the Frankfurt School’. 
New German Critique, No. 35 (Spring-Summer, 1985) p. 4. A more nuanced understanding o f Habennas’s 
position in relation to Adorno is offered in Robert C Holub, Jürgen Habermas: Critique in the Public Sphere, 
pp. 20-48. Between Habermas and Popper -  see footnote 14 on p. 46 of Holub.
181 David Frisby, ‘The Popper-Adorno Controversy: the Methodological Dispute in German Sociology’, 
Philosophy o f  the Social Sciences, Volume 2, ( 1972) p. 106.
185 Ibid, pp 106-107.
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To be sure, the position that Habermas embraced within this dispute is not enough, on its 
own, to draw a link between Habermas and Western Marxism. An equally scathing critique 
of positivism, for instance, was launched by Gadamer from the vantage point of a 
philosophical hermeneutics associated with the Heideggerian school. The central categories 
of this hermeneutically-informed critique, especially its insights into the social basis of 
positivism was in fact appropriated and modified by Habermas in the dispute. 18,1 What sets 
Habermas’s position apart vis a vis Gadamer is in the deployment of Hegelian motifs in the 
former’s critique of positivism. It is the ways in which these Hegelian impulses infiltrate his 
work that leaves very little doubt of which tradition Habermas can be generally categorized 
in. For him, our current attempts to philosophize about the world still make us 
contemporaries of Hegel, however much we would like to think that we have transcended his 
system. In the Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, Habermas lays bare the thought 
trajectories of the young Hegelians by noting the common ambivalence these philosophers 
have towards the synthetic system of their mentor. 187 On one hand they acknowledge the 
profound way in which Hegel denounced the one-sided metaphysical formulations prevalent 
in materialist, idealist and pluralist discourses as well as the violence of omission that they 
perpetuate. On the other hand they are also convinced that Hegel's dialectical logic retains a 
contradiction that even his entire system could not surmount. This is demonstrated by ‘the 
gulf between his claim that the dialectical process, which unites thought and history, 
culminates in the fundamental triumph of reason and the obvious irrationality of the social 
world’ . 188 For the young Hegelians, the triumph of historical reason lies in the materialistic 
inversion of Hegel’s dialectics. That is, what is needed is a translation of Flegel’s philosophy 
into the historical realities of the world. 184 Instead of the anomalous outright triumph of 
reason over history, the young Hegelians sought to correct Hegelian dialectics through a 
historicisation of reason while simultaneously retaining reason’s historicity; that is, its ability 
to grapple and influence historical realities.
The unfolding development of views pertaining to Hegel’s dialectics as depicted above could 
be summarized into three basic steps: the first involves the recognition of the value of 
Hegel’s dialectic and his critique of Enlightenment as extrapolated from Kant. The second 
involves the materialist inversion of Hegelian dialectic by the ‘left’ Hegelians and lastly, the
186 Jack Mcndclson, ‘The Habcnnas-Gadamcr Debate’ New German Critique, No. 18 (Autumn, 1979) p. 46.
1X7 Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, pp.51-74.
Ixx Peter Dews, ‘Habermas and the Desublimation of Reason’, p. 3.
189 Rudiger Bubncr, ‘Habermas's Concept of Critical Theory’, pp. 42-43.
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scepticism about the ultimate ‘triumph of reason' in the face the irrationality of our social 
reality. This is to say that, in the eyes of these leftist intellectuals of the Hegelian tradition, 
there is a gulf between what is and what ought to be.IW Habermas thus claims that we are 
still contemporaries of the 18lh century philosopher in light of the fact that we continue to 
grapple with his thematic project, a project that seeks to reconcile contradictions in its search 
for absolutes. It is also here that the danger of travelling along this path is made cbvious by 
the Frankfurt social theorist. Hegel’s dialectic, according to Habermas, epitomises a mode of 
thinking that falls under what he calls the philosophy o f consciousness, which comprises all 
forms of thought which rests on the premise that any mode of cognition is, by logical 
necessity, subject-centred. In other words they paid no attention to the communicative 
character or intersubjective dimensions of reason.
The new direction for Habermas entails a desublimation of the World Spirit or reason as a 
historical subject. What this means is that the status of World Spirit as a historical subject 
must be reconceptualised to avoid the aporias associated with the philosophy of 
consciousness. That is, we need to shift away from this philosophy towards a new orientation 
that is embedded within the universal grammar of dialogue. For Habermas, the turn towards 
communication is not just one alternative; it is the only viable exit out of the pitfalls of 
subject-centred reason. It entails a new sensitivity to the way contemporary societies have 
changed. It also means, he further posits, a revision of the theoretical categories that animate 
the accounts of Weber and Marx. This if we are to preserve the emancipatory potentials that 
would aid us in the realisation of the enlightenment ideals. The theory of communicative 
competence in this way is seen by Habermas as ‘a second attempt to appropriate Weber in 
the Spirit of Western Marxism’, after Lukacs.191 More specifically, this ‘second effort’ is 
aimed at coming up with a more adequate account of reification that is more reflective of 
contemporary realities. As such, one of its more distinctive features, that sets it apart from 
Lukacs, is its more positive evaluation of the emancipatory potentials existing in the 
prevailing conditions of ‘late’ or ‘high’ capitalism in the West. This potential was less 
obvious in Lukacs’ seminal work. Ultimately Habermas’s ‘revision’ led to a 
reconceptualisation of the commodity form and its reifying effects on society, which in turn 
became the basis for a programme that explores the conditions of possibility for a rational 
society. To this end, Habermas’s Critical Theory basically reconceptualises Lukacs’ notion
140 An enthralling account o f the different schools of thought within the Hegelian tradition can be seen in K.arl 
Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, pp. 53-162.
1,1 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Complexity and Democracy, or the Seducements o f Systems Theory’, p. 27.
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of reification as the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ . 192 It is at this juncture in his development 
that the elective affinities between the works of Weber, Marx and Hegel coalesce with 
themes that make up the tradition of Western Marxism.
Later on however, the lines associating him with that tradition became blurred. The primary 
factor for this can be attributed to his ‘linguistic' turn towards a universal pragmatics as the 
basis for his critical theory. The new turn stems from a number of critical considerations, the 
most pressing of which is his conviction that the aporias associated with the philosophy of 
consciousness or subject-centred reason could be, in part, due to the fact that the logic of 
material development (within instrumental rationality) does not in any way contribute to a 
corresponding development at the level of intersubjectivity. 193 The specific thrust of 
Habermas’s turn, however, did not arise from a blanket rejection of subject-centred 
philosophy. 194 Indeed he recognizes the outstanding contribution of this mode of thought to 
the survival of the human species. His problem with subject-centred reason however lies in 
the way it transforms science into an immutable dogma. 193 In so doing the philosophy of 
consciousness precludes any attempt by thought to reflect on itself. This lack of reflection 
stultifies reason's potential to recognise its communicative dimension. The failure to do so, 
according to Habermas, reduces thought to positivism. This is the main reason why, in his 
view, Horkheimer and Adorno could not find an exit out of the dilemma evinced in their 
critique of reason in the Dialectic.
For Habermas the exit lies in the move towards a communicative reason that is geared 
towards intersubjective understanding. 196 In the first volume of his Theory o f Communicative 
Action, Habermas points out that the epistemological paradox that the Dialectic found itself 
in was enough to ‘furnish us with reasons for a change of paradigm within social theory’ . 197 
He argues that a reason based on universal pragmatics is by its very nature oriented towards 
agreement. As early as Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas posited that ‘Our first 
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus’ . 198
192 Ibid.
193 See Chapter 2.
194 He secs this as a major point of difference between him and Adorno. It is also, as is shown in chapter 1, the 
basis from which he mounts his critique of'performative contradiction’ against the Dialectic.
195 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by Jeremy J Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 
1972) p. 67.
196 This exit was highlighted by Thomas McCarthy See his introduction in Habermas’s Philosophical Discourse 
o f Modernity, p. x.
197 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (I), p. 366.
198 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314.
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This new turn shows the extent to which Habermas has departed from the parameters set by 
the Frankfurt School’s first generation of theoreticians as well as the continuity he holds with 
the emancipatory aims of that tradition. In other words, Habermas’s shift to communication 
was done to realise the explicit aim of the ‘old’ critical theory for a rational and emancipated 
society. The achievement of this aim means, for him, the completion of the ‘project of 
modernity’.
3.2. From ‘Cognitive Interests’ to a Universal Pragmatics
To be sure, the idea of a communicative reason has always been an intrinsic part of 
Habermas’s oeuvre. This is nowhere more obvious than in The Structural Transformation o f 
the Public Sphere where he analyses the processes of will-formation within different periods 
in Europe. 149 Yet he was too immersed in the analytical framework of the ‘old’ Frankfurt 
scholars, at this point in time, to immediately abandon their theoretical legacy that revolves 
around the philosophy of consciousness. Indeed Habermas harboured the faith that an 
epistemological undergirding of critique is still possible as early as The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, its communicative content notwithstanding.2110 It was 
not until Knowledge and Human Interests and its attempt to make ‘cognitive interests’ the 
basis for a rational critique of society that the insurmountable problems associated with the 
framework of the philosophy of consciousness became very clear to him. Contextualised 
within the years defined by the ‘positivist dispute’ in Germany, Knowledge and Human 
Interests, was meant to be ‘read as an effort to open -  or rather reopen -  certain avenues of 
reflection that were blocked by the ascendancy of positivism during the last hundred 
years’ . 201 This was Habermas’s answer to the problem of reification associated with the 
capitalist enterprise as was raised by the Is' generation theorists of the Frankfurt School. It 
was to mark the reinvigoration of critical reflection in a terrain that has given rise to reified 
consciousness, brought about by the socially debilitating effects of the instrumentalist logic 
of capital. 202 As such Knowledge and Human Interests marks a fundamental shift in
199 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, translated by Thomas Burger, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
2011 Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Philosophico-Political Profile’, New Left Review, 15 1 (May/June, 1985) p. 78. 
201 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory o f  Jürgen Habermas, p. 53.
2l)2Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 25-26.
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Habermas’s position in relation to orthodox Marxism as well as the neo-Marxist variant of 
the Frankfurt School.
The most telling of these changes revolves around the way he attributed different forms of 
reasoning to specific cognitive interests. For instance, Habermas alleges that for Marx the 
only appropriate grounding of reason lies in labour, whereas for Adorno and Horkheimer, 
reason stems out of an anthropological or human need to master the ‘fear of the unknown’ . 203 
Habermas posits, on the other hand, the view that instrumental rationality is just a part, 
specifically, one third of what makes up the whole critical enterprise. This position mirrors 
the one that Gadamer also adopts in relation to science. In other words, instrumentalism 
depicts one form of reason that correlates to a specific orientation or cognitive interest in 
society. This part of the critical enterprise is generated by the technical orientation that is best 
expressed in the empirico-analyticaf sciences. For Gadamer, reducing reason to 
instrumentalism gives rise to the emergence of a scientific-technological civilisation that is 
inadequately geared to facilitate intersubjective interactions between subjects ‘in whose veins 
real blood flows’ . 204 For Habermas, the reduction of reason to only its purposive rational 
dimension leads to the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’: a situation that throws up social 
dilemmas similar to the ones argued by Gadamer as endemic in scientific-technological 
civilisations. Following hermeneutics, Habermas argues that in addition to an interest in 
technical mastery of an objective world, we also harbour a practical interest based on a 
collective quest for mutual understanding. This practical orientation gives rise to an 
intersubjective dimension of reason that is missing in purposive rational action. Habermas 
charts the trajectories of these different forms of logic by observing that
[W]hcrcas empirical-analytic methods aim at disclosing and comprehending 
reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control, 
hermeneutic methods aim at maintaining the intersubjeetivity of mutual 
understanding in ordinary language communication and in action according to 
common norms.205
In addition to this, Habermas claims that there is a third dimension of reason: one that is 
made up of an interest in autonomy or freedom. This interest facilitates the emergence of a 
critical orientation that ensures the means to emancipate society remain firmly within the
203 ibid.
204 Jack Mcndelson, ‘The Habcrmas-Gadamcr Debate' New German Critique, No. 18 (Autumn, 1979) p. 45.
205 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 176.
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grasp of interactive subjects. This emphasis on a third human orientation based on freedom is 
where Habermas casts himself adrift from Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. 
Habermas’s main argument against hermeneutics lies in the latter’s inability to reveal what is 
systematically wrong with society. Indeed Gadamer insists that one cannot step outside 
society (or the hermeneutic circle) as one must always analyse society from within. 
Habermas believes this insistence by Gadamer robs society of the ability to find certain truths 
from which it may redeem itself from unenlightened practices. In other words, hermeneutics 
renounces the objective perspective that would identify relations of domination by power. As 
such, a defective society will not have within itself the ability to rectify internal anomalies, as 
this capacity hinges on an analytical framework that is able to distinguish between what is 
good or bad for its members. 206
For Habermas, society retains the means to evaluate its own internal coherence by making a 
transcendental claim on emancipatory grounds. He uses the case of psychoanalysis as a case 
in point where ‘[T]he latent meaning of the present situation is made accessible through 
reference to the un-mutilated meaning’ .2(17 Given that it is possible to map out psychological 
disorders by appealing to an ideal so it is possible to delineate distortions in society by 
petitioning for a free society. Hence for him there are three basic human orientations or 
interests with corresponding reasons. Furthermore, he posits that the three different modes of 
reason correspond to three distinct areas of social engagement, that of work, language and 
power or domination. 208 As McCarthy notes, Habermas sees these distinct areas as universal 
mediums ‘in which the social life of the human species unfolds’ . 200 All human life in 
whatever society, with their unique specificities, is nurtured, developed, and lived through 
these three mediums. 210
Clear as these distinctions maybe, problems emerge in relation to how Habermas views these 
interests. For instance, there is an obvious link between technical interests and work, or for 
that matter between practical interests that aim at understanding through language.
06 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Hermeneutic claim to Universality’, in J. Bleicher (ed) Contemporary Hermeneutics: 
Method, Philosophy and Critique, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) p. 192.
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1973) p. 136.
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Furthermore, work and language are easily understood as distinguishing features of human 
life. Since social evolution ‘first took place in the structures of labour and language’, it is 
therefore logical to assume that they ‘are older than man and society’." However the third 
cognitive interest which relates to emancipation cannot be grounded in the same way as the 
first two. Indeed it cannot be linked to a ‘site’ or concrete reality that supports it nor is it seen 
by Habermas as predating human existence.212 In other words, an epistemological grounding 
of critical theory in terms of an anthropology of knowledge, as shown in Knowledge and 
Human Interests, is problematic due to:
the tension between the assumption that there existed a unified gcncrie subjeet, 
on the one hand, and the foundation provided by the structures of 
intersubjectivity for a practical and emancipatory interest in knowledge, on the 
other.213
This is to say, amongst other things, that the emancipatory interest is not as intrinsic to 
society as the other two, hence an interest like this can only arise from reflection. However, 
there is a problem in this proposition as reflection, in this way, is made to do a double task. 
First it is employed as a tool to ascertain that there is such a thing as an emancipatory 
interest. Then it is being tasked once again to define what this interest entails."14 To 
paraphrase, Habermas attributed an emancipatory interest in society to a moment of 
reflection. Yet he saw this same reflection as a derivation of an emancipatory interest. Thus 
the ambiguity lies in Habermas’s failure to tie a specified domain of action to this cognitive 
interest. This problematic arising out of the formulation of the emancipatory interest was not 
lost on Habermas who immediately suggests that it should be seen as a ‘guiding’ (as opposed 
to intrinsic) interest oriented towards redemption from the problems associated with 
‘communicative incompetence’. McCarthy provides an excellent insight as to how Habermas 
came by these cognitive interests as well as a critical but sympathetic evaluation of these 
‘standards’.215 By reaffirming that the emancipatory interest is actually a guiding interest of 
the critical sciences as well as philosophy, McCarthy wishes to show the different status the 
first two interests have compared to the critical impulse. That is, the emancipatory interest 
can only be a guiding interest because it is not connected to ‘anthropologically deep-seated
21'Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 137. Habermas evinces a positivistic 
understanding of social evolution in asserting that structures preceded humans.
212 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (II), p. 154.
213 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, p. 639
214 David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason, pp. 11-14 (especially p. 13).
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systems of action’. '16 As such societies can often function under a system of domination, 
whereas they cannot be said to function without work or language and their knowledge 
constitutive interests.
By allocating different interests, and therefore rationalities, in the three spheres of life, 
Habermas hopes to come up with a solution to the problem of identity thinking that was 
highlighted by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic. One of his central objectives in 
Knowledge and Human Interests, as stated by McCarthy, was to come up with a more 
‘systematic and theoretically adequate account of the relation of theory to practice, one 
capable of countering the hegemony of scientism on all fronts’.217 But the controversy over 
the ambiguities surrounding the grounding of the emancipatory interest in reflection and vice 
versa (i.e. reflection as a derivation of an emancipatory interest) is further exacerbated by a 
notion of critical theory limited to analysing the linkages between knowledge and human 
interests and their implications for society. A fundamental issue, for instance, that ensues 
from Habermas’s alignment of different forms of knowing with different human interests 
revolves around the difficulty of determining a normative warrant for an impartial quest for 
truth. Indeed, ‘[0]nce a solid connection is established between knowledge and human 
interests, critical reflection cannot establish itself as a disinterested pursuit of truth and must 
find some other way of justifying the normative force it seeks’.218
For Habermas, the answer for this problem lies not within the aporias of the philosophy of 
consciousness but in the promise of universal pragmatics. Critical theory, therefore, can only 
be normatively grounded in the sphere of language. It is only after this aborted attempt to 
rationally ground critical theory in ‘cognitive interests’ as evinced in Knowledge and Human 
Interests, that Habermas at last turned to the theory of language and its operational rules 
defined by a ‘universal pragmatics’.2 |g In the essay ‘What is Universal Pragmatics?’ 
Habermas outlines his ideas on the general presuppositions underlying speech acts." He 
argues that there is a telos towards greater understanding that undergirds all forms of 
communication. Each utterance or speech act raises what he sees as three redeemable validity 
claims. These claims are part and parcel of any language hence their universality. Habermas
216 Ibid., p. 75.
217 Ibid., p. I.
■^Jonathan Culler, Communicative Competence and Normative Force; New German Critique, No. 35 (Spring- 
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219 To be sure, the ‘linguistic turn’ was already anticipated in Knowledge and Human Interests and even its 
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grouped these claims in terms of the values of truth, sincerity and rightness.221 As such these 
validity claims can only be redeemable if they are discursively contested in what he calls the 
‘ideal speech situation’ or the public sphere. 222 The emergence of this sphere is conditional 
on a few prerequisites. Habermas is of the view that, firstly, there must be certain 
‘symmetries’ pertaining to the characteristics of all who participate in the public sphere. This 
is to say that the interlocutors must have the same ‘life chances’ and must adhere strictly to 
the rules of discourse allowing the intersubjective symmetry which guides the discourse 
within the public sphere to be maintained. The insistence on intersubjective symmetry stems 
from Habermas’s awareness of the possibility of constraints that might distort the kind of 
communication that he has in mind. These barriers could come in the form of communication 
itself, whether in terms of ideological or neurotic barriers. 223 Alternatively they could come 
as psychological barriers exemplified by conscious strategic actions within the 
intersubjective dialogue site. Against this, he offers the concept of an ‘ideal speech situation' 
where the dialogue is conducted on the presupposition that all involved want to achieve a 
consensus at the end of the process. Furthermore the ‘ideal speech situation' accords 
’symmetry’ to all the participants in the intersubjective exchange. This ‘intersubjective 
symmetry’ arises out of an even distribution of chances to initiate, question or refute claims 
in the discussion process. " 24
To be sure, Habermas notes that the contestations only arise when certain validity claims are 
disputed. The ‘shared’ background assumptions often ensure that these claims are agreed 
upon without disputes. The ‘ideal speech situation’ therefore is the corollary of the public 
sphere where consensus is reached through a rigorous contestation between competing 
validity claims raised by engaged individuals who share certain symmetries in this contest. 
All claims are hence tested in discourses, both theoretical and practical, which are subject to 
the criteria implicit in the ideal speech situation. But before contestation takes place each 
interlocutor ‘must choose a comprehensible expression so that speaker and hearer can 
understand one another’ .225 This condition sets the scene of the contestation that 
subsequently takes place. Every comprehensible utterance that is geared towards
221 Ibid., p. 3. Note that comprehensibility, strictly speaking, is not a claim, but a condition that oil claims must 
meet in order to be pitted against truth, truthfulness and rightness.
222 Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity (interviews), edited and introduced by Peter Dews ( London: 
Verso, 1986) pp. 89-90. Later on Habermas increasingly uses the term ‘Public Sphere’ as a ‘stand in’ for the 
‘ideal speech situation’.
222 Thomas McCarthy, ‘A Theory o f Communicative Competence’, pp. 145-148.
224 Ibid., p. 145.
225 Jürgen Habermas, Communication and tlic Evolution o f Society, p. 2.
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understanding raises three validity claims. The first of these is a claim to ‘truth for a stated 
propositional content’.226 This refers explicitly to the claim that what is being asserted by the 
speaker is also ‘true’ for the hearer. The second condition pertains to the acceptance by the 
hearer that the speaker is sincere in his assertion. For Habermas the claim to sincerity is 
accepted when the hearer grants that the speaker is sincere when making the truth claim." 
The last claim is a claim to rightness. This claim appeals to the normative standards of 
appropriateness of the hearer or what would amount, in Gadamer’s view, to an appeal for a 
‘fusion of horizon’. In other words, the third is a claim that what is being said is also ‘right’ 
in the sense that it meets the expected normative standards shared by interlocutors. In sum, 
rational consensus comes about when three conditions are met228:
1. when a hearer accepts the ‘truthfulness’ of an assertion made by a speaker
2. when the hearer also accepts the sincerity of the speaker when making the 
‘truth-claim’
3. that what the speaker asserts meets the normative standards of 
appropriateness of the hearer.
These claims in turn appeal to distinct ‘domains of reality’ namely, an external domain of 
nature (truth claim), an intersubjective world of understanding (rightness claim or claim to 
legitimacy), and an internal or subjective world (claim to sincerity).226 In other words each of 
these claims is made in relation to their corresponding ‘domains of reality’. Like Popper’s 
notion of ‘three worlds’, the claims of truth, sincerity and appropriateness are made in the 
domains of an objective world, a subjective world and a social world."20 For instance, in the 
utterance of a ‘standard speech act’, a speaker will be, simultaneously, making three validity 
claims whose requisites are outlined above. These standards correspond to: the objective 
world where truth claims are made; the social world where appeals to legitimacy are 
adjudicated; and the subjective world where the nonnative standards of appropriateness
226 Ibid., p. 65.
“ 7 Ibid., p. 66.
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within a lifeworld are evaluated. Agreement between hearer and speaker can only come 
about when all three conditions are met. 231
The above requirements imply that all those who participate in the ideal speech situation 
must be able to speak their minds openly and without fear of recriminations. This openness to 
dialogue must also extend to those who wish to question the position of others. Collectively 
these criteria, which regulate the dialogic engagements in the ‘ideal speech situation’, will 
facilitate the ‘procedures and presuppositions of free argument (that) are the basis for the 
justification of opinions’ . 232 It is also in the adherence to these criteria that the legitimacy of 
decisions, opinions and outlooks derived from the ideal speech situation, or the liberal public 
sphere, is presupposed. This is how, for Habermas, the ideal speech situation becomes the 
mainstay of democratic practices in the period of modernity.
By sketching a sphere where intersubjective dialogue is contingent on the ideal suppositions 
of a universal pragmatics, Habermas therefore is able to delineate a realm of the social that 
operates outside the instrumentalism exemplified by both positivistic thought and strategic 
action. In other words the site where the contestations of validity claims take place becomes a 
key design in his articulation of a two-tier system of society, as it establishes the conditions 
of possibility of that realm that lies outside the purview of systemic logic, namely the 
‘lifeworld’. The delineation of a model of society that encapsulates two interrelated yet 
distinct schemes of integration becomes, for him, an undertaking from which the completion 
of the ‘project of modernity’ can be realised.
3.3 The Theory of Communicative Action: A two-tier system of society.
The two volumes that made up Habermas’s exegesis on the theory of communicative 
competence is best understood as a critical intervention by Habermas to retrieve the 
emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment through a philosophic reinterpretation of the 
conditions that, according to him, gave rise to the defeatism that had earlier overwhelmed 
Adorno and Horkheimer. This defeatism can only, by this account, be averted by jettisoning 
the philosophy of consciousness; a philosophy that lends its aporetic tenor to the arguments 
in the Dialectic. David Ingram sums up the problem for Habermas in this way: ‘The chief
231 Jürgen Habermas, T he Theory o f  Communicative Action (If) p. 121.
232 David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. (London: Hutchinson, 1980) p. 260.
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defect of philosophy of consciousness is its location of the original source of valuation and 
cognition in an isolated subject, thereby ignoring the significance of communicative 
interaction’ .233 Salvaging the emancipatory potential of modernity, for him, necessitates a 
turn to the linguistic structure of communication as the basis for a critical theory of society. 
Society in this way cannot be perceived exclusively as the locus of reifying consciousness 
and its concomitant objectifying outlook; it must also be seen as a site where humans 
linguistically communicate and justify their wishes as well as actions to each other against a 
shared nonnative horizon. Furthennore, each time there is a consensus amongst competing 
claims, it in turn facilitates an enlarged nonnative horizon that encompasses two or more 
competing worldviews. This is clearly evident very early on in Habennas’s appropriation of 
Heidegger and Gadamer’s hermeneutical insights in the ‘positivist dispute’ . 234 The 
publication of the two volumes of The Theory o f Communicative Action represented in its 
clearest fonn the uses of the idea of a universal pragmatics to sketch the contours of a reason 
that is generated by the idealising suppositions of speech acts and which, in turn, are geared 
towards rational consensus. This reason, which he terms ‘communicative rationality’ 
becomes the harbinger of his two tier model of society that is premised on a union between 
the functionalist concept of ‘system’, which reverberates with Durkheimian and Parsonian 
undertones, and a notion of the ‘lifeworld’ borrowed from phenomenology." By steering 
clear of the aporias of the Dialectic, Habermas at the same time hopes to ground Critical 
Theory on more secure epistemological foundations.
One of the most troubling aspects of modern social theories, in Habennas’s view, is their 
tendency to explain the social world exclusively in terms of either social action or structural 
impetus. What is needed, in his view, is a model of society that incorporates both tendencies 
in a unified whole. 236 To be sure, Habennas admits that reconciling
the systems paradigm with the action paradigm or the lifeworld has been a
central preoccupation of the sociological theories of its founding triumvirates
(Marx, Dürkheim and Weber) as well as Talcott Parsons237.
233 David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic o f  Reason, p. 104.
2,3Jack Mendelson, ‘The Habermas-Gadamer Debate’, p. 46. Adorno on the other hand adopts an ambivalent 
attitude towards Heidegger alleging that the latter’s philosophy reeks of fascism through and through.
235 Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution o f  Society, p.3.
2,11 Adorno has the same view but directed against subject or object centred philosophies. Philosophies which 
falls into either/or category, for Adorno suffers from ‘transcendental delusion’. This discussion is covered in the 
next chapter.
237 Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 88.
74
The problem lies in the reductionism that often accompanies these theorizations. That is, 
these authors tend to lean towards either a systems-theoretic scheme or an action-theoretic 
model in their final analyses. The point however is to maintain the integrity of the different 
trajectories of material and symbolic reproduction in society.
Habermas’s critical reconstruction of Marxism very early on in his career stems from a 
conviction that the economistic version popularised by the Second International reduces the
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communicative dimension of Marx’s theory to its structural base." In a move that was 
designed as a protest against the fonns of vulgar Marxism, especially the materialist and 
scientific versions that abounded in the 60s, Habermas wanted Marxian thought to recover 
the communicative dimension that was originally part of Marx’s conception of modern 
society.239 For Habermas, Marx defines society as the outcome of the dialectical mediation 
between labour and its organising principles: a fonnulation he (Marx) later skewed by 
privileging practice (material production) over the social relations (theoretical interests) that 
‘guide’ this process - a relation that covers the intersubjective relation between producers.240 
Instead of the dogmatism that is associated with its ‘scientific’ formulations, Marxism, for 
Habermas, is to be seen as an ‘empirically falsifiable philosophy of history with practical 
intent’ .241
One of the implications arising out of this move is that Marxism, far from being a dogma, is 
to be nothing more than a hypothesis to be tested against historical conditions. Habennas 
argues that Marx’s dialectics cannot be regarded as an explanatory theory for no theory can 
profess to account for all the contingencies of history. This is clearly a shift away from the 
meta-theorising associated with the grand narratives of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In so doing, Habermas is trying to protect Marxian critical insights from the vices 
of the grand theoretical models -  vices that have been condemned by poststructuralists such 
as Lyotard and Foucault. Habermas insists instead that Marx’s theory of society is critical in 
the sense that it sees society as a dialectical system that comprises, on one hand, the ‘means 
of production’ and, on the other, the ‘productive relations’. These dual notions are
238 See Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic o f  Reason, pp. 118-123.
239 Jiirgcn Habermas , ‘Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism’ in Communication and the 
Evolution o f  Society, pp. 130-177.
240 This reduction is nowhere made clearer than in Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy, 
in which he proclaims that ‘[l]t is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their consciousness’ cited in Robert C Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd 
cd.), (New York: W W Norton and Company, 1978) p. 4.
241 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie and Praxis (cf. 271-279) as cited in Peter Dews, ‘Habermas and the 
Desublimation of Reason’, p. 4. This is also a position that is associated with Western Marxism in general.
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representative of the tensions between the philosophical concepts of Spirit and History that 
had previously occupied the thoughts of the young Hegelians. In a shift from what he sees as 
excessive philosophic orientation on the part of these disciples of Hegel, Marx, according to 
Habermas, subsequently began placing more emphasis on the scientific nature of his theory 
to oppose what he saw as ‘mere speculation’. This new emphasis is strictly a corrective 
measure as it affords, for Marx, the realisation of the liberal ideals embedded within a 
philosophy of history: ideals such as truth, autonomy, reason and justice. Marx’s 
disenchantment with what he sees as the futility of unbridled philosophising is fully 
encapsulated in his 11th theses on Feuerbach, where he laments that ‘philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however, is to change it’.24" It is thus clear 
that Marx, from the very beginning, intended his theory of society to rest on the twin pillars 
of forces of production and relations of production. The former consists of labour-power, 
technical knowledge related to production and organisational know-how while the latter 
consists of ‘those institutions and social mechanisms that determine the way in which (at a 
given stage of productive forces) labour power is combined with the available means of 
production’.242 Together they make up a mode of production.244
The important thing to remember, for Habennas, is that the different spheres also contain the 
outlines of different ways of coordinating action. For instance, the sphere that is defined by 
the ‘means of production’ is geared towards greater productivity, hence the kind of 
knowledge that will be most useful there is instrumental which, in turns, guides ‘purposive- 
rational’ actions. The ‘relations of production’ is interesting in the sense that, apart from 
aligning itself to the maximisation of output, it also suggests, for Habennas, the vestiges of a 
different fonn of reason based on intersubjective understanding. This is essential if we are to 
ensure the alignment of cooperation from the workers with the general interests of the 
bourgeoisie - the owners of the means of production. Thus Marx, for Habermas, was already 
defining two relatively different and autonomous logics embedded in the two distinct spheres 
that make up a mode of production. On the one hand, we have an instrumental logic that is 
utilised in the sphere of the ‘means of production’ ensuring maximum output, while on the 
other, we have another logic that is explicated in terms of intersubjective reason. This latter 
logic determines the degree of integration of the members of a society by ‘regulating access
2,2 Robert C Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 145.
2-1' Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution o f Society, PP- 138-139.
244 See ibid., pp. 130-177 for a more detailed overview of this discussion.
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to the means of production and thereby indirectly regulating the distribution of social 
wealth’.245 For Habermas, regulating both the access to the production process as well as 
distribution of social wealth is intrinsically tied in with normative questions on what a 
‘rational society’ should be. Such questions, in turn, can only be posed and answered through 
a process of discursive argumentation in which all are given fair and equal chances of raising 
validity claims. This, in turn, becomes the basis of his normative approach.
Habennas points out that the peculiar development of Marxism both in the hands of Marx 
and then his latter-day followers saw the subversion of communicative reason in the 
production process. That is, the logic prevalent within the sphere of the ‘means of 
production’ became recognised as the only one inherent in Marxism. It was especially true of 
the different ‘scientific’ variants of Marxism ranging from Stalinism to the more orthodox 
versions prevalent in the 60s, which gave rise to a form of ‘materialist metaphysics’. The 
charge of economism and scientism directed against Marxism around this time highlighted 
the truncated version of a critical theory that was designed to transform the world. However, 
Habennas was not simply trying to bring Marx back into vogue by redeeming certain insights 
in Marxian thought: his objective is much grander. Indeed Habermas aims to use Marx's 
insights as a platform to articulate a more comprehensive account of sociality. Marx, for all 
his far-reaching analyses of society is, for Habermas, still firmly a child of his epoch who 
was naively optimistic about the destiny of the proletariat as a historical subject in 
humanity’s march towards autonomy.
In another move that mirrors the earlier one by Adorno and Horkheimer, Habennas claims 
that freedom is a product of historical conditions and as such has not always existed. There is 
no basis, therefore, for assuming, as Marx did, that there is an underlying subject of history: 
one that will realise, in concrete tenns, the relations between history and philosophy.24f’ This 
is to say that Habennas is suspicious of Marx's claim about the historical relationship that 
links freedom with the actions of the proletariat. However, unlike Adorno and Horkheimer, 
whose theory was vehemently attacked after it summarily dismissed the proletariat from their 
historical role, Habermas aims to address this dilemma in a different way. Unwilling to be 
included together with the authors of the Dialectic as theorists of revolutions with no clear 
revolutionaries in mind - a situation created by the departure of the proletariat -  Habennas
245 ibid., p. 144.
246 Peter Dews, ‘Habermas and the Desublimation of Reason’, p. 5.
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felt that change ought to be sought from everybody in society. In Neil Saccamano's words, 
instead of relying on a subject of history, Habermas points out that the agent of change:
is to be derived, rather from the entity that has been transformed by the 
historical development of capitalism into the depoliticised “masses”: the public 
of private persons, capable of judging and debating rationally about political 
domination, which had secured through its critique of the absolutist state the 
institutional organs of liberal democracy.247
In this way Habermas aims to avert the spectre of revolutions without revolutionaries implicit 
in the Dialectic, which led to the accusation that Adorno and Horkheimer’s theoretical 
insights were directed at no one in particular: a ‘message in a bottle’ left to an imaginary 
future audience. 248
To be sure, Habermas did not arrive at his final elucidation of societal processes and their 
accompanying logics and action-theorems through a simple hermeneutic reengagement of 
Marxian tenets. Indeed his final destination was reached after an exhaustive interrogation of 
virtually every conceivable model of sociality, the contours of which are beyond the purview 
of this thesis. Suffice to say that Habermas's model entails a number of important 
considerations. First is the change that takes place concerning the epistemological ‘moorings’ 
of critical theory: from subject-centred philosophy to one based on intersubjective 
relations. 244 Second is the incorporation of both systemic as well as social forms of 
reproduction in a workable way within a single model of society. This move reflects 
Habermas's conviction that there are two different ways in which integration occur in 
society. Third is the appreciation, in light of the varying integrative functions in the two 
spheres of society, of dissimilar forms of rationality that are crucial to both material and 
symbolic reproduction. Fourth is how he maintains that the two tiers of society must be 
allowed to ‘evolve’ guided by the rationality intrinsic to each. Taking as his point of 
departure a paradox that he found in Durkheim’s explanation of integration in society, 
Habermas elucidates a new form of sociality based on the historically related but distinct 
dynamics of lifeworld and system. For Habermas, Dürkheim is correct in pointing out the 
links between ‘forms of social integration and stages of system differentiation’ . 250 However
4 Neil Saccamano, The Consolations o f Ambivalenee: Habermas anti the Public Sphere, MLN Vol. 106, No. 3 
(April, 199l)p . 686.
248 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, p. 279.
249 By way, o f course, o f an abortive attempt to ground critical theory in cognitive interests.
2MI Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f  Communicative Action (II), p. 118.
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the problem, according to Habermas, stems from the tautological explanation that Dürkheim 
advances about the specific links between normative regulations and forms of solidarity in 
society. For example, according to Dürkheim the moral rules that govern modern society (as 
expressed in the notion of organic solidarity) are derived from the ‘division of labour’. In 
other words, the division of labour is regarded as the source from which modern forms of 
nonnativity are derived. Yet Dürkheim also posits that ‘the dysfunctional character of certain 
forms of division of labour’ can be attributed to ‘the absence of such nonnative 
regulations’ .251 The dilemma for Dürkheim, as Habermas sees it, lies in the former’s inability 
to envisage any other form of social reproduction that can happen outside institutional 
settings. The answer, for Habennas, is to adopt a more holistic approach to society’s 
integrative processes on the basis of the two action-systems and their corresponding logics of 
reproduction that, collectively, make up society. As Habermas observes,
[I]n one case, the integration of an action system is established by a normatively 
secured or communicatively achieved consensus, in the other ease, by a
actors’
For Habermas, the former is symptomatic of the symbolic interactions associated with the 
works of George Herbert Mead while the latter typifies Emile Durkheim’s account of modern 
forms of social integration. The two distinctive ways in which society is integrated, by means 
of an ‘action theorem’ as well as a ‘system theorem’, leads to a ‘corresponding 
differentiation in the concept of society itself. Hence, for Habermas, societies can only be 
adequately grasped if they are conceived as both system and lifeworld.254 David Ingram sums 
this up well:
nonnormative regulation of individual decisions that extends beyond the 
consciousnesses.252
We are told that the system integrates diverse activities in accordance with the 
adaptive goals of economic and political survival by regulating the unintended 
consequences of strategic action through market or bureaucratic mechanisms 
that constrain the scope of voluntary decision. The lifeworld, on the other hand, 
contributes to the maintenance of individuals and social identity by organising 
action around shared values, so as to reach agreement over criticisablc claims.255
251 Ibid.
252 ibid., p. 117.
253 Ibid.
254 ibid., p. 118.
255 David Ingram Habennas and the Dialectic o f Reason, p. 115.
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Ultimately, the distinctions that Habermas had sought between a communicative form of 
reason that is to be distinguished from its instrumental counterpart (both strategic and 
purposive-rational) in his ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ model of society would prove decisive 
again in his articulation of the role of the liberal public sphere in anchoring modem society. 
Before delving into the dynamics of his liberal political sphere, it is important to highlight the 
extent in which Habermas has cast adrift from the moorings of Western Marxism. This is 
done in the next section via a discussion of his abandonment of Ideology-critique.
3.3.1 Shifting Textualities: From ‘Ideology-Critique' to ‘Colonisation o f the Lifeworld’
The new model, based on two different reproductive trajectories -  systemic and social- 
embedded within two separate spheres -  precipitated a revision of some motifs that have 
become synonymous with Western Marxism. One such issue was the proper place of 
ideology-critique in social theorisation, a legacy that Habermas inherits from Lukäcs by way 
of Adorno. For Lukäcs, the role of ideology-critique is to highlight the pseudo-nonnative 
power of the commodity-form in society, a power whose reifying effects transfonn social 
relations into relations between things. A relationship of this nature, for Habermas, cannot be 
anything other than strategic or instrumental. Read this way, reification becomes for Lukäcs’, 
an ideological obfuscation that arises out of systemic distortions as well as ‘false 
consciousness’. In other words, reification is caused by what Althusser sees as the 
‘ideological interpellation’ that occurs as capitalism and the state seek to define (thus 
controlling) subjective consciousness in an attempt to perpetuate the status quo. 256 As such, 
the prevalence of the commodity-form in all spheres of bourgeois society presupposes the 
notion of ideology-critique as a necessary countermeasure.
In contrast, Habermas argues that the distinctly Weberian overtones of the rationalisation 
process, as defined by Lukäcs, cannot be reduced exclusively to its reifying effects on 
society. 257 To do this, in his view, would be to deny modernity of any rational content. 
Habermas relies instead on a reformulation of the idea of reification by arguing that 
ideology-critique is relevant only if class distinctions are as palpable as they were during the 
nascent years of capitalism. In fact he notes that:
Sb For a discussion of this see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben 
Brewster, (New York: New Left Review, 1971) pp. 170-177.
Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f  Communicative Action (1), pp. 366-386.
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[I]n the face of a class antagonism pacified by means of welfare-state measures 
... and in the face of the growing anonymity o f class structures, the theory of 
class consciousness loses its empirical reference. It no longer has application to 
a society in which we are increasingly unable to identify strictly class specific 
lifeworlds.258
Appealing directly to Daniel Bell’s ‘end of ideology' thesis, Habermas points out that the 
fragmentation of ‘totalising conceptions of order’, or worldviews, which accompany modem 
processes, has in effect negated the role of ideology as an influencing force. 259 For him, high 
modernity, exemplified by the period of late capitalism, spells amongst other things, the end 
of the age metaphysics. Thus with its passing goes the need for ideology-critique.
In this way reification becomes, for Habermas, a symptom of ‘distorted’ communication that 
would be the ultimate result of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’. This is a key term in his 
theory of communicative competence. Colonisation of the lifeworld comes about as a 
consequence of the encroachment of systemic imperatives on the dynamics of the lifeworld. 
According to Habermas, the system and the lifeworld undergo rationalisation in 
fundamentally different ways. The former rationalises towards the attainment of high levels 
of institutional efficiency while the latter’s social evolution is geared towards achieving 
rational consensus in a context that is conducive to the free exchange of competing ideas or 
validity claims. Habermas calls this context that facilitates the interactive exchanges between 
acting subjects the ‘ideal speech situation’. For him people enter into these exchanges, or 
discourse, in an effort to find consensus. True consensus can only come about if 
communications between interlocutors are conducted within an ideal speech situation. The 
negation of this pure communicative state renders any form of consensus-seeking process 
vulnerable to the distorting influence that power and wealth may bring to any communicative 
interchange. 260 Colonisation of the lifeworld therefore occurs when power and money start 
influencing what is, for Habermas, supposed to be a collective quest for true or rational 
consensus based on undistorted communication. By recasting reification as colonisation of 
the lifeworld, Habermas hopes to show that the complexities of our current epoch necessitate 
a change in our approach to the problems besetting our time. Indeed, for him, the post­
metaphysical stage is one that renders ideology-critique redundant. With the passing of the
288 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (II), p. 352.
259 Ibid, pp. 353-355.
260 Note that the ideal speech situation plays a similar role as Weber's ideal types. They are used as heuristic 
devices to evaluate concrete experiences against their conceptual ideals. Ideal speech situations, again, like ideal 
types have no concrete exemplifications.
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old world of ideologies, concepts like reification must also be discarded if we are to alter the 
structure of our consciousness to suit our contemporary age.
The completion of the project of modernity, for Habermas, is directly linked to the 
overcoming of the conditions that inhibit undistorted communication. In other words, if we 
are to accept the rational content of modernity, then we must also move beyond the 
reification thesis (and together with it -  ideology-critique) in order to show the critical 
impulse of modern forms of sociality.
3.4 Communicative Antecedents in Habermas’s Early Works: The centrality of the 
notion of public sphere in Habermas’s oeuvre.
The communicative orientation that Habermas adopts as his definitive point of departure 
from the specific theorisation that defines the older generation of the Frankfurt School can be 
discerned even as early as his contribution to the ‘positivist dispute’ as well as in the ensuing 
work on the historical evolution of institutions of will-formation in Europe. 261 The former 
illuminates Habermas's understanding of positivism as arguably more nuanced than 
Adorno’s. For instance Habermas gave due credit to ‘empirical-analytical research method 
with gains in technical knowledge’, more so than Adorno whose position is ‘to dismiss it as 
false consciousness or ideology’ . 262 The differences in their respective positions could be 
explained by the fact that the former's stance in relation to the empirical-analytical sciences 
is based strictly on methodological issues whereas the latter tends to subsume these same 
issues to their political implications. Yet, in spite of this, there seems to be more than a 
suggestion in Habermas’s exegesis on the subject that alludes to an alternative form of 
rationality based on intersubjective understanding. This is clearly evinced in a rejoinder that 
was part of the same dispute, where he alluded to a more comprehensive form of reason that 
arises out of rational consensus achieved without constraint. This reference, still in its 
embryonic form, was later given concrete expression in Knowledge and Human Interests 
where, Habermas argues, natural science depends on a communicative context susceptible to 
hermeneutic understanding. 263
261 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere. The positivist dispute took plaee in 1%1 
whereas the German edition of the Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere came out in 1962.
21,2 Robert C Holub, Jürgen Habermas, p. 47.
262 Ibid.. p. 48.
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Habermas’s position on the presence of an alternative form of reason is perhaps a result of 
the fact that his major project around the same time was a sociological investigation of the 
emergence, transformation and subsequent disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere.264 
He attributed the genesis of the bourgeois public sphere to the socio-political climate of the 
eighteenth century and its demise to the logic of ‘late’ capitalism around two hundred years 
later. As such the public sphere was, for him, a defining feature that is crucial to any 
understanding of the modern period. 265 This historicisation of the concept within an epoch 
defined primarily by a nascent capitalist economy allowed Habermas to retrieve critical 
resources that could be employed later on as part of both a general critique of modernity as 
well as an exit strategy from the aporias of the Dialectic. The Structural Transformation o f 
the Public Sphere was a response to what Habermas perceived as a state of crisis in the 
German Federal Republic: a crisis that was engendered by a form of social neurosis afflicting 
West Germany’s social and political landscape. This seminal publication, as it turned out, 
was seen by its author as a form of practical intervention that would eventually lead to a 
better understanding, hence overcoming, of the factors behind the new republic's 
disempowering social and political terrain in the aftermath of the Second World War. 266 It is 
as early as this work that one may find the seeds that eventually led to Habermas’s later 
stance against the Dialectic. One interesting aspect is its tacit departure from the critical 
focus of the Dialectic. While the latter concerns itself with just critiquing the status quo 
(through its critique of the culture industry), the former is not satisfied with the ‘mere 
speculation’ in the cooperative efforts of Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘performative 
contradiction' notwithstanding. Moreover, the synthetic element that marks out his later 
works is also evident at this early stage in his career. This is evinced by his engagements with 
diverse theoretical disciplines ranging from cultural history, legal history, mass media theory 
as well as empirical social sciences. 267
Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere is, in short, a theoretical excavation of the 
traces of public will-formation. Habermas points to the historical existence of such processes 
as corresponding to the movement of authority from a world of religio-feudal absolutism to 
one where the logic of capital was gaining in ascendancy. The public sphere thus
264 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, p. xi.
265 Peter Hohendahl, ‘Jürgen Habermas: The Public Sphere', New German Critique, No. 3 (Autumn, 1964) pp. 
45-48.
266 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere p. xi.
267 Peter Hohendahl, Jürgen Habermas’, p. 45.
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metamorphosed from a ‘world of letters’ to one where it was appropriated by the nascent 
bourgeois class to rein in what it saw as excesses of state power, often represented by the 
monarchy as well as the absolutist bureaucratic organisation.26* The first clear example of 
this shift in emphasis away from authoritarian political formations occurred in Britain at the 
end of the eighteenth century where ‘[Fjorces endeavouring to influence the decisions of 
state authority appealed to the critical public in order to legitimate demands before this new 
forum’ . 269 The ‘de-centering’ of religio-feudal absolutism resulted in the emergence of new 
freedoms and accompanying institutions in areas that were formerly ruled by the medieval 
public sphere. This new development brought about a levelling effect, resulting in the 
devolvement of public institutions such as the judiciary and bureaucracy from their imperial 
moorings to serve the specific needs of the new order. Historically, the ‘public sphere’ is a 
social sphere whose discursive space was generated by a plethora of information outlets 
owned by the bourgeoisie. These included cafes, salons, literary societies, newspapers and an 
ever growing number of journals. 270 It is in this discursive sphere, constructed by the 
conduits of information outlined above, that contestation of validity claims takes place. As 
such the ‘public sphere’ becomes a discursive space where opinions are formed, revised, 
sustained or reconstituted in light of more valid argumentation. The prominence given to the 
role information play even at that early phase saw newspapers evolving from mere 
publishing tools to important determinants of public opinion, as the public sphere 
metamorphosed from a ‘world of letters’ to an influential tool of will-formation. It is within 
this latter phase that Habermas locates its political potency. The public sphere generated by 
various information conduits became a watchdog for the bourgeoisie against perceived or 
real excesses of the state; that is, in occupying the interstices between the state and the 
‘lifeworld’, Habermas proposes that, historically, the public sphere was a measure 
constructed by certain segments of the bourgeois to rein in the desultory effects of 
hierarchical forms of authority exemplified by constellations of power such as the state, the 
economy and religio-feudal absolutism. Indeed by the end of the eighteenth century, the 
medieval power-complexes had been largely negated by the structural changes spearheaded 
by an expansionist bourgeois mentality.
Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere, p.52.
269 ibid. p. 57.
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It is at this point of delineating the origins of the public sphere that Habermas also trumpets 
its class linkages by examining its relation to the capitalist mode of production.271 Indeed,
[T]hc social precondition for this “developed” bourgeois public sphere was a 
market that, tending to be liberalized, made affairs in the sphere of social 
reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people left to themselves 
and so finally completed the privatisation o f civil society.272
Yet this class feature, which sees the emergence of public spheres as dominated by bourgeois
individuals and/or property owners, is but a reflection of a new configuration of power that is
being ratified as legal and rational. For it shows the shifting of power from the old guards to
the new - from the pulpit and the throne to the market. Yet the most important thing, from
Habermas’s perspective, is the greater degree of access that is granted to the new public
sphere. In other words, bourgeois individuals notwithstanding, Habermas sees this class
feature of the public sphere as a distinct improvement, in terms of inclusivity, when
compared to the public sphere that preceded it. In fact Habermas argues that the specific form
a public sphere takes reflects the power constellation of a particular age. For example, the
particular characteristics of the bourgeois public sphere is indicative of the ‘new’ power
tectonics that undergird an emerging capitalist economy, just as the medieval public sphere
stood for the absolutism of church and monarch. Habermas’s attempt, therefore, to recast the
bourgeois public sphere in a more positive light to that of its predecessors in different
historical periods was motivated by Marx’s identification of the problem of ‘false
consciousness’ as nestling within the bosom of bourgeois society.
The problem for Habermas is to match his ideal conceptualisation of the public sphere with 
its concrete manifestation. As Holub puts it, the dilemma confronting Habermas is that 
‘[T]he notion of general accessibility and unconstrained dialogue is an obfuscation by and of 
bourgeois ideology, since it stands in contradiction to the empirical reality of the public 
sphere in capitalist societies’.273 This predominantly bourgeois construction of the ‘public 
sphere’ became problematic as capitalism began manifesting itself clearly along class lines. 
Indeed the class structure of capitalism in the 18lh century severely limited free and fair 
interchanges of the interlocutors in the ‘public sphere’ to members of the bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeois origins of this social sphere meant limitations to it being able to articulate a social 
reality based on wide ranging consensus. This discrepancy merely mirrored the widening of
271 Ibid, pp. 57-60, also see p. 85 for a summary o f the class character o f the public sphere.
272 Ibid, p. 74.
277 Robert C Holub Jürgen Habermas, p.5.
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cleavages as monopoly capitalism developed. In other words, as the gulf between the 
powerful bourgeois class and those closely associated with the state on one hand and the rest 
of civil society on the other widened, so did the waning relevance of the ‘public sphere’ as a 
tool of mass oppositional politics become more obvious. Indeed, the period of ‘late 
capitalism’ saw an ever increasing role of a specific logic-predominant in both neo-liberal 
politics and the capitalist market economy -  in the process of social integration.274
The bourgeois public sphere that emerged in the eighteenth century is, therefore, a 
consequence of the growing division between (European) states and their civil population 
due to the expansionist trajectories of market economies. 277 Thus the institution of will 
formation associated with the bourgeois epoch was accorded the role of mediator to the often 
conflicting interests of the state and privately owned capital. 276 The public sphere therefore 
would be a ‘realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed’ . 277 To the extent that it is a genuine site of ‘public will-formation’, the sphere 
operates on the protocols of language-use defined by a universal pragmatics. This ensures, in 
Habermas’s view, a symmetry between interlocutors in raising as well as refuting validity or 
truth-claims in discourse (ideal speech situation). The successor to this political sphere, 
associated with bourgeois society, thus becomes primarily the way in which Habermas puts 
forward a procedural model of democracy, one that revolves around ‘the democratic control 
of state activities’.27x
Yet Habermas maintains that for all its weaknesses the bourgeois public sphere is a definite 
improvement from all the other preceding historical forms. In this way, Habermas argues, the 
emergence of a capitalist society becomes a defining moment in the history of will-formation 
as it broadens the accessibility of the sphere to the population at large. It is here, however, 
that the contradiction between the logic of the public sphere and that of the market is made 
apparent. It soon dawned on him that the practice of linking freedom in the public sphere to 
the emergence free market competition in capitalist modernity effectively compromises the
'7| Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere, p. 175-195. see also Muller J-W ‘The 
Court Philosopher of Berlin’, The Wilson Quarterly. Summer Volume 25 Number 3 (2001) pp. 101-103 and 
Woodiwiss T ‘Critical Theory and the Capitalist state’, Economy and Society, Volume 7 (1978) pp. 175-192.
27s Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere, pp. 57-60 & 85.
276This assertion also marks a departure from Marx’s argument on how the state is a tool that furthers the 
interests of the bourgeoisie.
277 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article’, New German Critique, No.3 (Autumn 
1974) p. 49.
~7S Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere’, p. 51.
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welfare of society as a whole. 279 For Habermas, this contradiction became apparent in the 
growing disparities between the interests guiding the public sphere on one hand, and the 
logic of the capitalist system on the other. Thus the role of the public sphere is to chart the 
best way forward by mediating between the requirements of the system as well as the needs 
of the lifeworld. In mediating between the private interests of its participants as well as 
recognising how these interests are contextualised within a realm influenced by the non- 
linguistic steering media of private capital and state bureaucratic power, the public sphere 
ensures that processes of integration taking place in both tiers of society -  system and 
lifeworld -  are done in a manner that is cognisant of their respective needs.
The constriction and eventual disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere can be traced to 
the attempts by the state to control the crises of complex market economies through greater 
intervention. As the administrative arm of the state began playing an increased role in social 
life, systemic interventions began encroaching onto our social lifeworlds, leading ultimately 
to the deformation of the public sphere. For Habermas these interventions are guided by 
purposive-rational logic - a reason that is perhaps uniquely suited to rendering systems more 
effective. Indeed Habermas argues that it is the indiscriminate application of this particular 
form of reason on areas that are defined by intersubjective actions that leads to the 
disintegration of the public sphere and the ‘colonisation’ of the lifeworld. Take state- 
welfarism as an example: one of the troubling aspects of increased intervention of the state in 
social life revolves around how it attempts to address inherently social problems through 
technical and bureaucratic procedures, as if these problems are solely technical in nature. As 
such, developments such as the advent of parliamentary systems, the emergence of public 
relations as opposed to free exchange of ideas, party politics as well as the manipulation and 
commercialization of the mass media are all viewed by Habermas as contributing to the 
‘refeudalisation’ of this sphere -  a situation where form and representation outweigh 
substance and rational debate. 28(1 Using Habermas’s rather esoteric formulation of this 
problem, we may say that the delinguistified media consisting of both power and money 
came to define the social embroidery of the public sphere, rekindling the process of its 
refeudalisation. 281 It came as no surprise then that mass media turned to purely commercial
274 See Hohendahl, ‘Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture’, pp. 79-80 for an explanation on how the logic 
o f the market became the modus operandi of the bourgeois public sphere. This, as will be argued later in chapter 
6 is a problematic part o f the public sphere that Habermas could not eliminate from his populist notion o f it, 
hence the allegation that he is becoming an apologist of the status quo in the late 20'1’ century.
2X0 Robert C Holub Jürgen Habermas, p.5.
2X1 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere, p. 195.
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concerns and subsequently became a tool of the ‘culture industry’." " The pervasion of 
instrumental reason in the ‘public sphere’ and the succumbing of communicative action to 
‘systemic’ embraces have led to an increase in the opinion-forming capabilities of culture 
industries. This gives rise to a situation where ‘rational critical debate had a tendency to be 
replaced by consumption and the web of public communication unravelled into acts of 
individuated reception, however uniform in mode’ . 283 Roles that used to be attributed to the 
public sphere are now re-appropriated ‘by other institutions that reproduce the image of the 
public sphere in distorted guise’ .284 By tracing the contours of a public sphere in this way - as 
an abstract ideal - Habermas hopes to put forward a yardstick by which social reality can be 
gauged.
In his articulation of the specific trajectory of the bourgeois public sphere, from inception to 
its final demise, Habermas remains steadfast in his conviction that critical theory must be 
grounded by a quest that would realise the emancipatory potentials inherent in modernity. 
Habermas’s relationship to Hegel becomes clearer when his oeuvre is viewed in this way. 
Indeed the success of Habermas’s attempt to salvage the project of modernity would also 
mean, in a nutshell, the fulfilment of Hegel’s dialectic between history and philosophy. 
Amidst all these considerations, the one thing that stands out is Habermas's conviction that if 
we are to redeem the promise of the Enlightenment, we must resurrect the concept of the 
public sphere. For him this is the only way of safeguarding the rationalisation of the lifeworld 
from the encroachments of the system. Habermas sees the fate of the project of modernity 
and that of the public sphere as irrevocably intertwined - the establishment as well as the 
retention of the latter will lead to the fulfilment of the former. That is, the public sphere is the 
site that will adjudicate between competing validity claims put forward by humans as they 
chart their way through the vicissitudes of life. The concept of a liberal public sphere, 
therefore, is a mechanism by which equilibrium is reached within the totality of social life. It 
also trumpets Habermas's attempt to retain the positive insights gained from the bourgeois 
public sphere while avoiding the aporias associated with its class-based features. Indeed, the 
liberal dynamic that guides the new public sphere is shaped by the need to transcend the 
shortcomings associated with its bourgeois version, prevalent in European societies after the
282 The ‘culture industry’ was first coined by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic to denote the structural 
transformation of culture and mass media resulting in them being tools of indoctrination wielded by the 
bourgeois on the rest of society. This leads to a subtle form of social control and domination. Indeed, culture 
succumbing to instrumental reason has become an industry.
282 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, p. 161.
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demise of religio-feudal absolutism. This is to say that the current attempt to realise the 
promise of the Enlightenment is problematic, for Habermas, because it is taking place in a 
terrain marked by capitalist modernity. As such modern attempts at rescuing the promise of 
the Enlightenment must do so in a context that is not conducive to the realisation of these 
goals - an atmosphere in which systemic logic gradually increases its penetration of the 
lifeworld.-85 The concept of a liberal public sphere, given the vagaries of capitalist 
modernity, can only, therefore, be articulated in the abstract for Habennas. For him, the 
tendency for capitalist society to reduce everything down to their commodity forms 
necessitate the concept of the liberal public sphere to take on the attributes of an ideal type in 
the Weberian sense. This idea of the public sphere as an ideal type became a pillar in
Habennas’s theory of a two-tier system as evinced by his two volumes on communicative
. 286competence.
3.5 Concluding Remarks: Communicative Theory and Political Practice
The aim of the discussion so far is to throw some light on Habermas's recent thoughts on the 
liberal public sphere. It has already been noted above (3.4) how the examination of 
institutions of will-fonnation continues to be the centrepiece of Habennas’s political 
philosophy. The theoretical outline of the liberal public sphere only becomes clear after his 
exegesis of the two tier-theory of society. Indeed it is impossible to understand his liberal 
public sphere without understanding his theory of communicative action.287 It is also obvious 
that the liberal public sphere straddles the grey area that acts as a buffer between the ‘system’ 
and the ‘lifeworld’. Rooted in the dynamics of the lifeworld, the public sphere is also 
designed to sift through the systemic impulses and discursively align these interests with the
288 .Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, pp. 106-130. Interestingly, what becomes obvious 
here is that Habermas, on a certain, level agrees with the thematic arguments of the Dialectic on the reified 
effect of capitalist (or systemic) logic on human consciousness. So in actual fact, his scathing critique of the 
Dialectic was specifically directed against the sense of despair and defeatism that he attributes to its authors. 
This sense of melancholy, according to Habermas, drove Adorno and Horkhcimer to commit the ‘performative 
contradiction' that comes about as a consequence of (mis)reading sociality from the lenses tinted by 
Nietzschean motifs. This in the end had the disastrous effect, paradoxically Habermas alleges, o f identifying 
reason with a ‘will to power’
286 For Habermas, the existence of non-linguistic steering media is attributed to the complex systemic 
differentiation occurring in modern societies. That is, non-linguistic media increasingly mediates between 
‘objective units' (read organization) within the ‘system’-see Theory o f  Communicative Action (II), p. 154.
287 There have been some ambiguities as to the exact designation of this public sphere. Peter Hohendahl, in 
‘Jürgen Habermas’, refers to it as the post-bourgeois public sphere. Habermas himself terms it the political 
public sphere. Moreover he asserts that it has to be understood as an abstract. I am going to call it the ‘Liberal 
Public Sphere’ to differentiate it from the other forms of public spheres already discussed in this chapter. This 
designation is in view of Habermas’s understanding of the thrust of Marx’s ideology critique as a critique of the 
conditions that prevents the realisation of liberal aims and not of the aims themselves.
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lifeworld’s normative horizon. To be sure, the notion of public sphere has always been 
Habermas’s way of restating the need to create a more democratic society and how this need 
is curtailed by the knowledge-power matrix in capitalist modernity. Habermas’s discussion of 
the medieval public sphere, through which rulers ‘represent their power “before” the people, 
instead o f ‘for the people’, is, in this light, closely linked with his views on the philosophy of 
consciousness.2SS On this reading, his turn to communication takes the form of an 
idealization of universal pragmatics within the public sphere. The abandonment of the 
historical form of the public sphere is achieved via the inherent telos that he sees as 
embedded within language-use. As such, he is of the view that the new public sphere does 
not have an empirical exemplification. Like Weber’s ‘ideal types’, the political public sphere 
becomes ‘real’ only in the sense that it provides standards from which we can then measure
-)g t)the degree of democratisation in contemporary politics.'
The centrality of the liberal public sphere for Habermas’s political philosophy cannot be 
overstated. Indeed he identifies the liberal public sphere as the last frontier from which we 
can philosophically and politically defend the viability of the project of modernity as well as 
its political manifestation: a democracy based on the ideal of undistorted communication. 290 
Indeed, from the very outset, the defining characteristics of the public sphere are linked to the 
impulses of the lifeworld; that is, to the premises that are normatively grounded in a universal 
pragmatics which acts as the rules of free dialogue, guiding it towards rational consensus. ' 91 
It becomes explicit to his audience very early on just how important this concept is in the 
examination of the dynamics of democracy in a terrain that is increasingly pervaded by the 
technological impulses and instrumental rationality of modern capitalism and bureaucratic 
power.
Epistemologically the intrusion of purposive-rational reason, whose operative site lies 
normally within ‘authoritarian and bureaucratic’ frameworks, into the ‘democratic and co­
operative framework’ of the ‘public sphere’ defined by communicative rationality, leads to 
all sorts of social pathologies culminating in a crisis of legitimacy. 292 This brings to light yet 
again the danger of conflating instrumental reason with communicative action. If we lose
2SS Jürgen Hahennas, ‘The Publie Sphere’, p.5 1.
28'Jürgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by Christian Lenhardt and 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p. 89.
2'MI 1 am by no means projecting a Utopia to Habermas’s political philosophy even though there is a definite 
utopian moment in his theorization.
‘"Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution o f  Society, pp. 1-5.
21,2 Woodiwiss T ‘Critical Theory and the Capitalist state’, p. 181.
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sight of the different logics inherent in the two modes of reasoning, we not only run the risk 
of adopting inappropriate criteria for discursive analysis, we also ‘neglect a valuable basis for 
the interpretation of historical development’ .293 It becomes clearer, from this discussion, how 
the public sphere is seen as incorporating the emancipatory thrust of the lifeworld. It is also a 
reminder of how the lifeworld is the repertoire of processes that have not been colonised by 
systemic inclinations and as such becomes the basis for our hope for an emancipated society.
For Habermas, modern liberal democracy, embedded within a capitalist context, needs to 
retain the concept of the public sphere. Only this time, the sphere is to be revised to 
incorporate a more inclusive definition that takes into account the plurality of the social. As 
we have seen, this revision led Habermas to relocate his critical theory from the viewpoint 
defined by the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ onto the terrain of language itself.294 In so 
doing Habermas postulates the existence of a ‘Universal Pragmatics’ whose ethics ultimately 
lie in its rational orientation towards understanding and agreement. 295 This is then to be 
guarded against oppressive impulses embedded within the dynamics of both neo-liberal 
politics and the capitalist economy, which have the potential to corrode or distort the 
discursive space of the public sphere. 296 Indeed for him democracy can only be sustained if 
we salvage those ‘institutionally secured forms of general and public communication that 
deal with the practical question of how (humans) can want to live under the objective 
conditions of their ever expanding power of control’ .297 By distorting communication, late 
capitalism contributed directly to the demise of the public sphere. In this way democracy 
under a capitalist setting governed by neo-liberal thinking, which is itself given impetus by 
positivist philosophy, has stopped listening to the voices of the ‘other'. The public sphere 
thus enables us to listen to alternative expressions of humanity. This is how democracy is
293 Ibid.
294 This ‘relocation’ was only done after the initial attempt to revise Critical theory highlighted the aporetic 
nature of subject-centred philosophy. This is easily discerned by the ‘flaws' apparent in Knowledge and Human 
Interests.
2)3 Habermas contends that ‘[RJeaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech'; see Theory o f  
Communicative Action (1), p. 287.
2% The fate of democracy in a terrain defined by neo-liberalism is also examined (albeit in a way that strikes a 
common chord with postmodern impulses) in a combined work by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. 2nd Edition, (London: Verso, 2001). 
These ‘post-Marxists’ tried to steer a path between what they see on the one hand as Habermas’ universal 
democratic ideal and on the other the nihilistic tendencies of Lyotard’s ‘plurality o f incommensurable language 
games'. Norman Geras, in ‘Language, Truth and Justice' New Left Review. No. 29 (1995) pp. 110-135, has 
provided a critique of this kind of relativism by noting that the absence of truth (since truth is only relative) also 
denotes the absence of justice.
217 Jürgen Habermas, Toward a rational Society: Student protest. Science and Politics, translated by Jeremy J 
Shapiro, ( London: Heinemann Educational, 1971) p. 57.
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premised in his scheme. By arguing in this vein, Habermas continues to uphold the critical 
role of rationality in the world.
Between Facts and Norms is perhaps the clearest exposition of the role of the public sphere 
in Habermas’s political philosophy.29* This work is an elaboration on ‘the specifically 
discursive aspects of (the] public sphere’ . 249 In this book, Habermas outlines a procedural 
model of democracy that is underlined by free and un-coerced deliberations. The presence of 
‘procedures of discourse’ or ‘ideal speech situations’, which he regards as pivotal to the 
integrity of the public sphere, must be protected from the influences of non-linguistic steering 
mechanisms of the system. Only by protecting the public sphere can we salvage the positive 
gains accrued from Welfarism. 200 Habermas is well aware of the problems standing in the 
way of an ideal speech situation devoid of power relations. To this end, he maintained that 
the ‘procedures of discourse’ in the lifeworld (and by extension in the public sphere) must be 
guarded from the encroachments of systemic impulses represented by logic of money and 
power. In fact he went so far as to suggest the ‘building up of restraining barriers for the 
exchanges between system and lifeworld and of building in sensors for the exchanges 
between lifeworld and system’ . 301 Indeed the importance of defending the autonomy of the 
lifeworld from being ‘colonised' by the system underlies his belief that,
[T]he systemic spell cast by the capitalist labour market over the life histories of 
those able to work, by the network of responsible, regulating, and supervising 
public authorities over the life forms o f their clients, and by the now 
autonomous nuclear arms race over the life expectancy of people, cannot be 
broken by systems learning to function better. Rather impulses from the 
lifeworld must be able to enter into the self-steering of functional systems’. 302
That is, the autonomy of the lifeworld from the system and, furthermore, the possibility that
the systems can be ‘steered’ by decisions from the lifeworld, is a basic precondition of the
realisation of the project of modernity. To paraphrase, the independence of the public sphere
from the social, economic and political realities defined by state and the economy and
~',s Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory o f  Law and Democracy, 
translated by William Rehg, (London: Polity Press, 1996).
2 W I Kapoor ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? The relevance of the Habermas-Mouffe debate 
for Third World Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, V(27) No. 4 (2002) p. 4.
300 It is apparent from here that Habermas still harbours some Marxian principles in assuming a modicum of  
economic equality between the interlocutors o f the public sphere. In this way the Welfare State also had a 
positive impact on society apart from its retrogressive tendencies of trying to provide technical solutions, 
through its bureaucracy, to every social problem. Indeed, a deliberative model must concern itself with the 
‘reflexive continuation o f the welfare state’, see Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political 
Theory, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992).
301 Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, p. 364.
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subjection of these realities to the will of the public sphere are requirements for any form of 
meaningful democracy. In a nutshell, what is required for undistorted communication in the 
lifeworld as well as in the public sphere is nothing less than the transformation of our social, 
economic and political status quo. His two-tier theory of society, as well as his concept of the 
public sphere, is both the philosophical and political expression of the conditions of 
possibility of the realisation of the promises of Enlightenment and the democratization of our 
modem capitalist societies.
This chapter has shown how Habermas’s theory of communicative action is intrinsically 
linked to his political philosophy through the concept of the public sphere. As is noted in the 
last chapter, the theory of communicative action is, for him, the route out of the aporias 
surrounding the philosophy of consciousness. It tries to salvage the emancipatory potentials 
in society that it sees as being lost in the Dialectic’s radical critique of reason. In this way, 
Habermas remains loyal to the completion of the modernity project. The next chapter 
describes the other way out of subject-centred reason. This is the one that Adorno opts for in 
light of the reification inherent in capitalist modernity. For him, subject-centred reason must 
be undermined by the power of the subject itself. This is the underlying theme of Negative 
Dialectics.
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C h a p t e r  4
In Defiance of the ‘aura’ of the Subject: Negative Dialectics and Transformative Praxis 
4.0
This chapter lays out the main tenets of Theodor Adorno’s philosophy based on a negative 
dialectic and the practise of immanent critique that is associated with it. If we are to look at 
Adorno’s work in retrospect, one of the things that would become pertinent is the uniformity 
of the imperatives that inform his major works. Indeed writings like Minima Moralin, 
Negative Dialectics, Against Epistemology, Jargon o f Authenticity, Aesthetic Theory as well 
as Critical Models in fact continue to grapple with the issues that were highlighted in the 
Dialectic. 3()3 The collective aim of these works is to highlight the dynamics as well as the 
limits of identity thinking. Adorno hopes that in so doing, the outline of a more substantive 
reason, one that will liberate nonidentity from the yoke of conceptual thought, will finally 
come to light. Like the discussion of Habermas in the previous chapter, a major part of the 
discussion of Adorno will revolve specifically around the linkages between his philosophy of 
determinate negation and his political position vis-a vis capitalist modernity.
fhe discussion starts with an adumbration of the contexts from which Adorno’s 
philosophical position emerged (4.1). This is then followed by some general remarks on the 
major bearings of his intellectual development and how these led to a radicalised critique of 
modem society (4.2). The discussion here revolves around Adorno’s critical appropriation 
and revision of conceptual tools of analysis, whether these are from Hegel, Marx or Lukäcs. 
The discussion will revisit some themes introduced in chapter two in order to develop a line 
of reasoning that will take into account the historical trajectory of his work up to the time he 
wrote his seminal texts.304 The chapter then goes on to a consideration of why Adorno failed 
to take the Habermasian exit - the communicative turn - from the philosophy of 
consciousness. This coverage is primarily by way of an analysis of Adorno’s philosophy of 
language (4.3). The major section of this chapter discusses the principles and dynamics of 
Negative Dialectics and the political implications that ensue from it (4.4). The next section 
(4.5) offers a more systematic defence of Adorno in light of Habermas’s allegation of a 
‘performative contradiction’ inherent in any dialectic that espouses a radical critique of
m Against Epistemology was originally supposed to be included as part o f Negative Dialectics but a decision 
was taken later against this -  see Review by Gillian Rose, ‘Negative Dialectics’, pp. 598-599.
"" I am treating all his relevant works highlighted above as seminal.
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reason. This is done in order to delve behind the reason(s) as to why the Dialectic would risk 
its own epistemological foundations by advocating a searing critique of reason itself. The 
Chapter concludes by recapping some of the main themes of Adorno’s philosophy (4.6).
As a final note, all the discussions in this chapter will be oriented towards the general aspects 
of Adorno's oeuvre that have direct relevance to Habermas’s model of the public sphere. In 
other words, the chapter will highlight the salient features of negative dialectics as a mode of 
critique that can be deployed later on as a basis from which to interrogate Habermas's 
political philosophy. It goes without saying that this selective appropriation of Adorno’s 
work will necessitate omitting and glossing over other dimensions of his oeuvre.
4.1 The Development of a Radicalised Critique of Society
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno was born in 1903 of a Jewish father and Italian mother from 
whom, in the years of German fascism, he adopted the surname that he was to be known by 
for the rest of his life. He was exposed, as a child prodigy, to the Classical as well as the 
Idealist traditions that reigned within the German intellectual landscape of the time. By his 
teens, he was already immersed in a study of Immanuel Kant’s first Critique under the 
tutelage of the renowned anti-idealist philosopher, Siegfried Kracauer.1 This initiation was 
to have a lifelong influence for Adorno. Indeed the works of Immanuel Kant form one of the 
pillars from which Adorno constructs his immanent critique of society. Kant’s first Critique 
marks a defining moment in the history of Western philosophic tradition. It emerges within a 
context defined by the raging dispute between two schools of thought - rationalism and 
empiricism. According to Kant, the rationalists are quite correct in their insistence on a priori 
truth. However what is lacking in the rationalist argument is an adequate epistemological 
ground for this claim.306 Conversely, Kant thinks that the empiricists were correct in positing 
that experience is the only valid basis of knowledge, but he points out that ‘empiricists 
neglect the ‘formal’ contribution which the mind makes to the empirical “content” it receives 
from sensation or “intuition”’.307
One of the things that Adorno gleans from his study of Kant is the dissonance between real 
life conditions, or ‘lived experiences', and the way these are articulated in scholarship. This 
chasm, Adorno insists, arises due to the irreducibility of a ‘thing-in-itself, or ‘nonidentity’,
'()S Martin Jay, 1984, Adorno, p. 25.
'(l<’ David West Continental Philosophy(2"d ed.), (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) p. 20.
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to its concept. Indeed, it is from Kant’s distinctions between phenomena and noumena that 
Adorno develops the idea of nonidentity as a substrate of thought which falls outside the 
process of conceptualization. It is also to the philosopher from Königsberg that Adorno turns 
to for an insight on the subject’s role in the process of understanding. 308 For Kant, 
phenomena are tied to our understanding of an object through its representation by the 
concepts that are available to us: ‘[Ajppearances, so far as they are thought as objects 
according to the unity of the categories, are called phenomena’ . 300 Noumena on the other 
hand correspond to the dimension of the object that exists independently of sensibility; that 
is, an object as a ‘thing-in-itself. 310 Knowledge then, according to this Kantian logic, 
becomes the product of the mediation that occurs between a (transcendental) subject and the 
object that lies within as well as outside of subjective consciousness. The Kantian insistence 
that all knowledge presupposes a concept had a crucial impact on Adorno’s understanding of 
reason. It is Kant’s conception of a thing-in-itself as the object of consciousness that 
becomes, for Adorno, the basis for the relations between the subject and object. Indeed Kant 
notes the interdependence of thought and its object in the Critique o f Pure Reason when he 
proclaims that: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind’ . 311 Even though Kant subsequently tries to resolve the antimony between subject and 
object by dissolving the concrete ‘thing-in-itself to its conceptual exemplification, Adorno 
came away with the certainty that the dignity of knowledge can only be sustained by an acute 
sensitivity to the respective inputs of the subject and the object in knowledge production. 
This sensitizing consciousness has, according to him, been missing from the philosophies of 
his time. In fact, how to achieve this new sensitivity became the defining inspiration of his 
life’s work.
Like Kant, Adorno sees the subject as intrinsic to an understanding of the object. Following 
this line of thought, Adorno further posits the asymmetrical process that takes place in the 
mediation between subjective thought and its object. 312 What he means by this is that in any 
process of mediation, the part of an object that is a thing-in-itself, or its nonidentity, is 
rendered superfluous (or suppressed) in an identitarian logic that seeks closure, as a matter of
308 For Kant’s discussion on phenomena and noumena see Critique o f  Pure Reason, translated by Norman 
Kemp Smith, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965/1921) pp. 257-275.
309 ibid., p. 265-266 (A 249).
310 Ibid
311 ibid., p. 93. This maxim was to be echoed by Adorno later on in Negative Dialectics, when critiquing 
Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology and the Existentialism of Soren Kierkegaard.
(IJ Theodor Adorno, ‘ On Subject and Object’ in Essential Frankfurt School Reader (eds) by A. Arato, and E. 
Gebhardt, (New York: Continuum, 1982).
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principle, in the process of cognition. Like Kant, Adorno secs the presence of the nonidentity 
in an object as the condition of possibility of true knowledge. Without the nonidentity, 
‘cognition would deteriorate into tautology; what is known would be knowledge itself . 313 In 
other words, the process of cognition, for Adorno, depends on two variables that are different 
yet, at the same moment, share a close affinity. That is, ‘knowledge’ is premised on the fact 
that there is an object that, in the process of cognition, becomes the focus of attention of a 
subject that is also an object at the same time. The duality of the subject allows it to 
‘perceive’ the object, uneven as this perception may be. Idealism, for Adorno, does not 
recognize this duality and insists that the concept is a true representation of its object. In so 
doing, it wilfully erases the epistemological ‘distance’ between object and subjective thought 
and as such denies the ‘cavities between what things claim to be and what they are’ . 314 It is in 
this way, Adorno claims, that the object becomes a ‘prisoner’ of abstraction. Indeed, the 
specific way in which subjective thinking assumes total or absolute understanding of an 
object necessitates a process of closure, as it is in closure that the identity of the object is 
finally generated by the concept. For the Frankfurt Scholar, this closure epitomises what he 
terms identity thinking. The problem with Kant is that, in spite of his awareness of the 
limitations of the concept in ‘capturing’ its object, he nevertheless accords primacy to the 
subject in the first Critique. In this way, Kant’s transcendental idealism succumbs to 
identitarian logic.
As a necessary corrective to this ‘wilful’ forgetfulness on the part of the Kantian subject as to 
the true role of the object in knowledge production, Adorno accords ‘preponderance’ to the 
latter in all processes of mediation. 315 The disjuncture between lived experiences and 
conceptual thought, that is, how real life conditions are made to disappear in conceptual 
categories, gradually became real for Adorno as he immersed himself in Kantian logic. 
Consequently he became acutely aware of the historicity of philosophical texts and how truth 
is not readily available given the distance between what is and its conceptual exemplification. 
This new sensitivity helped him to ‘hear’ what Martin Jay describes as:
the subtle expression of material, human suffering submerged in those writings, 
those irreducible cries of pain that idealist systems vainly sought, theodicy-like, 
to transfigure. 316
M'Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 184.
314 Ibid., p. 150.
315 Ibid, p. 184.
316 Martin Jay Adorno, p. 25.
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If the Critique o f Pure Reason brought home, for Adorno, the realisation of the opacity of 
conceptual categories, then it was Hegel’s dialectical method that succinctly sums up the way 
in which conceptual thought ‘dissolves’ the particularistic makeup of the object. Convinced 
of the veracity of the insights embedded within Kantian philosophy as well as Hegelian 
dialectics, Adorno began developing a searing critique of society based on an ingenious 
appropriation of the works of the two philosophers that involves using them as counterfoils to 
each other’s respective positions. By this stage, he is convinced that the only valid form of 
critical thinking is via a dialectical method that is, in turn, sensitised to the idea of the 
nonidentity, that is, a dialectical thinking that is premised on the recognition of the 
incommensurate values that the subject and object bring into mediation. What Adorno 
specifically opposes in the Hegelian cognitive schemata is the way in which the dialectics 
accords primacy to the concept at the expense of the nonidentity of the object. Accordingly 
Hegel, in true idealist fashion, completely disregards the issue of the nonidentity, regarding 
instead that part of the object that falls outside the purview of conceptualisation as totally 
insignificant. In other words, Hegel sees nonidentity as an idle form of existence. 317 In reply, 
Adorno posits, using Kant as a foil, that the Hegelian synthesis completely misses the point, 
that is, the World Spirit or the Absolute only emerges out of an act of ‘violence’ on the 
nonidentity. Hegelian dialectic, in this way, was only able to arrive at its conclusion by 
systematically eliminating all that would not conform to its conceptual gaze. In so doing, it 
posits a totality that, if interrogated by the Kantian idea of nonidentity, would show itself to 
be untrue. 318 Hegel thus, for all his criticism of Kant, nevertheless retains a trace of Kantian 
idealism in his dialectics.
For Adorno, the fault ultimately lies in Hegel’s failure to follow the internal logic of his 
dialectical system. Adorno asserts that the logic of dialectics, that Hegel wilfully overrides, 
lies in its in-built imperative ‘to break the compulsion to achieve identity, and to break it by 
means of the energy stored up in that compulsion and congealed in its objectifications’.3n 
That is, it is a system that seeks to break through the veneer of subjective thought or 
identitarian logic through the power of the subject itself. Hegel’s failure therefore stems from 
his overriding desire to achieve synthetic unity. As a result, he ‘could not admit the untruth in
117 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.S. Also Fred Dallmayr, ‘The Underside o f Modernity’, p. 106.
'Is Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.50. 
m Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 157.
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the compulsion to achieve identity’ . 320 Hegel, in other words, was not critical enough of the 
misrepresentation that comes about as a consequence of the inconsistencies between 
subjective thought and social reality. The crux of the disagreement with Hegel lies in the 
simple fact that Hegel’s logic generates identity at the cost of expunging nonidentity from 
conceptual determination. The Hegelian practise of negating a negation in the aim of 
reaching an ultimate reconciliation (conceptual identity) is spurious therefore. Once Hegel 
had critiqued the Kantian subject, substituting in its place a historical being, he failed to 
further analyse the ‘conditions of possibility' of his own subject based on the subject's own 
historicity. In other words the subject neither exists in a vacuum nor is it immutable but 
rather is conditioned by history itself. By this same token, the production of meanings takes 
place only within definite social parameters or normative horizons.
The legitimacy of a new critique of society must therefore rest on it eschewing any form of 
closure as is depicted by the Hegelian method. The Hegelian thesis of negation of the 
negation, leading to an affirmation (and identity), becomes in the hands of Adorno a 
determinate negation that always leads to further negation. In this way, the Frankfurt scholar 
hopes to show that the aspiration to achieve identity or harmony of perception in a social 
environment that is based on a misrepresentation of social reality, via a process of closure, is 
hollow. As Adorno himself puts it: ‘[TJo negate a negation does not bring about its reversal; 
it proves, rather, that the negation was not negative enough’ . 321 Instead of the emergence of 
identity, the new dialectics would remain ‘open’ in its attempt to give nonidentity its due in 
the course of becoming. The new knowledge that Adorno anticipates from this process is a 
radically different one. For instance, it is not a product of the rules and regulation of modern 
rationality but one that emerges in direct opposition to these rules. Yet at the same time the 
new understanding remains steadfast in its focus on its object of cognition, realising that 
without it knowledge becomes tautological. Hence a negative dialectics with a new 
sensibility is to be based on a:
thinking that approaches its objects openly, rigorously, and on the basis of 
progressive knowledge [and] is also free towards its objects in the sense that it 
refuses to have rules prescribed on it by organised knowledge’.322
320 ibid.
321 ibid., pp. 159-160.
322 Theodor Adorno ‘Why Still Philosophy?’ in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, translated by 
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Adorno came under the influence of Marxism by way of Lukäcs. 323 The publication of 
History and Class Consciousness and its adumbration of how bourgeois consciousness is 
rooted in the commodity principle was a watershed moment in his career as a materialist 
philosopher. 324 For Adorno, Lukäcs’ aims were similar to what Schoenberg’s music sought to 
unveil. This is in the way the composer’s musical pieces were seen as signs of his refusal to 
validate accepted forms of compositions based on the demands of the culture industry. 
Adorno is, indeed, of the view that Schoenberg’s compositions are the musical equivalents of 
a form of analysis that is informed by socialist doctrines current in Germany at the time. 
Schoenberg’s musical pieces, especially his controversial ‘new music’, were thus interpreted 
by Adorno as a form of resistance to ‘the bourgeois principle of tonality ... exposing its 
claims to naturalness in the same way that dialectical thought undermined the pseudo­
naturalism of bourgeois economics’ . 325 This is to say that, for Adorno, Schoenberg’s atonal 
music disrupts ‘the collective continuity’ of administered music. 326 Hence it was at this early 
juncture that Adorno grasps the implications of the bourgeois principle of standardisation and 
how this presumes the exchange principle. Later on, this understanding would form the 
backbone of his critique of modern life-forms. In fact the interfacing of his training in 
philosophy and music left an indelible imprint on his major works later on.
The impact of Lukäcs on Adorno cannot be understated as History and Class Consciousness 
made clear, for Adorno, the affinities between objective reality and the ‘commodity form’ in 
bourgeois society. Just as the commodity form is based on an unequal and dubious exchange 
between labour and capital, so is objective reality dubiously constructed by the internal logic 
of conceptual thought itself. Harking back to a Hegelian theme, Adorno restates how identity 
thinking presupposes a correspondence theory of truth; that is, the logic of identitarian 
thought works on the supposition that the concept and its object are in total harmony. The 
superimposition of this principle onto the dynamics of modem exchange society, epitomised
3 9 7
by the commodity principle, enables idealism to claim that what exists is in fact rational. 
Then using Kant, again as a counterfoil, Adorno goes on to argue that, ironically, it is the
Marx had ‘inverted’ Hegel’s dialectical method giving it a materialist orientation.
Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics: Theodor W Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the 
Frankfurt Institute. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977) p. 27.
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way in which the commodity/exchange principle currently structures capitalist societies that 
renders the correspondence theorem suspect. That is, ‘the concept cannot identify its true 
object’.328 This view subsequently became the basis of his argument that bourgeois society is 
an irrational social form that gives rise to a false reality. However it was the speeific way in 
which Lukäcs equates capitalist reality with reification that enables Adorno to draw a clear 
link between identity thinking and reified consciousness. In other words identity thinking, 
rooted in the correspondence theory of truth, and reified consciousness, patterned by the 
commodity exchange principle, both generate the same reifying effect. The first contributes 
to cognitive paralysis in the field of epistemology, the second to the ossification of relations 
in bourgeois society. As such they share close affinity in the specific sense that they both 
suppress, through a process of abstraction, what they cannot account for.
Adorno’s critique of Enlightenment’s conceptual thought revolves around its claim that it can 
provide summary and true definitions of social reality. He argues that this claim, when 
viewed from the concept of nonidentity, is spurious. In fact, through its suppression of the 
nonidentity of the object -  that element that lies outside all conceptualisations -  conceptual 
thought, in turn, becomes totalising. It pretends, therefore, that ‘nothing’ lies outside its 
conceptual gaze. This critique in the area of epistemology finds its concrete exemplification 
in the capitalist order. As Jarvis pointed out, for Adorno:
[J]ust as the motto of ‘enlightened’ thought is that ‘nothing shall remain 
outside’, that nothing ean be taken as a limit to thought, so the motto of what 
Adorno often refers to as ‘exchange society' is that nothing shall remain outside 
it, that no value shall resist commensurability with exchange value.329
Identitarian logic, in other words, levels out the differences between unlike things. The
levelling of incommensurate values in modem society by identity thinking is quintessential^
reflected in the principle of commodity exchange. Needless to say that this was a Marxian
insight, gleaned from Lukäcsian lenses, on the injustice that lies at the heart of free and fair
exchange in capitalist societies.
Like Hegel and Marx before him, Adomo judiciously appropriates elements of a work by an 
author while at the same time disregarding other parts. This he did also with Histoiy and 
Class Consciousness. In view of it, Adorno argues that the dialectics of Marx, as defined by 
Lukäcs, are basically sound as a critical method of comprehending societal dynamics. He
328 Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 44.
329 Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) p.44.
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however qualifies this support by rejecting both Lukäcs’s Marxian eschatology as well as his 
‘concept of the proletariat as the subject-object ofthat process’ . 330 Furthermore, he does not 
concur with Marx’s insistence that social repression is but an epiphenomenon of the conflict 
that is embedded within the economic structure of society. Adorno offers instead an 
anthropocentric account of the emergence of domination stemming from a ‘primal history of 
subjectivity’ itself. 331 What Adorno means by this is that social domination emerged as a 
mechanism of self-preservation in light of the vagaries of nature and that this repression of 
‘outer nature’ for survival necessitated the suppression of ‘inner nature’ also. This was the 
main theme of the first excursus in the Dialectic. Consequently, he points out, Marx and 
Engels went astray in fusing political power to economic conditions, as if a change in the 
latter will automatically usher in wholesale changes in the former. 332 He pointed to the rise of 
the Soviet Union as having put paid to that erroneous perception. Indeed for him, the story of 
domination is as old as subjective consciousness itself.
The culmination of these various and disparate influences and insights into the nature of 
social reality and the specific ways in which we have come to ‘know’ about it became the 
cornerstone of his negative dialectics. The next section offers a more thorough discussion of 
this.
4.2 Negative Dialectics as a ‘Logie of Disintegration’.
It is clear from above that the notion of a negative dialectics is the culmination of Adorno's 
critical engagement with disparate philosophical traditions. From Kant and Hegel, Adorno 
sees how the primacy of conceptual thought actually fails to do justice to the object in the 
sense that the identity of the object is obtained at the cost of misrepresenting it. This critical 
hermeneutic engagement was later extended to another tradition of thought that was in 
currency in Germany at the time, one that shares some basic misgivings with Adorno on the 
inadequacy of concepts to depict their objects accurately. This tradition is defined by the 
fundamental ontology of Heidegger.
"" Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f  Negative Dialectics, p. 28.
Ul Peter Dews, observed that, "Adorno employs his "primal history of subjectivity’ in order to develop 
searching interpretations o f social, cultural, and aesthetic phenomena, showing how the dominance of identity 
in the form of commodity exchange, and the reification to which it gives rise, shape all aspects of modern 
capitalist society’ -  See The Idea o f  Evil, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) p. 194.
"■ Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 321-323.
102
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger laments how he attempts to do away with the subject 
altogether in favour of a direct appeal to the object. In so doing, Adorno alleges that 
fundamental ontology refuses to acknowledge the social nature of objects. 333 Granted that, in 
agreement with Heidegger, there is an object that is beyond conceptualisation, this object, for 
Adorno, is only understood when it is brought under the prism of conceptual thought. 
Therefore there is no way we can bypass the mediation of the concept by a direct appeal to 
the object.334 By naively accepting what is given, Adorno argues, fundamental ontology 
engenders passivity on the part of the subject to an already a priori truth, forgetting in the 
process that knowledge is already mediated. As he states in Negative Dialectics:
When men arc forbidden to think, their thinking sanctions what simply exists.
The genuinely critical need of thought to awaken from the cultural 
phantasmagoria is trapped, channelled, steered into the wrong consciousness."5
The point that Adorno makes here is two-fold. Firstly, the object is incoherent without the 
subject. That is, it needs the subject to make itself known. Yet by enlisting the subject to its 
cause, the object at the same time highlights the inadequacies of subjective thought in the 
process of cognition. In other words, it is only in this process of giving expression to the 
‘object’ that the object (specifically the nonidentity) in turn reminds the subject of its foibles.
A similar problem, Adorno notes, besets existential philosophies that owe their origins to 
Kierkegaard. Adorno argues that while Kierkegaard may be right in his critique of Hegel’s 
theory of correspondence, he nevertheless falls into the same trap as Hegel. That is, 
Kierkegaard’s existentialism with its emphasis on subjective particularism offers, in Jay’s 
words, a
pseudo-reconciliation of real social contradictions by giving ontological 
significance only to the spiritualized subject. This unwarranted reconciliation 
thus also produced an identity theory despite itself, because it posited an object­
less dialectic of pure subjectivity. " 6
Kierkegaard and Heidegger therefore occupy opposite poles of the epistemological matrix: 
radical subjectivism and radical objectivism respectively. One falls prey to unmediated 
materialism (Heidegger), the other (Kierkegaard) to idealism unbound. This, Adorno posits 
has been the problem besetting thinking since the Copernican revolution in philosophy. That 
is, rhetoric aside, there is a tendency within idealists, on one hand, and exponents of
ibid, p. 84.
" 4 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, p. 11.
" 5 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 85. 
" 6 Martin Jay, Adorno, p. 30,
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ontology, on the other, to fall into an either/or divide. Both forms of thought, in Adorno’s 
view, are guilty of a ‘transcendental delusion’ . 337
In contrast, Adorno maintains that what differentiates Critical theory from ontological, 
existential as well as idealist philosophies is its specific warrant:
The task o f criticizing ideology is to judge the subjective and objective shares 
and their dynamics. It is to deny the false objectivity of concept fetishism by 
reducing it to the social subject, and to deny false subjectivity, the sometimes 
unrecognizably veiled claim that all being lies in the mind.338
This argument is derived from Kant’s explication on the link between concepts and their
objects. 339 By doing so, Adorno highlights how the subject and its object are irrevocably tied
to each other in such a way that absolute primacy can be given to neither. Following from
this Adorno insists that there is a need to dismantle any form of hierarchy between subject
and object in thinking processes. Adorno realises quite well that the act of bringing the object
under the gaze of conceptual thought gives rise to another problem. That is, in order to render
it sensible to the mind, conceptual thought (or identity thinking) subsumes the peculiarity of
the object (specifically, its nonidentity) under the aegis of a cognitive matrix that only
employs generalised concepts in order to understand things. The objective nature o f ‘reality’,
in other words, is always subsumed under its subjective or conceptual component. It is this
problematic of unequal power relations between a subject and its object that was highlighted
in ‘Why Still Philosophy?’ and the reason behind the Frankfurt scholar’s attempt to seek
redress by probing into the possibility of disavowing the positive affirmation that is at the
root of Flegelian idealist philosophy.
Adorno starts by defining his dialectic as the ‘logic of disintegration’. By this he means that 
negative dialectics ‘seeks to free dialectics from such affirmative traits’ as could be evinced 
from its use in the hands of Plato to the positive synthesis of contradictions found in Hegelian 
thought, ‘without reducing its determinacy’ . 340 In other words, it is to be the nemesis of all 
forms of idealism and identitarian logic, which presume a unity between subject and object -
337 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 180-182.
338 ibid, pp. 197-198.
3W Indeed Kant observes the intrinsic nature o f this relationship by noting that ‘Thoughts without content are 
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a unity that arises out of suppressing either the subjective or objective moments of 
thought. 341 In a critique of the idealism of Husserl, Adorno notes:
that the sphere of the factual and the sphere of thought are involved in such a 
way that any attempt to separate them altogether and to reduce the world to 
either of these principles is necessarily doomed to failure. 342
In contrast to this, ‘many philosophies ... reduce subject to object or vice versa and thereby
proclaim false identities’ . 343 Indeed he sardonically observed that all philosophies that
engage themselves in this way come ‘in some way or other into the position of
Münchhausen, who tried to drag himself out of the swamp by his own pigtail’ .344
David Held sums this up by observing that the new order, espoused by Adorno, is one where 
the
subject and object are constituted by one another but are irreducible to each 
other -  neither can be wholly subsumed by the other. They arc internally related, 
inter-dependent structures within which the cognitive process unfolds. 343
Thus Adorno’s movement away from a subject-centred philosophy is to be understood in the 
specific way in which subject and object come together in the act of cognition. For him, the 
whole idea is to move beyond the idea of Critical Theory as just a distinct way of theorisation 
to a ‘way of knowing' or acquiring knowledge that has within itself the conditions of its own 
immanent critique. This way of ‘knowing’ is opposed to science which, for Adorno, is non­
reflexive in the sense that it cannot mount a critique against itself from within. The non- 
reflexivity of science robs it of the ability to acknowledge its own limitations, which in turns 
paves the way for its belief in the self-reinforcing myth that nothing is outside its ambit. This 
is the context from which the authors of the Dialectic alleged that myth has become 
enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology. 346
To be sure, the yearning for a new sensitivity to the object in processes of cognition is driven 
by the conviction that there is an incomplete or indeterminate moment in identity thinking, or 
to paraphrase, there is a discrepancy between the ‘object’ and its ‘concept’. This component 
of indeterminacy (discrepancy) is wilfully ignored in our quest for total mastery of the world
341 This kind o f unity is always ‘false’ since it requires the forceful reduction o f reality into conceptual 
definitions. ‘The whole is the untrue' in Minima Moralin (p. 50) is really Adorno’s rallying call against any 
form of nominalism.
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around us. 347 In doing so, the ‘un-conceptualised’ component of an object, the nonidentity, is 
undermined for the sake of understanding. The suppression of the nonidentity, for Adorno, 
has been the critical component of humanity’s quest for ‘self-preservation. Therein lies the 
problem for Adorno, for self-preservation becomes oxymoronic in the sense that it is 
synonymous with the dehumanisation of the species, the destructions of enclaves of sociality 
leading ultimately to a wrong kind of life.
In order to address this problem, Adorno advocates a way of thought that seeks to nullify the 
asymmetrical power relationship that takes place in any mediation between the concept and 
its object. This will entail a new way of cognisance that valorises the interdependence of the 
subject (that stands for conceptual thought) and the object. For him, as long as we maintain 
the integrity of both and do not reduce one to the other, we are engaging in what he terms 
‘nonidentity thinking’. The salvaging of this new sensitivity towards nonidentity is at the 
heart of Negative Dialectics. 348 Its novelty lies in its attempt to subvert the dynamics of 
organised knowledge, substituting in its stead a new polyvalence based on a constellation of 
ideas that surrounds the object that seeks to be recognised. Adorno hopes, in this way, to 
tackle the ‘fallacies of subjectivism’, which supposes that the world is produced by the 
subjects’ concepts; that objects more or less dissolve into their conceptual exemplifications 
or its antithetical mirror image, fundamental ontology. 349
Adorno’s negative dialectics helps to undermine the hegemonic position of conceptual 
thought by highlighting its inadequacy in describing the object. It is this enlightening aspect 
that negative dialectics, as a mode of thought, brings to reason. Ultimately negative dialectics 
aims to facilitate the proper realignment of the power relationship between the subject and its 
object giving rise to a dialectical method that will aid in, to cite Jameson’s somewhat 
flamboyant expression, ‘the detection of the absent presence of totality within the aporias of
, 350consciousness .
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4.2.1 Negative Dialectics as an Ontology o f the false state o f affairs.
Negative Dialectics then, in a tangible sense, is an epitaph to the failures of the assumptions, 
both historical and epistemological, that are infused within the dialectics of Hegel and Marx. 
Both, for instance, are driven by a belief in the ‘historical directionality' of progress. For the 
former, the culmination of this march of history is epitomized by the emergence of the world 
spirit or absolute, while the latter’s teleology infused within his materialistic inversion of the 
Hegelian dialectics meant the inevitable march of society towards a communist epoch. 
Indeed what enables this utopian speculative moment in both Hegel and Marx is the synthetic 
element embedded within their respective dialectics.
As its point of departure Negative Dialectics eschews the utopian speculative moment that 
arises out of a ‘forced’ synthesis. The abandonment of the synthesis, in both its idealist and 
materialist forms, is justified by Adorno on two grounds -  epistemological and historical. 
Epistemologically, synthesis perpetuates the abstraction that befalls all conceptual thinking: 
an abstraction that glosses over the existence of what cannot be accounted for by conceptual 
language. What we get, consequently, is an ambivalent social reality that misconstrues the 
true nature of our social existence. Historically, the atrocities of the Second World War 
accompanied by the failures of Marxist attempts at social engineering convinced Adorno that 
the basic arguments of his magnum opus, first outlined in the Dialectic, are sound. Put 
another way, the concentration camps of the Second World War brought home to Adorno the 
collusion between technological progress and human barbarity. This was further underscored 
by the emergence of an increasingly oppressive form of government in the USSR under 
Stalin. Cumulatively these developments persuaded him that, in contrast to Hegelian and 
Marxian convictions and eschatologies, the fate of humanity is far from being decided. These 
failures imply that there is no guarantee that the future of society and its survival is assured. 
In fact social regression seems to confirm historical trends. As he laconically puts it, ‘[N]o 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb’.351
Yet it is precisely because of these failures that philosophy, he argues, must continue. In 
other words philosophy lives on because its philosophical realisation in history, forecast by
'^Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 320. See also Theodor Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 
1964-1965, translated by Rodney Livingstone, edited by Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) pp.3^t.
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Marx to accompany the onset of communism, has been thwarted. " To continue however 
this time around, philosophy must shed itself any illusions of a utopian ending.353 It must 
therefore readily accept the inescapable fact that humanity, as a whole, can as easily slide 
into an abyss as liberate itself. This is the ‘new’ dialectic it must embrace; a more reflective 
and less illusionary one. That is, negative dialectics must constantly engage with the 
limitation of conceptual language that it employs and, following this, forgo any pretension 
that utopia is a mirror image of philosophy itself. It is in this new way that negative 
dialectics, as a system of thought, must understand itself and its role. In eschewing all forms 
of synthesis, it must also offer a compelling critique of contemporary society and 
accompanying life-forms in light of the failure ‘to change the world’.354 As such, it must be 
considered as a modality of thought that keeps in mind the idea of the nonidentity355. As a 
mode of thought, it says no more, ‘than that objects do not go into their concepts without 
leaving a remainder ... It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not 
exhaust the thing conceived’.356 This untruth finds social expression in the bourgeois socio­
economic order. The clearest example of this is the existence of the damaged life-form that 
seems to be a natural consequence of capitalism. The existence of bourgeois society, 
therefore, is a reflection of the dominant epistemological matrix in vogue today. An appraisal 
of one is also an evaluation of the other. A critique therefore of dominant knowledge 
structures is also at the same time, for Adorno, an indictment of the lives we are being forced 
to live within an ambivalent social reality. A dialectics that aims to be taken seriously must, 
in the face of this awareness, continuously strive to show the disparity between what is and 
what ought to be. It becomes, in this way, an ontology of the dismal state of things.
35"*
4.2.2 A hermeneutic o f a failed form of Life.
The seed of Adorno’s unrelenting critique of capitalism and its reified effects on 
subjectivities was quite evident in his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt in 1931. On this occasion 
he outlined his theoretical framework as one that revolves around an analysis of capitalism as 
a ‘hermeneutic of a failed form of life’.357 Capitalism, for Adorno, gives rise to a damaged
352 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 3.
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life-form: a form that is mutilated due to the process of standardisation that ensues from the 
exchange principle. Indeed capitalist exchange’s relationship to ‘particularity’ is similar to 
the relationship that identitarian thought has with nonidentity; that is, they both posit a 
‘standard’ that is only possible through a wilful suppression of what they cannot account for. 
For commodities, what cannot be accounted for by the principle of exchange, and is thus 
suppressed during trade, is the qualitative difference that is inherent within them. In a similar 
vein, identitarian thought glosses over what cannot be accounted for by its concepts.3?x The 
logical consequence of this process is that ‘particularity’ is expunged from the concept of 
person. Adorno argues that in the face of this people are treated exactly like the commodities 
that they produce: the latter are reduced to their exchange values while the former becomes 
exclusively associated with labour power. 359 The reduction of both to a point where they 
could be traded with impunity is enabled by the erasure of their exclusive core. Treated like 
the commodities that we produce means that the same market laws that ensures trade in 
bourgeois society become the mainstay of our thought processes and vice versa. In this way 
domination is entrenched in society.
It is perhaps worth repeating at this point that Adorno does not see capitalism as a novel form 
of domination. His ruminations on the subject can be traced back to the Dialectic where he, 
together with Horkheimer, argued that the history of repression harkens back to the ‘primal 
history of subjectivities’. Repression, therefore, is not an exclusive feature of capitalist 
society but is embedded within the psyche of the human mind ever since the emergence of 
self-consciousness. The thing that underpins this ‘false state of affairs’ is the epistemological 
framework on which it is grounded. The common thread that runs through all periods of 
history and their corresponding forms of life is the conviction that mastering the unknown, 
the exotic, the particular, the nonidentity is a pre-condition to life itself. In other words, the 
mindset that ruled ever since humans became conscious of themselves and of their 
surroundings has not changed at all. What has changed is our ever increasing ability to 
manipulate nature (both inner and outer nature) to do our bidding. As such, capitalism 
signifies a new plateau in the reign of tyranny. It also becomes an explanatory schema of 
why there is still so much poverty in a society that has the technological expertise to wipe it 
away from the face of the earth. The crux of the argument put forward by Adorno in relation 
to the failed form of life in capitalist society is that it is but one form of historical life that has
This has been adequately covered in the discussions on Adorno’s Kantian heritage.
359 This is why they complained about how Marx envisioned the world to be a giant work house -  for a 
discussion see Negative Dialectics, p. 206.
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been defined by identity thinking. This is to say that the problem is not capitalism per se but 
what it represents -  the intertwinement of suppressive positivist and idealist tendencies.
4.2.3 Evaluating ‘wrong’ forms o f life.
The Hegelian premises of Adorno’s dialectics allow him to offer a critique of a truncated 
form of reason that is simultaneously a critique of society. The precept that the critique of 
one is also an indictment of the other is one that resonates throughout the works of the 
Frankfurt School in that period.3(1(1 Just as reason has been colonised by identity-thinking and 
utilitarianism so has society succumbed to the ideological twinning of the philosophies of 
idealism and positivism. For Adorno, positivism harkens back to idealism in the way that it 
expresses its conservativism -  by imagining nothing exists outside itself. Therefore the real is 
rational also for positivism. Adorno argues that the Hegelian identificiation o f ‘rational’ and 
‘real’ has grave consequences on the ability of immanent critique to highlight the 
contradictions between what ‘is’ in society and what it ‘ought’ to be. Yet if history has been 
marked by the long march of failed life-forms in one guise or another, how then can we 
differentiate between forms of life or even argue that the life we are currently living is a 
failure? In other words, how can we know, given that there is no distinction between is and 
ought, that a ‘form of life’ is failing or wrong?
The answer, for Adorno, lies in a critical evaluation of what currently ‘exists’ in society. 
Take for instance the implicit presence of suffering. The fact that suffering in its many forms 
continue to exist in a world that has at its disposal the means of eradicating most of the root 
causes of these phenomena, is indicative that all is not as it should be: ‘[T]he smallest trace 
of senseless suffering in the empirical world belies all the identitarian philosophy that would 
talk us out of that suffering’ . 361 To be sure, ‘suffering’ here is not meant to be taken literally 
as an empirically observable phenomenon or linguistically articulated experience, as this 
would mean that suffering is bound by its specific contexts. What Adorno has in mind is far 
more ambitious. In entwining the notion of suffering with the deformity in our capacity to 
reason, he posits a context-transcending concept of suffering that would be applicable 
everywhere at all times. As Honneth succinctly puts it, the concept of suffering, for Adorno,
360 Herbert Marcuse famous phrase o f ‘one-dimensional man’ was meant to highlight the deformity of reason in 
the era of late capitalism. For an overview of Herbert Marcuse’s discussion on this issue, see Myriam 
Malinovich, ‘Marcuse in 1978: An Interview’, Social Research Vol. 48, No. 1 (Summer 1981) pp. 372-376. 
Horkheimer offers a similar analysis in his Eclipse o f Reason. (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 
1974).
361 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203.
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is ‘transcendentally presupposed everywhere there is the justified suspicion that human 
beings experience a loss of their self-realisation and happiness through the restriction of their 
rational capacities’ . 362 This loss is felt physically as well as mentally, since thought has a 
somatic character. Following Freud, Adorno thinks that the presence of suffering does not 
only mean that we are living in a form of life that has failed us. The existence of suffering 
also anticipates resistance against it: ‘[T]he physical moment tells our knowledge that 
suffering ought not to be, that things should be different’ .363 The question that follows in 
light of this is: at what level is resistance to the suffering around us possible?
Adorno is not convinced that it is possible to act autonomously in the current climate in light 
of the fact that at ‘countless moments external -  notably social -  reality evade the decisions 
designated by the words “will” and “freedom” ’ . 364 This observation is important in a number 
of ways. First by admitting the influence of external reality on the supposed autonomy of the 
subject, Adorno is in fact disputing the validity of Kant’s transcendental subject. Instead he 
holds that the subject is an empirical as well as a historical being. This means that just as we 
actively set out to change the conditions of our existence, these same historical conditions, to 
a certain extent, determine the parameters in which this can be done. This insight can be 
traced back to Marx and his observation in The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte to 
the effect that both autonomy and history are the basic ingredients of social change, his 
insistence that the freedom of humanity are circumscribed by the historical circumstances 
that it finds itself in. 365 Secondly, the extent of historical or structural determination in 
bourgeois society effectively robs the concepts o f ‘will’ and ‘freedom’ of any substance. It is 
because of the reified effects of capital and its institutions that humans have been reduced 
‘more and more to the status of functions’ . 366 True and meaningful resistance, therefore can 
only be achieved at on the level of the species. Adorno’s call then is a universal call to arms, 
for solidarity against a failed form of life. 367
One of the criticisms levelled against Adorno’s attempt at resisting and changing the status 
quo stems from his perceived lack of appreciation of the epistemological grounds from which
362 Axel Honneth, ‘A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life', p. 60.
363 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203. This is similar to Freud’s insistence that a psychological 
neurosis is, by its very nature, also a call for ‘recovery’ or deliverance.
364 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 213.
'<,s Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Napoleon, (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2008/1852) p .l . 
366Theodor Adorno, History and Freedom, p. 5.
367 Flabermas held similar views about the need to recover from suffering in Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 
214, 220. That is, before his turn to a universal pragmatics.
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he makes the attempt. Habermas, for instance, deplores the way in which Adorno steadfastly 
held on to the philosophy of consciousness while simultaneously launching a radical critique 
against it.3f,s He does not agree, therefore, with Adorno that the contradictions embedded 
within a negative dialectics stem from the conflicts that are there in society itself. For 
Habermas, Adorno’s problems stem from not having an adequate appreciation of language 
and how this could have saved him from making the philosophical and analytical mistakes 
that he did. To be sure the route that was supposedly not taken by Adorno was actually one 
that the First generation Frankfurt scholar had travelled although not in the way Habermas 
had in mind. This is the theme of the next section.
4.3 ‘The Road not taken’: Adorno’s conception of language
The parameters of Adorno’s theory of language can be discerned from his polemical 
engagement with other currents of thought in Europe (particularly in Vienna and Germany) 
at the turn of the last century. Hohendahl notes for instance that Lukäcs’ critique of linguistic 
reification in History and Class Consciousness impacted greatly on Adorno’s view on 
language.v 1 Benjamin’s influence on Adorno's conception oHanguage, moreover, cannot be 
overstated as he played a prominent role in sensitizing Adorno to the problems besetting 
philosophy and aesthetics as well as the problematic nature of language as a medium of 
truth. 370 For Adorno, language, as a medium of conceptual thought, is both disabling and 
enabling. It is disabling in the sense that the concepts it uses to articulate reality conjures up a 
social ‘whole’ that is false. Yet it is also enabling due to the fact that it is exclusively through 
language that we are able to have an account of the nature of our social reality. The problem 
of a language-based reason for Adorno is intrinsic to the properties of language itself vis-a- 
vis the articulation of reality. Granted that without language, reason cannot be deployed, it is 
nevertheless important to keep in mind the way in which language and reality are 
dialectically entwined. Both show up the inadequacy of the other. In this paradoxical way, 
language enables and simultaneously limits the capacity of reason to grasp reality. Adorno 
maintains that language is not only poorer than the reality it strives to express but also more.
See chapter 3 for an account of the ‘performative contradiction’ in Adorno’s critique.
'I,'> Peter Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought: Theodor W. Adorno. (London: Nebraska University Press 1995) p. 
218.
'7" Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f  Negative Dialectics, p. 21. Buck-Morss further observes that Benjamin’s 
influence is such that by the close of the 1920s, Adorno’s pieces were practically littered with the lexicons 
developed by his friend.
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Language is more in the sense that it has words that do not have empirical exemplifications 
such as verbs and grammar, 371 However, it is also poorer in the sense that it inevitably 
reverts to generalized abstractions when seeking to represent reality. Reaffirming this lesser 
sense of language, Müller remarks:
[I]t is well known, for example, that it is possible to perceive many more colours 
than can be articulated in language. One must only try to give a precise 
description of the rich palette of the fall foliage in order to experience, in a flash, 
the poverty of language’. '72
Adorno highlights this conceptual problematic in his discussion of nonidentity. For him 
dialectics advances the view that abstraction is the inevitable way in which language 
suppresses the facticity or concreteness of the object, while in the same breath he insists on 
the indispensability of language itself in thought.
The dialectical way in which he approaches language is nowhere more succinct in Negative 
Dialectics than in the section on Heidegger. According to Adorno, fundamental ontology 
simplistically accords perception an unjustifiable cognitive status. Heidegger does this via a 
direct appeal to the ‘thing’ itself by means of ‘intellectual intuition’. In other words, 
intellectual intuition as an intuitive process is supposed to be the means by which language is 
bypassed on our way to grasping ‘being’ in its immediacy. 373 Truth, for Heidegger, is 
therefore self-disclosing. On the contrary, Adorno maintains that there can neither be any 
‘direct’ appeal to things nor are things self-evident. A disingenious acceptance of what is 
given without accepting the mediated nature of ‘being’ engenders a passivity on the part of 
the subject to an already pre-given truth. This makes Heidegger’s position closer, ironically, 
to the positive sciences and against speculative thought or metaphysics. 374 Against 
Heidegger, Adorno insists that any form of reality is already mediated. In pointing out the 
disparity between language and reality, Negative Dialectics reminds us of this. For Adorno, 
all attempts at grasping reality that bypass language are doomed, for they assume that 
‘legitimate thinking is nothing other than the ability to perceive it’ .375 As such, thinking 
without the use of concepts, and therefore language, cannot call itself thinking at all. 376 
Hence Adorno’s philosophy of language, like thought itself, rests on the ambivalent ground
371 Another example would be the word ‘unicorn’ -  it depiets something in the mind without that something 
manifesting itself empirically.
372 Harro Müller ‘Mimetic Rationality: Adorno's Project of a Language of Philosophy’, New German Critique 
Vol. 36 No. 3 (Fall 2009) p. 95.
373 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, translated by J Stambaugh, (New York: Harper Row, 1972). 
374Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, pp. 8-9.
375 Ibid, p. 9.
37<’ Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 98.
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that it is at the same time necessary although inadequate. This is where, nonidentity, once 
again, plays a crucial role.
Nonidentity, for Adorno, is a constant reminder of the asymmetrical nature of the mediation 
between conceptual language and reality. Language allows us to grasp things by its never 
ending quest ‘to express the inexpressible’ . 377 In other words, the strength and weakness of 
language in the grounding of understanding are inseparable. The realisation that language 
lends voice to the object, even though it may not be authentic, is enough to give us hope for a 
future where the ‘violence’ and deception that lies at the heart of the relationship between 
language and its object would be no more. Adorno thus argues that one cannot escape the 
language of subject-centred philosophy. One must rather use this language to break the 
hegemony of the concept over its object. This is what he means by ‘using reason to transcend 
itself. It is this conviction that the utopian moment in Adorno becomes illuminated. It 
suggests that for language to truly reflect what it tries to represent, a total transformation of 
society is warranted. This kernel of truth, for Adorno, is only rendered implicit through a 
dialectical approach that will throw light on the shortcomings of reason and its medium, 
language. In light of this, Adorno puts forward the idea of a dialectical consciousness, one 
that uses the conceptual language of philosophy to delineate truth, whilst simultaneously 
realising that its own account of truth remains inadequate due to the sediment within the 
object that falls outside conceptualisation itself. Hohendahl aptly describes this ambivalence 
to language by noting that, for Adorno, language is both, ‘inadequate and indispensable’ . 378 
The problem besetting language as a medium of thought is comprehensively addressed in 
Adorno’s various writings, although he has not written exclusively on the subject per se. But 
even Tess-philosophically oriented’ works such as Aesthetic Theory contains an outline of his 
approach to a philosophy of language. 379 In fact it is here that the tension between 
(conceptual) language and truth is worked out more substantively. For Adorno, it is in the 
explication of works of art that the limitation of philosophical language is thrown into sharp 
relief. In other words, the problematic relationship between subject and object in 
epistemology comes across in aesthetics as the problem of articulating the truth content of 
individual art works. What this means is that works of art, for Adorno, are quite pivotal to 
philosophy, since they serve as incessant reminders to conceptual language of its 
inadequacies. It is through this conviction that the utopian moment in Adorno becomes
377 ibid, p. 108.
'7^  Peter Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, p. 221.
,77 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. (London: Continuum, 1997).
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illuminated, because it suggests that for language to truly reflect what it tries to represent, a 
total transformation of society is warranted. This kernel of truth, for Adorno, is only rendered 
explicit through a dialectical approach that will throw light on the shortcomings of reason 
and its medium, language. The alternative provided by Heidegger, therefore, of appealing 
directly to an ‘immediate access to transcendence’ would be guilty of a form of delusion that 
is based on an unmediated materialism. 380
Thus from an Adornian point of view, the primacy of language in communicative reason is 
spurious. For it connotes a subtle movement towards the search for ‘first principles’ which 
has been the plague of the more influential western philosophical traditions. Language-based 
consensus, when viewed from an Adornian perspective, exhibits the properties of a ‘first’, or 
founding principle, in the way it involves the adoption of rational validity claims on which 
consensus rests. Indeed whether this claim is an amalgamation of different validity claims put 
forward during contestations or otherwise is beside the point. By insisting on a language- 
centred reason, Habermas seems to have fallen prey to the search for first principles. This is 
truly ironic in the case of Habermas, since he saw language as the ‘exit’ from the aporias of 
subject-centred reason. 381
Given the insufficiency of conceptual language to present truth in his own account of subject- 
object mediation, Adorno introduces a matrix that will allow the mediation between language 
and reality in such a way that both the truth and falsity of language is thrown into sharp relief 
in the process. This he does by the idea of ‘constellational thought’ and it is to this we will 
turn to next.
4.4 The Dynamics of Negative Dialectics: the idea of Constellations.
Susan Buck-Morss notes that Adorno’s primary aim in constructing constellations is ‘to 
discover the truth of the social totality (which can never be experienced in itself) as it quite 
literally appeared within the object in a particular configuration’ . 382 In other words, 
constellations or what Benjamin refers to as ‘historical images’, offer a way of conceiving 
the nonidentity together with its conceptual other, thus, enabling a peek into a moment of an
'X() Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 180-183. Also Simon Jarvis, Adorno, p. 150.
'Sl Thomas McCarthy notes in his introduction to the Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity that the key to 
understanding Habennas lies ‘...in his rejection o f the “paradigm of consciousness” and its associated 
“philosophy o f the subject” in favour of the through-and-through intersubjectivist paradigm of “communicative 
action” -  sec Jürgen Habennas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. x.
's: Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics, p. 96.
115
ever-changing totality. This is done in the full knowledge that the construction of these 
dialectical images involves the continuous ‘regrouping’ of the constitutive elements of 
phenomena in the ‘renewed attempt to picture the essence of society’. Constellations do 
not present themselves as texts to be read but as codes (ciphers) of social reality that need to 
be deciphered. In this way Adorno distinguishes himself from the philosophers of the 
hermeneutic school, such as Gadamer, who work from the supposition that the meanings 
behind texts are stable and need only to be uncovered.
Adorno's thinking in terms of ‘constellations’ is specifically attributed to Benjamin’s Origin 
o f German Tragic Drama. Benjamin starts this work by drawing a distinction between truth 
and knowledge. For him truth is a unity of essences (or ‘ideas’) while knowledge is a product 
of conceptual unity. 384 Furthermore, ‘[A]s a unity of essence rather than conceptual unity, 
truth is beyond all question (s/c) ’ . 385 The notion of truth, for him, is given form through ‘the 
dance of represented ideas’ or constellations. 386 Just as a constellation is a pattern where 
individual stars can be rendered more recognisable, so do ideas come together in a way in 
which objects are given true meanings.387 In the hands of Adorno, however, the idea of 
constellations takes a different course for, unlike Benjamin, he is convinced that ideas cannot 
be radically separated from concepts. Ideas, therefore, are in essence conceptual ideas and as 
such are also open to interrogation. This is to say that ideas can only be thought through and 
in fact are given coherence by their concepts. 388 In the same way, for Adorno, social reality is 
given meaning by the mediation between subjective thought and nature. In other words, 
social reality can only be inferred from a particular constellation at any one time. That is, it 
exists as a cipher. As such, negative dialectics becomes a ‘decoding process’ that provides an 
access to truth using a continuous process of interpretation, which shows the multifaceted 
sides of truth in its various constellations. In each instance, a ‘figure’ emerges that can be 
accepted as a basis, fleeting as it may be, from which truth is grasped. 384 What this means is
384 Walter Benjamin, The Origin o f German Tragic Drama, translated by John Osborne, (New York: Verso, 
1998) p. 30.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid, p. 29.
3X7 David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 206-208 offers concrete evidence of the influence of 
Benjamin on Adorno.
'88 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 164. Also see Simon Jarvis, Adorno, pp. 175-176. 
m  Theodor Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy’, Telos 31 (Spring 1977) p. 120.
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that each time subjective thought sets out to decipher social reality, it is helped on its quest 
by a social reality that provides an image for concepts to ‘grind against’ . 390
To grasp the impetus behind the idea of constellation and what is new in this approach, one 
has to keep in mind a few things. The first of these is that Adorno’s constellations are 
constructed as antitheses to the principle of commodity exchange which, for him as for Marx 
before him, defines capitalist relations. Indeed, Marx in Capital first highlighted the 
abstraction that takes place in the process of commodity-exchange between different things. 
That is, exchange, or representation, is made possible through the elision that takes place 
between incommensurable values. This social process reminds Adorno of the abstraction that 
takes place in identitarian/conceptual undertakings in which the nonidentity is subsumed by 
subjective thought. In Adorno’s view, the common thread that binds identitarian thought 
together with commodity exchange is the misapprehension that gives priority to subjective 
thinking. Thus, in light of these considerations, the idea of thinking in terms of constellations 
seeks to reintroduce what has been glossed over in the process of identitarian thinking and 
concomitantly, commodity-exchange. In so doing it presupposes a transformative change 
both in the structure of our thought systems as well as in our society.
Susan Buck-Morss explains that constellational thinking involves three procedures: 
differentiation, nonidentity and active transformation. The first procedure involves an 
adequate articulation of ‘nuances which pinpointed the concrete, qualitative differences 
between apparently similar phenomena’ .391 What this means is that the idea of thinking in 
terms of constellations must start from a new form of dialectical consciousness that is alert to 
the limitations of conceptual thinking in ‘capturing’ its object. What brings about this new 
orientation in thought is a new ‘openness’ between conceptual thought and mimetic 
reaction. 392 The ‘openness’ between two different forms of understanding culminates in the 
acceptance of their nonidentity, or following Buck-Morss - ‘extremes’. The second step in 
this process involves ‘juxtaposing extremes’. This includes ‘discovering not only the 
similarity of opposites but also the connecting links (the “inner logic”) between seemingly 
unrelated elements of a phenomenon’ .393 Thus the beginning of constellational thinking 
involves differentiating between the constitutive elements that together make up a
390 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 44-45. Also sec Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics, p. 98.
391 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 98.
392 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 45.
393 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 100.
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phenomenon and then mediating between these elements using a ‘key’ that is made up of a 
cluster of themes. In her own words:
[T]he phenomena first needed to be broken up, their relevant components 
isolated and conceptualised, and here philosophy depended on the humanistic 
and social sciences, whose task it was to research and analyse the empirical data 
in a way that made them accessible to philosophical deciphering.399
What remains is the questions of how objects release what is stored within them to
constellational thinking. The keys to deciphering the rearranged elements of society are
found, for Adorno, in the Marxist and Weberian and Freudian concepts depicting capitalism
such as class, ideology, commodity structure, profit motive, market chances as well as
subjective motivations to succeed. 395 Using ‘ideal types’ as analogies, Adorno explains how
objects are unlocked by a constellation of concepts. 399 That is, just as Weber uses concepts
such as profit motive, opportunity costs, free labour and a rational legal order amongst other
things to assist in defining the cover concept of capitalism as an object of analysis, so are
objects unlocked ‘by gathering concepts round the central one that is sought’, forming a
constellation that will, ‘attempt to express what that concept aims at, (and) not to
circumscribe it to operative ends’ . 397 These Weberian profiles are then reconfigured in the
light of Marx’s insights on the fetish character of commodities as well as their exchange
value and how these give rise to reification. This is further complemented by ‘Freudian
concepts such as anxiety, sadomasochism and ego-weakness’.
As a dialectical materialist Adorno demands that the preponderance (as opposed to the
primacy) of the object must be the guiding light in how we use concepts to unlock objects.
This novel way of approaching knowledge, based on the preponderance of the object, is
based on Adorno’s belief that all knowledge is generated by active construction and
interpretation. Moreover these cognitive processes must be anchored in an appreciation of the
irreducibility of the object to conceptual manipulations. Shane Phelan puts this position
across clearly by noting that constellative thinking is a process where:
[I]deas do not “penetrate” to the essence of things, but illuminate them in their 
relations to other things; they are thus dependent upon particular historical forms 
of relations, as well as the internal constitution of such ideas.399
339 ibid., p. 97.
393 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 165-166.
396 Ibid, pp. 164-166.
397 ibid, p. 166. For him Weber’s example shows a third way thinking beyond that of positivism and idealism 
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399 Shane Phelan, ‘Interpretation and Domination: Adorno and the FIabermas-Lyotard Debate’, Polity Vol. 25 
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Surviving the pitfalls of a negation of negation, on one hand, and an ontological abstraction 
reminiscent of Heidegger, on the other, implies that the ‘unifying moment’ comes into being 
or derives its concretising moment not from a hierarchical ordering of concepts culminating 
into a classificatory system that produces an identity that is arbitrary in nature. It survives 
because it comes into being from a constellation of concepts one that gives equal emphasis 
to all the individual concepts in the constellation. Objectivity in this way is derived from the 
relations between the concepts in a constellation as opposed to their hierarchical ordering at 
any given time. 400 As a direct result, the dialectical usage of Weberian, Marxian and 
Freudian categories results in a transformative effect on the same categories, culminating in 
the alteration of both concepts and constitutive elements of a phenomena and so giving rise 
to a new representation -  a novel way of experiencing what is otherwise deemed to be a pre­
given truth. The resultant ‘image’, eschewing any form of synthesis, ‘illuminates 
contradictions rather than negating or sublating them’ .401
In an attempt to add more clarity to an otherwise esoteric formulation, Adorno drew an 
analogy between the dynamics of constellations and that of language. For him constellations, 
like language, provide the context in which concepts come together.402 The context, in this 
instance, is not the mind or spirit as it is for Hegel. It is a ‘force-field’ that enables each 
concept to come into contact with others in the act of defining or expressing things. 
Language supplies the vocabulary as well as the ‘rules' (hence force field) for using 
conceptual words; that is, it supplies the tools and conditions under which meanings are to be 
generated in an authentic manner. In this way language does not determine identity in the 
same way that mind or spirit generates things.
Identitarian logic, on the other hand, works on the premises of conceptual progression, with 
the most basic of concepts subsumed by more complex ones until a generic principal identity 
that arises from a unity of definitions is reached.403 The progression of concepts from simple 
to complex entails a determinate negation of nonidentity from each concept concerned. 
Identity is achieved only when the nonidentity has been totally eliminated. The ‘closure’ that
"^Concepts arc historical so change in concepts leads to changing relationship between them, giving rise to new 
meaning in the process. This is what differentiates Adorno from his friend Benjamin who harbours a 
transcendental notion of truth.
""Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f  Negative Dialectics, p. 102.
102 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
404 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 162. Again, Adorno both follows and extend the work of Kant who 
deems this process as ‘synthetic unities’, made possible by the aid of categories, from the ‘manifold’ see 
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, (London: Penguin Classics, 2007) p. xliii.
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ensues, for Adorno, is one where the conceptual exemplification of the object portrays itself 
to be at one with its object. In this way thought sustains its pseudo-claim that nothing lies 
outside itself and the fate of the nonidentity dissolves in the process of closure. This is how 
Identity is achieved within conceptual or identitarian logic.404
A negative dialectics, by contrast, also seeks unification - only this time, ‘[T]he unifying 
moment survives without a negation of negation, but also without delivering itself to 
abstraction as a supreme principle’.40^  Thinking in terms of constellations thus affords us 
meanings minus the aporias associated with the ‘conceptual closure' associated with 
idealism. Meaning in this instance, is generated, instead, by the union between the object and 
its nonidentity through a constellation of concepts. For him,
Constellations represent from without what the concept has cut from within: the 
‘more’ which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of being. By 
gathering around the object of cognition, the concepts potentially determine the 
object’s interior. They attain, in thinking, what was necessarily excised from 
thinking.406
To put it simply, the arrangement of concepts in a constellation, for Adorno, is an attempt to
erase the deformities of understanding that comes via conceptual thought. In this vein, a
constellation fashions meanings out of the specific ways it arranges concepts around a thing
to be defined without defining the concepts themselves. The concepts, in turn, would
highlight the nature of the nonidentity not through a classificatory process, but rather,
through the specific ways in which a language or constellation places them in relation to the
object in order to generate ‘unifying moments. 407 Phelan, once again, succinctly sums up this
process of understanding based on constellations by noting that:
The constellation thus provides order without system. Without order, without 
patterns, riddles could not be solved, for there would be no meaningful 
juxtapositions of elements. Systems, however, imply and express not simply 
juxtapositions but Laws, causality, hierarchy of being.408
The implications from this are worth considering. Firstly, Adorno is of the view that it is only 
through the deployment of a constellation of concepts that the ‘power of the subject' can 
survive without succumbing to identity or classificatory thinking. The constellation, in other 
words, prevents the process whereby the concepts superimpose themselves on the object of
1114 Adorno observes that ‘When thinking follows its law of motion unconsciously, it turns against its own sense, 
against what has been thought, against that which calls a halt to the flight of subjective intentions. The dictates 
of autarky condemn our thinking to emptiness’ -  see Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 149.
405 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
406 Ibid.
4,17 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
408 Shane Phelan, ‘Interpretation and Domination’, p. 604.
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study. Instead the concepts are made to constantly rearrange themselves around the object in 
ways that would allow for the totality -  the interdependence of identity and its other -  to 
emerge. Secondly, the idea of thinking in terms of constellations preserves the dignity of both 
subjective thought and the object of cognition. That is, thinking manages to evade the pitfalls 
of abstraction associated with either materialism or idealism, or between existentialism 
(Kierkegaard), phenomenology (Husserl) and fundamental ontology (Heidegger) on one side 
and idealism epitomised by Hegelian dialectics on the other. Indeed the causes of 
abstractions in these systems stem from according primacy (as in first principle) to either the 
object or the subject. The former is exemplified by reified consciousness which, erroneously, 
perceives the status quo as pre-given or natural. This kind of consciousness is prevalent in 
societies where the principle of commodity-exchange has a predominant sway over other 
forms of social relationships. The latter, on the other hand, is represented by positivist 
thought and, as portrayed in the Dialectic, leads to the domination of both outer and inner 
natures. Politically both forms of abstraction justify the perpetuation of the status quo. They 
either cultivate passivity and acquiescence on the part of the subject by denying ‘power to its 
reason', or use the ‘power of reason’ to erect an ideological smokescreen that would 
effectively curtail resistance to the status quo.
Yet despite the problems associated with identitarian thinking, Adorno does not advocate a 
simple substitution of classificatory thinking (where a thing is known by the category it 
comes under and not by what it is in-itself) by a nonidentitarian reason. This is because of 
two interrelated reasons: first, for all his criticism of Hegel, Adorno still subscribes to a 
dialectics whose truth is generated within the mediation of subject and the object. Analysis of 
one, for him, is nonsensical without the other. Second is the fact that nonidentity on its own 
is incoherent. In other words, it cannot be directly known: ‘[T]he nonidentical is not to be 
obtained directly\ 409 What he means by this is that it cannot be obtained in the same way 
identity is attained in Hegelian dialectics; that is, by a simple process of ‘closure’ that 
denotes the positive synthesis of two opposing forces. As such nonidentity thinking cannot be 
used to positively construct a qualitatively different society in the way that Habermas's 
model can. To do so, for Adorno, converts nonidentitarian logic back to identity thinking. As 
he puts it, ‘[T]o equate the negation of negation with positivity is the quintessence of 
identification; it is the formal principle in its purest form’ .410 For Hegel to insist on the
409 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 158.
4nibid.
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soundness of his classificatory schemata is, in Adorno’s views, to succumb to the same logic 
that his dialectical method finds problematic: the same logic that undergirds identitarian 
thought. Adorno’s disagreement with Hegel therefore, is not over the dialectical method per 
se, but rather over its synthetic orientation in the hands of its master. As he points out, in 
Hegel’s dialectics, identity ‘springs from the method -  not from the thing’ .411 This one­
sidedness, according to the Frankfurt scholar, is the link that idealism shares with positivism.
If we are to gain a true knowledge of the object, then we must give it the opportunity to 
unlock itself to us. This can only happen if the subject allows the object to animate the 
subject’s understanding about the nature of the object. Adorno notes that this entails the 
subject trying to comprehend the object of analysis via the classificatory way in which 
concepts are deployed, while the object (material substance) becomes the basis of ‘resistance 
which otherness offers to identity’ .412 We are to ‘think’ our way through to a non-identitarian 
comprehension by pushing subjective thought towards its own limits as these are defined by 
the rules and systems of reasoning. It is at the limits of the classificatory system that the 
condition of possibility for nonidentity thinking is enabled -  one that arranges concepts in a 
constellation so that each concept is accounted for and not subsumed by other concepts. This 
constellational arrangement ensures that the totality of each concept's contribution to the 
whole is duly noted.41' Thinking in terms of constellations, therefore, requires the role of the 
subject in arranging the constitutive elements of a phenomenon in an order that will facilitate 
meaning via an interpretive, rather than a reductive process. Understanding of the object is 
achieved via a ‘unifying moment’ that arrives, in contradistinction to Hegel, ‘without a 
negation of negation’: a moment that also, in the process, refrains from succumbing, ‘to 
abstraction as a first principle414. The dual features of this ‘unifying moment’ serve to 
highlight the distance between Hegel and Adorno on one hand and that between the latter and 
Heidegger on the other.415 The one thing that the other two share in common, Adorno argues, 
is that both presupposes the primacy of the subject and identitarian thought: one overtly and 
in direct opposition to the logic of his own dialectic, while the other does so covertly. This 
Heidegerian stance is succinctly summarised in Adorno’s critique of Husserl’s attempt to
411 ibid, p. 159.
4'~ibid, pp. 160-161.
413 ibid, p. 163.
414ibid, p. 162.
413 For all his attempts to bypass conceptual thought by appealing directly to the thing (immediacy), Heidegger 
forgets the mediated nature of the thing.
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overcome the problem of subject-object relations. 416 For Adorno, the only valid stance, in the 
face of all these, is a philosophy that ensures the preponderance of the object in its analysis 
and a materialism that recognises the need for the subject to articulate its (material) reality.
The discussion above shows at some length the kernel of Adorno’s thoughts pertaining to 
society and the need to transform it. Unlike Habermas, Adorno persists in deploying the 
power of the subject to break the ‘veneer of subjectivity’ present in all identitarian systems of 
thought. Ironically this position lies at the very heart of the perception that Adorno’s radical 
critique of society entraps him within an epistemological paradox. The next sub-section takes 
us back to this contentious issue and attempts to (re)present Adorno’s position in a way that 
follows the trajectories of constellational thinking closely.
4.5 The Idea of Determinate Negation as Disclosing Critique: A defence against 
Performative contradiction.
There is no doubt that contemporary interrogations of the relevancy of the type of analysis 
inherent in the Dialectic have been influenced heavily by what Habermas has to say on the 
matter.417 Indeed his claim that the Dialectic suffers from a performative contradiction in the 
way it offers a totalised critique of the rational potentials of the Enlightenment has been a 
kind of a touchstone for subsequent social theorists’s opinion of the seminal text produced by 
Horkheimer and Adorno. We now turn to a more detailed account of Habermas’s claim of an 
epistemological paradox inherent in the Dialectic in order to have better appreciation of the 
issues at stake.
Habermas’s Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity contains a series of lectures that together 
makes a compelling case against the aporias of the French poststructuralist school of thought. 
Reading the book, one begins to sense that there is more to the chronological order in which 
the chapters are arranged. It is as if the author, in attacking poststructuralism, also wants to 
indict Adorno in the process. A close reading, however, of the Philosophical Discourse o f 
Modernity throws up some interesting insights into Habermas's critique against his mentor, 
the most interesting being that the Dialectic was re-read through the genealogical lenses 
provided by Foucault. Consequently, this seminal text was brought closer to
116 Theodor Adorno, 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism’, pp. 5-18.
417 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (I), pp. 77-86. Also sec Jürgen Habermas Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, pp. 106-130.
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poststructuralism than it otherwise would have been. In the preface of the Philosophical 
Discourse o f Modernity, Habermas admits that the lectures on the different strands of 
poststructuralism and their antecedents were delivered between 1983 and 1984 while ‘The 
Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment’, the chapter that contains his critique of the 
Dialectic, was written a year earlier and was included because of what he saw as affinities 
between this work and the arguments of poststructuralism. Peter Hohendahl makes the same 
point in suggesting that what transforms Habermas’s stance on the legacy of Adorno and 
Horkheimer from sympathetic yet critical to acrimonious is the elective affinity between the 
Nietzschean-inspired analyses of poststructuralism and the critique of society propagated by 
the Dialectic. According to Habermas, both suffer from performative contradictions. In view 
of the fact that the 1980s and the decade preceding it were periods marked by the ascendency 
of poststructuralist thought, it was not surprising that this was also the point that Habermas 
made the ‘break’ with his theoretical forebears.418
But is Habermas justified in conflating the impulses of the Dialectic (namely its negative 
dialectics) with poststructuralist texts whose analyses were also exposed to withering 
criticism? This question is pertinent in light of the agreement by poststructuralist and 
Frankfurt theorists on the fundamental difference that separates Adorno from 
poststructuralism. According to Jean-Francois Lyotard, Adorno is anything but a 
poststructuralist. In a highly polemical publication, the French postmodernist, who 
announced to the world the ‘death’ of the subject of history by proclaiming that we are living 
in an age that is marked by an incredulity towards metanarratives, stated that the ‘dissipation 
of subjectivity in and by capitalism’ is perceived as a setback by the Frankfurt Scholar.4u 
The difference between negative dialectics and poststructuralism, as noted by Peter Dews, is 
that the fonner offers:
some of the conceptual tools with which to move beyond what is increasingly 
coming to appear, not least in France itself, as a self-destruetively indiscriminate 
and politically ambiguous assault on the structures of rationality and modernity 
in toto.42"
4lh For an account of the evolution of Habermas’s views on the Dialectic, see Peter Hohendahl, 'The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment Revisited’, p. 5.
4l)Jean-Francois Lyotard, ‘Adorno as the Devil’, Telos V.9 (1974), p. 127. For the difference between Adorno’s 
notion of historical truth and ‘the spectacle o f the free play of liberated textual elements’ see Max Pensky 
‘Editor’s Introduction: Adorno’s Actuality’ (ed) The Actuality o f  Adorno: Critical Essays on Adorno and the 
Postmodern ' edited by Max Pensky (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997) p. 11.
420 Peter Dews, The Limits o f  Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy, (London: 
Verso, 1995) p. 20.
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If anything, Adorno is actually an anathema to the Nietzschean inspired tradition. To be sure, 
Habermas’s view towards Adorno has not always been ambivalent. In 1969 for instance, in 
an obituary, Habermas made known his full appreciation of the emotive dimension that is 
inherent in Adorno’s work. In fact he attributed this emotive dimension, which is linked to 
early experiences of growing up, as the propelling impulse of Adorno’s critical theory.421 
This lends credence to the view that Habermas’s shifting positions in relation to Adorno 
reflect his growing concern at the impact of poststructuralist discourses on society. As such, 
it would be wrong to regard the critique directed against Adorno by the Philosophical 
Discourse o f Modernity as Habermas’s last word on the subject. This is despite the tone of 
finality that could be discerned from it.4_~ In fact, Habermas, in an interview four years later, 
admits that the utopian dimension of Negative Dialectics, which strives for a non-violent 
reconciliation between the subject and the object, or, between conceptual thought and 
nonidentity, is indispensable to his theory of communicative action.423 This utopian element, 
which suggests a counter image to what is, becomes the signature imprint that distinguishes a 
critical theory of society from other forms of analyses.
Be that as it may, one of the implicit assumptions made by Habermas in his diatribe against 
the Dialectic is that the critique of perceived society has to be immanently generated. An 
immanent critique derives its normative force from the social fabric of a society. It then uses 
this as the basis from which it puts forward a validity claim that something is amiss, that 
some form of social injustice has emerged. In other words, immanent critique directs itself 
against the facticity of what ‘is’ by throwing it into sharp relief with what ‘ought’ to be in its 
place. The standard that it uses to do this is derived internally. The problem, however, with 
this kind of criticism, in Habermas’s view, starts when the normative horizon that makes 
immanent critique possible is rendered suspect. This, he alleges, is the premise from which 
Adorno and Horkheimer started. The answer to this allegation lies in the conviction of the 
Dialectic that the first half of the twentieth century has seen a social reality that has 
successfully co-opted the powers of immanent critique to its cause. As a consequence 
Enlightenment thought has turned against the Enlightenment itself, giving rise to a new and 
terrifying age where the boundaries of emancipation and tyranny have imploded. In the
421 See Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the Frankfurt School’, pp. 76-78.
122Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, pp. 106-160. Also see Jürgen Habermas, ‘The 
Entwinemcnt of Myth and Enlightenment’, pp. 13-30.
422 Jürgen Habennas ‘Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas. Edited by Peter Dews 
(London: Verso, 1986) pp. 156-157.
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1944/1947 preface, the authors of the Dialectic extrapolated on their joint project as ‘nothing 
less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a 
new kind of barbarism’.424 They were tackling a world where regression seems to be the 
natural order of the day and where critique metamorphoses into an affirmation of the status 
quo.425 In 1951, a few years after the Dialectic began circulation, Adorno again raises the 
spectre of an immanent critique losing its critical edge through its affirmation of the present. 
This time it was in a book of aphorisms reminiscent in style and content to the writings of 
Nietzsche. Adorno laconically proclaimed that,
the difference between ideology and reality, has disappeared. The former resigns 
itself to conformation of reality by its mere duplication ... There is no crevice in 
the cliff of the established order into which the ironist might hook a 
fingernail.426
In other words, the disappearance of any difference between ideology and reality means, for 
Adorno, that ideology critique has been rendered superfluous by its social environment. This 
would in turn suggest that the normative horizon that makes such critique possible is 
complied in the disempowerment of critique. Thus the question that confronts them is: How 
is critique to be enabled if its normative sources are deemed to be part of the problem itself? 
Or put another way, what happens when the values that inform critique are complied in the 
problem that is to be critiqued?
The first inkling of an answer can be discerned the preface of the Dialectic itself:
If public life has reached a state in which thought is being turned inescapably 
into a commodity and language into a celebration of the commodity, the attempt 
to trace the sources of this degradation must refuse obedience to the current 
linguistic and intellectual demand before it is rendered entirely futile of those 
demands for world history.427
From the passage above, a few things clearly emerge. Firstly, the authors of the Dialectic are 
aware that there is a problem in society. Secondly, the nature and scope of this problem 
necessitates a different approach, one that would require a refusal to adhere to the prevailing 
orthodoxy governing the use of language and thought. Third, the project that they are 
embarking on is more ambitious in its intentions than any form of immanent criticism. In 
other words Adorno and Horkheimer were not going to settle for anything less than a world­
disclosing critique -  a critique that is bold enough to derive its standards from outside. A
424 Dialectic, p. xiv.
42> Ibid, p. xvi.
426Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.211. 
4' 7 Dialectic, pp. xiv-xv.
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world-disclosing critique averts the fate that immanent critique finds itself in as a 
handmaiden of the status quo. If this is so, what then should be the normative standard upon 
which a disclosing critique relies and is to be measured against? This is the backdrop from 
which the analysis of the Dialectic needs to be understood.
Axel Honneth, in an insightful essay, insists that because of its context-transcendent nature, 
disclosing critique should align itself to a vision of social perfection or ‘ideal values’ 
problematic as this may be.4"s His insistence is based on two interrelated views. Firstly, in his 
opinion, there is a need in all liberal societies for a form of social self-criticism that he calls a 
‘therapeutic self-critique’ .429 This is because there are no institutional guarantees that would 
always render the development of ‘value preferences’ in the socialisation process compatible 
with the assumptions undergirding the notion of the ‘good life’. As such, members of a 
society need, from time to time, to engage in ‘therapeutic self-critique’ in order to gauge how 
far their prevailing values are from the idea of what a good life entails. A second reason is 
that there is always a possibility that we may, due to factors such as our psychological make­
up, reject the specific ways in which institutional dynamics influence our own interests.4411 If 
this is the case then a disclosing critique will always suffer from an epistemological paradox, 
since it views the nonnative fabric of society as tainted. In Adorno’s case, society suffers 
from the commodity principle. Adorno, in fact, seems to have realised this when he points 
out: ‘[TJhe limit of immanent critique is that the law of the immanent context is ultimately 
one with the delusion that has to be overcome’ .431 The realisation of the inherent 
epistemological paradox of his critique of society does not stop him from arguing in this 
vein. In fact he suggests, by his insistence on a context-transcending critique, that allegation 
of a performative contradiction is a price he is prepared to pay since, for him, the potential to 
imagine a transformed society lies outside the purview of immanent dialectics at that point in 
time.432
42s He puts the problem in this way: ‘On the one hand, epistemological arguments against objectivist 
assumptions about human nature prevent us from speaking carelessly of universal conditions of the good life; 
on the other, insight into increasing value pluralism excludes the hermeneutic possibility of assuming socially 
shared beliefs o f the good' -  see Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility o f a Disclosing Critique of Society', p. 122.
429 This is reminiscent o f Habermas’s use of psychoanalysis in Knowledge and Human Interests.
430 Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society’, p. 122.
431 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 182.
432 Axel Honneth, ‘The Possibility o f a Disclosing Critique of Society', p. 122.
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Yet by insisting on a disclosing critique, he is presented with a paradox himself. This stems 
from the fact that he is seemingly bereft of any rational way in which he can ground his 
disclosing critique of society. Be that as it may, Honneth points out that
there still seems to be a need for such critical diagnoses because it is only by 
means o f these that the chance of a therapeutic self-critique is kept open -  a self 
critique, that is, within whose horizons we can reach agreement on the 
appropriateness of our way of life.433
In light of this, Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that we must sever ties with the rules 
that govern the validity of ‘linguistic and intellectual demands’ is highly suggestive of the 
point that they were fully aware that their critique cannot be validated on any rational 
grounds. In fact, give what they were faced with in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
meeting any demands of rational justification will, in their eyes, only nullify the thrust of 
their searing critique. As Adomo himself says, ‘[N]o immanent critique can serve its purpose 
wholly without outside knowledge’ .434 That is, for immanent critique to faithfully do its task 
it must risk moving outside its own moorings. Despite this, however, the authors of the 
Dialectic were mindful of the consequences of their actions. Hence their depiction of the 
enlightenment as a dialectical process suggests, at least for Wiggershaus, that ‘Horkheimer 
and Adorno did not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater, that they only wanted to 
demonstrate the ambiguity of the idea of enlightenment’ .435 What they intended instead, 
through a disclosing critique, was to evoke new ways of thinking and perceiving, ways that 
would transform our consciousness by providing insights that otherwise would have been 
unavailable. This is the same idea behind the use of constellations in Negative Dialectics. 
Habermas it seems may have been too hasty in lumping disparate analyses together in the 
Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity.
4.6 Concluding Remarks: Defying the aura of the Subject
There is no clear roadmap in Adorno’s oeuvre as to the specific way(s) we can overcome the 
circumstances that have contributed to our current life forms. He instead offers an index of 
what is wrong in our society. Instead of offering a way to a better future, his negative
433 Ibid.
4 34 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 182.
435 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, p. 327. For a defence o f Adorno against the allegations made by 
Habermas see Espen Hammer, 'Minding the World: ‘Minding the World: Adorno’s critique o f Idealism’, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 26, No.l, (2000) pp. 71-92.
128
dialectics casts its discerning gaze on what is wrong with the present. In other words, 
Negative Dialectics, in the words of Jarvis, is ‘an attempt to criticise the obstacles -  real and 
conceptual -  impeding our possible access to the absolute, rather than a claim to have 
achieved such a success’ . 436 As such Adorno's critique is not in any way claiming to have all 
the answers as to how we are going to transcend our present circumstances. His critique of 
conceptual or identitarian thought and how it is manifested in society exhorts us to critically 
examine the cost of our becoming. The failure to posit a better future does not in any sense 
take away the utopian longing in his works. Negative Dialectics will retain, in this way, its 
relevance as long as there is inhumanity amongst us. He sums this succinctly by observing 
that, ‘[T]he undiminished persistence of suffering, fear, and menace necessitates that the 
thought that cannot be realised should not be discarded’ .437
A dialectics that thrives on negativity does not in any way understate the functional utility 
(or dimension) of identity thinking. What it rejects is the claim of this thought can faithfully 
represent the ‘whole’. The defiance in Minima Moralia epitomised in the words ‘the whole is 
the untrue’ has two functions438. The first is to raise the bogus nature of the positivist claim 
while the second, arising directly from the first, is a clarion call for a reason whose contours, 
apart from its mimetic quality, are defined by an awareness of its own limitations; a reason 
that is not afraid to break the invincible aura of all forms of subjectivity. For it is only in this 
way that reason will gain a more comprehensive understanding of itself and the reality that 
awaits its voice.
436 Simon Jarvis, Adorno, p. 16.
4 (7 Theodor Adorno, Critical Model, p. 14. 
438 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.50.
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C h a p t e r  5
Apotheosis of Reason: Interrogating Communicative Ethics
5.0
This chapter critically interrogates Habermas’s theory of communicative action and its 
contemporary relevance as a theoretical model. The basic thrust of this chapter is to 
effectively gauge how the problematic features of communicative action find expression in 
Habermas’s model of ethico-political practise. This is done by rereading the theoretical 
works of the preeminent social philosopher through the cognitive lens of Negative Dialectics. 
The chapter therefore is the first phase of a two-stage critique. This initial phase outlines 
some of the problematic features of his communicative action theory. The second phase, 
directly following the current phase, consists of drawing out the implications of the aporias 
of his discourse ethics in his political philosophy. This latter stage is addressed in the next 
chapter. It must be emphasised from the outset that this is not an ill-founded attempt to 
consign Habermas to the ‘dustbin of history’. That is neither warranted nor feasible in our 
current context. Indeed the works of Habermas are unsurpassable in coverage, analysis and 
application. The aim of this chapter therefore is to tease out ways in which the theory of 
communicative action and by extension the procedural logic of the deliberative model of 
democracy can be reworked so it fully encompasses the broad plurality that has become the 
hallmark of modernity.
In a commentary on the salient thematic aspects arising out of Habermas’s critical 
engagements with poststructuralist thought, the philosopher Richard Rorty explained that one 
crucial difference between the two schools of thought is that poststructuralists such as 
Lyotard would ‘abandon liberal politics in order to avoid universalistic philosophy’ whereas 
Habermas would ‘hang on to universalistic philosophy, with all its problems, in order to 
support liberal politics’ . 439 The chapter provides a critique of Habermas from within the 
ambit of the Frankfurt School itself with the aim of sketching the parameters of a new form 
of emancipatory politics. In that way, it is not a scathing derision of all that Habermas stands 
for but a critical engagement with what needs to be addressed in his political philosophy in 
light of our contemporary needs.
4W Quoted in James Farganis Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism (3rd ed), 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000) p. 433.
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To do this, the essay starts with a problematisation of the basic division of the social that 
Habermas introduces into his theory of society. The essay argues that this basic division has 
its concomitant impacts on Habermas’s theory of democracy, where the problems that arise 
from the decoupling of the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ are evinced in the structural weaknesses 
of Habermas’s political public sphere.1111 The chapter, therefore, begins with a discussion of 
the difficulties inherent in the decoupling of systems and lifeworld and, as a corollary, in the 
separation of arts from science and morality in Habermas’s two tier theory of society (5.1). 
The section will also deal with some of the new issues that arise due to this basic separation, 
such as the fundamental alteration to the classic understanding of freedom and how the 
notion of autonomy is problematic when viewed against the work of Adorno on totalitarian 
society. The chapter continues by critically interrogating Habermas’s universal pragmatics. 
This it does by analysing the affinities between Habermas’s and Kant’s idea of the subject 
and the problems the former inherited from the latter’s notion of the transcendental subject 
(5.2).
Section 5.3 critiques Habermas’s ‘ideal speech situation’ and, by extension, the public 
sphere. The argument here is that the way in which intersubjective symmetries are 
presupposed in a ‘universal pragmatics’ leads inevitably to asymmetrical forms of 
deliberation as well as exclusionary politics within the discourses of the public sphere. The 
next section continues this discussion by delving into the elective affinities between 
intersubjective symmetries and capitalist exchange relations -  a theme that seeks to 
problematise Habermas’s approach to language by juxtaposing it to Adorno’s critique of 
capitalist relations (5.4). This is followed by subsection 5.4.1 which looks closely at how 
continuities established in section 5.4 leads to a reaffirmation of the neo-liberal order. To be 
sure, the main point here is that Habermas, through his conception of the public sphere, 
simply re-traces the cognitive footprints established by Hegel in his Philosophy o f Right and 
the problems associated with equating the real with the rational and vice versa.441 The 
discussion then goes from here to a problematisation of the intersubjective consensus that 
Habermas insists must underpin deliberations within lifeworld discourses as well as the 
public sphere (5.4.2). This is done by looking at some seminal lessons derived from 
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s ontology and how these can be deployed once again against 
Habermas. Section 5.4.3 reasserts the somatic character of thought in the works of Adorno in
440 The way in which the delinking process gives rise to problems in the dynamics o f the public sphere is 
discussed in the next chapter.
441 G WF Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 10.
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light of Habermas’s ‘Kantian’ subject. The point here is that the absence of corporeality 
simply turns knowledge back to a singular subjective plane devoid of any consideration of 
the object. This section leads to the next chapter; which considers how Habermas’s notion of 
the public sphere will benefit immensely if it takes on board the notion of corporeality that 
animates Adorno’s work on knowledge. The discussion here is animated by the critique 
mounted by Hegel against the vacuous character of the Kantian transcendental subject. The 
last section (5.5) brings out the different threads of arguments in the chapter and charts out 
the way in these interrelated arguments form an axis from which a coherent critical 
examination of contemporary society is to be launched. The chapter ends with some 
concluding remarks on the thematic points raised and how these are to be developed in 
chapter 6.
5.1 Problematising the System and Lifeworld distinction.
The driving impetus behind Habermas’s development of a two-tier theory of society stems 
from a number of considerations.442 The first of these lies in his conviction that the ‘project 
of modernity’ can be salvaged only through a paradigm shift. For the second generation 
Frankfurt scholar, this shift is from the philosophy of consciousness to language or ‘universal 
pragmatics’: a turn that will, in his view, redeem Critical Theory’s emancipatory potentials. 
Hitherto, the theorizations of the Frankfurt School, especially those of Adorno and 
Horkheimer, have led to a philosophical impasse. This stalemate, in Habermas’s view, forced 
the authors of the Dialectic to embrace a nihilistic form of radicalism espoused by Nietzsche 
and filtered down through the works of Bataille, and is evinced by the stringent tone found in 
the Dialectic,443 Habermas proposes, in lieu of this, that the path taken by the Dialectic 
betrays the legacy of the Enlightenment. What is needed, in the face of this duplicitous 
relationship with the Enlightenment legacy, is a model that, while accepting the ossified 
atmosphere of capitalist modernity, at the same time, delineates a path that would lead to 
greater human autonomy. The way forward thus, for him, is the decoupling of the system and 
lifeworld. The former is characterised by the dominance of functionalist logic (purposive- 
rational reason) and strategic actions while the latter becomes the focal point of consensus 
based on a communicative form of rationality. For the second generation Frankfurt scholar, it
442 Sec chapter 3 for an account o f Habermas’s two-tier theory of society.
443 For an account of the genealogical roots of a radicalised critique of reason that began with Nietzsche -  see 
Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
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is only by splitting the social into two distinct spheres, with specific concomitant 
rationalisation processes, that we can hold out the hope of emancipation.
The theorization of society as system as well as lifeworld allows Habermas to reclaim the 
Enlightenment’s positive potentials which, in his view, have been rendered problematic in 
their fusion with the Nietzschean ‘will to power’. However, in so doing, Habermas had to 
revise some fundamental concepts within the purview of Western Marxism, chief among 
them is the concept of freedom as presupposed in the writings of Marx and his heirs in 
Western Europe. 444 By reinterpreting freedom, or the lack of it, in terms of the ‘distortions’ 
in ideal speech situations, Habermas is able to subsequently dispute the extent to which the 
reification thesis, a leitmotif that guides Western Marxism’s critique against capitalist 
modernity, continues to be relevant in contemporary society.445 This new sensitivity to how 
society engenders two qualitatively different forms of integration is brought home, for 
Habermas, by the works of the French sociologist, Emile Dürkheim.446 Adopting this model 
enables Habermas to defend the project of modernity on two fronts. The first is against the 
allegation that society is hopelessly entangled within a dialectic that has resulted in the 
emergence of totalitarian tendencies within a reified social environment. The second is from 
the criticisms levelled against him by systems theorists, such as Niklas Luhmann, who points 
out that the increasing complexities of modern society must mean that any form of 
normativity must be hopelessly inadequate to regulate life.44' For Habennas, giving in to 
either of these attacks would amount to a fatalistic view that equates progress with 
dehumanisation. In fact he sees the intersection of the two schools of thought -  counter­
enlightenment radicalism and systems theory -  as basically the site where strands of 
theorising that come under the umbrella of Western Marxism are found wanting. For him, 
the:
confusion o f system rationality and action rationality prevented Horkheimcr and 
Adorno, as did Weber before them, from adequately separating the 
rationalisation o f action orientations within the framework of a structurally 
differentiated lifeworld from the expansion of the steering capacities of 
differentiated social systems.448
444Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered Totality of System and Lifeworld’, Historical Materialism, Volume 13:4 
(2005) p. 60.
445 See chapter 3.
446 Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered Totality of System and Lifeworld', p.56. Also see Thomas McCarthy, 
‘Complexity and Democracy or the Scduccmcnts o f Systems Theory'.
447 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Complexity and Democracy or the Scduccmcnts o f Systems Theory', p.29.
448 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (II), p.333.
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Habermas, as the above suggests, sees the decoupling of the two spheres as £ positive 
development on many fronts. For him, this move enables us to raise a critique against 
instrumental reason without getting entangled in the ‘performative contradiction’ that is 
symptomatic of the Dialectic, as well as other forms of Nietzschean inspired critique. 
Reification is now couched in terms of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ and happens only 
when systemic impulses start altering the dynamics of discourse leading to distortions in the 
communicative process. Apart from this, the delinking also frees up the members of the 
lifeworld ‘to devote themselves exclusively to the symbolic reproduction of the.r culture, 
society, and personality’.44^  The system, on the other hand is controlled by the norm-free 
steering media of the economy and the state. This sphere ensures that the material conditions 
of life are reproduced.
The system and lifeworld model that Habermas based his theory of society on has been 
problematised by some of his closest sympathisers. Thomas McCarthy, for instance, has 
questioned some of the guiding premises of Habermas’s two-tier theory of society. In a 
revealing analysis of how system and lifeworld logics are enmeshed in social life, McCarthy 
concludes that the two levels are more porous than Habermas would have us believe. 450 In 
his judgement, Habermas is too optimistic in maintaining that the guiding mechanisms for 
the different spheres in his model can be clearly distinguished from each other: that they are 
mutually exclusive in terms of logic and domains of application. It is worth quoting 
McCarthy at some length concerning this point:
The action-theoretic accounts ... suggest that the “buffer zone” o f organisational 
“indifference” to personality and individual life history, to culture and tradition, 
to morality and convention is frequently no more effective than the military 
barrier erected by the American Anned Forces between North and South 
Vietnam -  much of what is to be kept out is already within, and much o f the rest 
can enter as the need arises.'451
In other words, Habermas’s argument on the need to uphold the distinct boundaries that 
separate the system from the lifeworld is rather weak, given the ways that individuals 
traverse the distance in their dual roles as functionalists (labourers) looking for material 
advantage and as communicative actors or reflective beings seeking consensus. As such 
Habermas should be more circumspect in ‘conceptualising administrative organisation in
444 Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered Totality of System and Lifeworld’, p. 59.
45(1 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Complexity and Democracy or the Seducements o f Systems Theory’, p. 40. 
4M ibid, p. 34.
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systems-thcoretic terms’, simply because action-theoretic considerations often play a pivotal 
role in determining the kind of outcomes within such setups.
Deborah Cook expresses similar sentiments to McCarthy on the aporias surrounding the 
division between lifeworld and system. For Cook, the conceptual delinking of the system 
from the lifeworld pits Habermas directly against the understanding of ‘freedom’ (or the loss 
of it) that is entrenched within the discourse of Western Marxism as seen in the works of 
Lukäcs, Marx as well as Adorno.453 The three theorists, in her view, would have eschewed 
the path taken by Habermas since, in their collective view, the logic of market forces, 
whether it is in the form of alienation, reification or ratio, is immanent in society454. As such 
they cannot be wilfully theorised away into conceptual enclaves. The prevalence of reified 
moments in modern socialities is, for Adorno, symptomatic of what lies behind ‘damaged’ 
forms of life in contemporary society. The separation of lifeworld and system, with their 
corresponding modes of thought and action, also raises another problem. As Cook argues, the 
division implicitly suggests that there is a distinction between mental and manual labour in 
the Habermasian model -  the former occurs only in deliberative processes within the 
lifeworld while the latter is confined to the labour processes that are regulated by the norm- 
free subsystems.4^  This renders asunder the conventional relationship between theory and 
praxis that Western Marxism as a tradition epitomised.
Adorno would have agreed with the misgivings expressed by McCarthy as well as Cook for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, he sees the principle of exchange as immanent in capitalist 
modernity -  there is no subverting it. Thus the only way forward is to work through it by way 
of a radical critique of what it stands for. In a ringing passage that seems to have anticipated 
Habermas’s delinking process, Adorno reminds us that:
Ever since mental and physical labour were separated in the sign of the 
dominant mind, the sign of justified privilege, the separated mind has been 
obliged ... to vindicate the very claim to dominate which it derives from the 
thesis that it is primary and original -  and to make every effort to forget the 
source of its claim.4'6
In other words, Adorno would have not supported the decoupling of society into two 
conceptually distinct spheres, because he sees an intrinsic relationship between mental and
452 ibid, p. 40.
453Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered Totality of System and Lifeworld', p. 60.
454 Ratio is the term used by Adorno to denote the exchange principle that undergirds modern capitalist 
societies.
455 Ibid., p. 69.
456 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 177.
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manual labour: one that completely disappears in the works of his student. The very 
insistence that thought has a somatic component is a powerful reminder of the futility of 
divorcing the two.457 Thought, for Adorno, is always animated by a felt need. By 
conceptually separating the two, Habermas exposes his theory to the aporias associated with 
a form of subjective knowledge that is not tempered by a self-reflective moment. Adorno 
insists that this moment of self-reflection in thought only comes about when concepts admit 
to their own insufficiencies in representing objective reality. The concomitant effect of this 
on rational consensus that arises out of intersubjective deliberations cannot be overstated.458 
Freedom, in the way that Habermas defines the term, in this way becomes a highly 
controversial concept.
Given the discussion above, Habermas seems to be advocating a truncated form of freedom 
that accrues from the diametrical opposition between the system-theoretic and action- 
theoretic processes of the social world. The naturalistic slant to his social theorisation is hard 
to ignore here. As Cook points out:
Habermas uncritically describes and endorses a completely sundered society 
where individuals are simultaneously free and unfree, unconstrained by material 
concerns in their leisure activities and denatured by the struggle to survive in the 
workplace, fully human in their social intercourse and dehumanised in their 
labour.459
Habermas’s position, when analysed from an Adomian point of view, is also problematic. It 
propagates a reduced notion of freedom as well as an ambivalent conception of the fate of 
human agency and its link to the emancipation of the species. Indeed, Habermas sees 
freedom as belonging exclusively to the domain of the lifeworld. This is to say that the 
system, the sphere entrusted with the material production of life cannot, by necessity, operate 
under conditions that prioritise the autonomy of ‘labour power’. People then are, from this 
vantage point, necessarily enslaved by the conditions generated by the material conditions of 
life. Given the distinct spheres of action and the differing logics that prevail within these 
spheres, Habermas propagates the fatalistic view that people are destined to be 
simultaneously free and unfree: free to the extent that they live and socially reproduce 
themselves in the lifeworld and unfree because of the way labour is organised along 
instrumental and strategic lines in the system. This, for Adorno, is what a ‘damaged life’ is -  
a life that has learnt to make do with what it is, because it cannot envision something ‘better’
4’7 This is discussed later on in section 5.4.
See section 5.4 for a detailed discussion on this.
459Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered Totality of System and Lifeworld’, p. 71.
136
than what is. In other words, ‘rational' has become in this way a euphemism for the ‘real’.46" 
This is to say that Habermas has fallen into the Hegelian trap of a forced reconciliation 
between is and ought. It also brings to mind the warning Adorno gave about the need to base 
knowledge on the object, otherwise what we will be faced with is a tautology where what is 
known becomes knowledge itself. The problematic nature of this separation of system- 
theoretic from action theoretic models in Habermas’s two-tier theory of society finds its way 
into the dynamics of his discourse ethics in the public sphere. This is analysed in some detail 
in Chapter 6.
The next section aims to throw into sharper relief the problems associated with Habermas’s 
model of society. This it does by problematising his notion of universal pragmatics and the 
role this has on linguistic interchanges between interlocutors within the public sphere. 
Habennas envisions his interlocutors in terms of the Kantian subject, admittedly with some 
qualifications. Yet despite these qualifications, the Kantian influence in Habermas’s 
linguistic subject is apparent in his adumbration of universal pragmatics. Adorno, on the 
other hand, has always insisted on the problematic nature of language even as he recognises 
its indispensable nature. The subject's use of conceptual language needs to be re-examined in 
light of the tendency of language to reduce everything it explains to conceptual 
approximations. It is to this rereading of Habennas from Adorno’s Negative Dialectics that 
we now turn to.
5.2 The ‘Kantian’ Subject in Habermas’s Universal Pragmatics.
One of the clearest indications of the Kantian legacy in Habennas’s philosophy of language 
is the latter’s adoption of the Kantian subject in his theorisation of the dynamics of the 
lifeworld and its political manifestation -  the public sphere. It is here that the Kantian 
autonomous subject, adhering only to generalised principles of conduct called categorical 
imperatives, makes its appearance once again. Kant uses the concept of the categorical 
imperative as a way of putting forward the argument that the autonomy of the subject is 
embedded within a universal moral order. Accordingly, all sense of moral worth is 
determined by actions that are motivated by none other than a sense of duty -  duties that are 
‘naturally’ binding in all circumstances where they can be willed into universal laws. These 
unconditional or categorical imperatives are, in Kant’s view, different from technical 
imperatives which are utilitarian in nature; that is, technical imperatives are actions driven
GWF Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 10.
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toward a desired end. 461 Indeed Kant makes it clear that the condition of possibility for 
categorical imperatives is that they must ‘refer to no other property of choice (by which some 
purpose can be ascribed to it) than simply to its freedom’.46~ What this means is that these 
commands or imperatives to act in a certain way are moral, because actions ensuing from 
them are ‘necessary’ as they increase and reaffirm the autonomy of the transcendental 
subject. The autonomy of the subject, therefore, lies in the subject’s strict observance of these 
imperatives; that is, the freedom of the subject is achieved if it acts according to these 
commands. The existence of the autonomous subject therefore hinges on a voluntary 
subjection to an existing general moral order.
Habermas, in a like manner, incorporates the Kantian subject into the dynamics of the 
lifeworld and, by extension, the public sphere, albeit, with a few major revisions. Like Kant, 
he posits the need for generalised principles of contestation to be observed, though this time, 
in relation to validity claims within the lifeworld. He also sees the conduct of interlocutors of 
the public sphere as governed by strict adherence to generalised laws of intersubjective 
mediation. However unlike his theoretical forebear, these principles, for Habermas, do not 
arise out of a universal moral order but from a context-transcendent universal pragmatics 
whose specific orientation is geared towards understanding. In other words, rationality (or 
morality for that matter) is not anchored in a universal moral order but in intersubjective 
dialogue guided by the rules regulating all speech acts. As such, what is open to the Kantian 
subject -  the ability to autonomously determine universal moral tenets via self-reflection -  is 
rendered problematic by Habermas. Indeed, for Habermas, universality of moral tenets can 
only come about by means of discourse between subjects.463 This signals the move away 
from the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ towards an intersubjective paradigm that, for him, 
transcends the problems surrounding the subject-centred philosophy of Kant. It becomes 
clear that the Kantian subject of the moral order becomes, with a few modifications, the 
autonomous interlocutor within Habermas’s universal pragmatics. For the latter, the 
adjudication of validity-claims is not a matter of critical self-reflection but is determined 
through discourse. Yet despite this important alteration, the subjects, in both cases, are 
ironically similar to each other. That is, both are shorn of any passion or desire and are driven 
only by rational considerations and the conviction that he/she is amongst equals in a process
461 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, translated by Mary Gregor, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) pp. 48-54.
462 ibid, p. 49
464 Jiirgen Habermas, ‘What is Universal Pragmatics?’ In Communication and the Evolution o f Society, p. 1-68.
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whose rules are understood in exactly the same way by all. In short, both view their subject 
primarily as an epistemological subject bereft of any feeling that would interfere with the 
rational faculty that is embedded within. This is to say that the difference between Kant and 
Habermas, from the vantage point of Negative Dialectics, is one based solely on the way the 
subject acts in ascertaining truth; the former espousing transcendental reflection while the 
latter advocates discourse between subjects.
The Habermasian characterisations of the subject, when analysed from an Adornian 
viewpoint, have significant ramifications as far as consensus is concerned. . For Adorno, a 
consensus between subjects (or intersubjective agreement) is one that does not recognise the 
‘object’ in all subjects. In other words, all agreements in the public sphere are based on a 
wilful suppression of the ‘concrete particularities’ of the interlocutors. Habermas himself 
acknowledges the possibility of distortion in the discursive process within the ideal speech 
situation by highlighting the ideological, psychological or neurotic barriers that may distort 
the process of will-formation. 464 To compound this, there have been some convincing 
arguments about Habermas’s prejudice against non-European societies that are embedded 
within his communicative ethics. In fact, the German philosopher notes that the assumption 
that the people from the Euro zone would, as a rule, have more rational resources to tap into 
when contesting validity claims is inbuilt within universal pragmatics.465 This ominous state 
of things suggests that the public sphere needs to be radicalised in order for it to take into 
account the irreducible concreteness of the ‘other’.
In the discussion of ‘concepts and categories’ in Negative Dialectics, Adorno continuously 
reiterates the need to be mindful of the particularity of the object.466 The particularity of the 
object can be attributed to its historical and social nature. The gist of his line of reasoning is 
that one must always be aware of the ‘violence’ perpetrated by conceptual reason on the 
object in the name of order. This ‘violence’ comes predominantly in the form of repressive 
tendencies of identity thinking against that part of the object (nonidentity) that escapes 
conceptualisation.46' When viewed from Adorno’s Kantian reading of the distance that lies 
between a thing-in-itself and our understanding of that thing, the idealistic element in 
Habermas’s conception of intersubjectivity becomes apparent. The actions of Habermas’s
464 See chapter 3.
465 See Barry Hindcss, ‘Men Behaving Badly’ Revue Internationale De Philosophie, Volume 64, No. 251 
(2010) pp. 39-57.
466 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 134-207.
467 See chapter 4.
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interlocutors are guided only by the rules of engagement evinced by the generalised 
principles of argumentation within the public sphere. They do not meet Adorno’s standards 
of rationality. The problem becomes acutely clear when we take a closer look. First, 
Habermas’s conception of his discursive subjects as having the same set of rational attributes 
runs in the face of modem plural sensibilities. In other words, it lacks historical depth. 
Secondly and intrinsically bound to the first, the heir to the first generation of Frankfurt 
scholars is totally silent on the corporeal dimension of the subject and how this corporeality 
drives the cognitive processes of the public sphere. This silence is, perhaps, inevitable in 
light of the way that, in spite of his best intentions, he has delinked theory from praxis: a 
relationship that animates fundamental premises of Western Marxism.46X To be sure, 
Habermas’s awareness of the dilemma surrounding the deliberative process is obvious in his 
insistence that there has to be a modicum of economic equality between the interlocutors. Yet 
he does not extend this awareness to an outright acceptance of the somatic character of 
thought. This glaring omission simply accentuates the problem that is associated with what a 
commentator has termed as ‘intersubjective symmetry’ .469 What follows is a critique of 
Habermas’s position based on this notion o f ‘intersubjective symmetry’.
5.3 Intersubjective Symmetries.
One of the persistent features of Habermas’s oeuvre is the striking continuity between his 
philosophical attempt at articulating a coherent account of social and system integration in 
society with his political convictions.4711 The former culminated in a two tier theory of society 
while the latter manifests itself in his concept of the public sphere. The lines of continuity 
that link his theory of communicative action with his political philosophy are evinced in the 
pragmatic suppositions that undergird the discourse in both the lifeworld and the public 
sphere. These pragmatic suppositions, or rules of discursive engagement, in turn, enforce a 
form of equivalence between the interlocutors of the public sphere that provides the criteria 
of a just, equitable and rational consensus. In so doing Habermas sees, intersubjective
468 This is related to the argument on how he distinguishes between mental and manual labour (see p. 137 
above)
l<’9 Nancy S Love, ‘Epistemology and Exchange’, pp. 71-94.
17,1 See chapter 3
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symmetry as an intrinsic part of his concept of public sphere.471 Let us briefly examine what 
this would entail in Habermas’s communicative theory.
Intersubjective symmetry, in Habermas’s framework, is a pre-condition for discursive parity 
and is derived directly from the premises of his universal pragmatics. 472 In an attempt to 
ensure that all outcomes from the deliberative procedure in the public sphere reflect the basic 
equivalence between all the interlocutors, Habermas makes a further claim on the 
transcendental status of the rules of discourse inherent in his universal pragmatics. That is, 
the rules of discourse are context-transcendent in the way that each speech act makes three 
substantive claims to the objective, social and subjective worlds -  no matter the context in 
which the utterance takes place in. These rules, furthermore, are oriented towards consensus. 
In order for this consensus to be a true reflection of fair and free deliberation, Habermas 
posits that these rules of linguistic engagement ensure that all interlocutors are equal. By this, 
he means that within the ‘ideal speech situation’, all are free to initiate discussions, questions 
the validity claims of others as well as putting forward their own.473 To be sure, these validity 
claims and their corresponding domains of reality amount to a reworking of Habermas's 
model of cognitive interests and the types of knowledge they produce, as was first outlined in 
Knowledge and Human Interest. The difference this time is that these validity claims are 
linked to the rules embedded within language-use rather than being aligned to cognitive 
interests in the field of epistemology. This reworking marks the shift of the grounding of his 
critical theory.
The problem, however, lies in how the notion of intersubjective symmetry glosses over the 
peculiarities of the interlocutors.474 That is, it suppresses the fact that the interlocutors are 
sensual beings whose feelings, temperaments and contexts all come into play in their thought 
processes. As Seyla Benhabib observes:
In assuming this perspective, we abstract from the individuality and concrete 
identity of the other. We assume that the other, like ourselves, is a being who 
has concrete needs, desires and affects, but what constitutes her moral dignity is
471 Nancy S Love, ‘Epistemology and Exchange’, pp. 92-94.
47~Jiirgcn Habcnnas, Communication and the Evolution o f Society, pp. 1-68. Also see Jürgen Habermas, 
‘Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence' Inquiry 13 (1970) p. 372.
471 Jürgen Habcnnas, Communication and the Evolution o f Society, p. 68. Also see Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f  
Communicative Action, p. 119-126 (especially p. 121).
474Nancy S Love, ‘Epistemology and Exchange', pp. 92-94.
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not what differentiates us from each other, but rather what we, as speaking and 
acting rational agents, have in com m on/71
For Habermas, issues of morality can only be justified when they are validated through a 
consensus that comes about as a result of an argumentation process that is guided by the rules 
of discourse. This, according to Habermas, is the Tiniversalisation principle’ that undergirds 
all communicative dialogues.476 Moral validity, as such, is a product of a ‘cooperative search 
for truth’ that culminates in the distillation of the best argument that everyone adheres to: a 
consensus devoid of any coercion. For him, consensus generated this way has to be rational 
and binding to all participants since:
a contested norm cannot meet with the consent of the participants in a practical 
discourse unless ... all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side 
effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to 
have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual.417
As such, difference acquires an ambivalent status in the works of Habermas. For instance, it
cannot be the basis from which issues of morality are sustained in society. This dilemma is
not only recognised within the ambit of Frankfurt theorisation but in other philosophic
traditions as well. Poststructuralists, for instance, have long argued that Flabermas’s
conception of the public sphere leaves no room for irreconcilable differences. In fact they
argue that Habermas sees difference as a symptom of a lack of reasoning. The specific way in
which this critique is framed according to Habermas’s framework is that any form of
‘difference’ can, and should be, (dis)solved through rational deliberations. For Habermas,
therefore, difference has no epistemological basis. Consequently, his concept of the public
sphere cannot give an adequate account of the pluralities of the social, despite the
argumentations over validity-claims that take place within it. To be sure, from the vantage
point of poststructuralism, all consensus models have the same effect of throttling the
effective articulation of ‘difference’. Read this way, Habermas’s discourse pragmatics, far
from being oriented towards real consensus and rational outcomes, in effect generate
asymmetrical outcomes in discourse. The fact that the ‘levelling effect’ of the rules of
discourse gives rise to intersubjective symmetries ironically makes any consensus arising out
of lifeworld deliberations dubious. However this form of critique against Habermas, by
poststructuralists, has been mainly a red herring as Richard Bernstein made clear in a
rejoinder to Dallmayr’s critique of Habermas:
,7’ Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics’, New German Critique, No. 35 
(Spring-Summer, 19X5) p. 93.
,71’ Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, pp. 120-121.
411 ibid, p. 93 (emphasis in the original).
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As there are dangers in appeals to rational consensus, there are also dangers in 
the new celebration of fragmentation, difference and plurality. Indeed when we 
pursue the dialectic of such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty who are 
suspicious of all appeals to universal principles, we discover a ‘hidden’ form of  
universality. For when Lyotard calls for a playful agonistics of 
incommensurable language-games, he presupposes a universal principle in 
which we will be genuinely tolerant of the new forms of plurality and will not
478resort to terror.
It is apparent from this discussion that the critique launched by poststructuralism against 
Habermas is fraught with its own problems. It seems that poststructuralists are engaged in a 
duplicitous form of appraisal where, on one hand, they lament the transcendental claims of 
universal pragmatics while on the other, introducing a claim of universal proportion of their 
own. The question as to which is the better claim, given the poststructuralist de-legitimation 
of all master narratives from which criteria to judge could be sought, is thus rendered 
superfluous. The poststructuralists have simply asked us to trust them on faith.
On this point, Adorno offers a basis for a more compelling critique of the intersubjective 
symmetries in Habennas's public sphere -  one that, in my view, manages to evade the 
pitfalls in which poststructuralist critiques sooner or later find themselves in. Again in the 
section on ‘Concepts and Categories’ in Negative Dialectics, Adorno highlights the need to 
be conscious of the ‘violence’ perpetrated by a generalized reason on the particular in the 
name of systemic order. 474 This need arises from an awareness that order is a conceptual 
status that comes at the expense of recognising what lies outside rational cognition. The need 
to be mindful of the particularity of an object has always been a primary consideration of 
Adorno and is reflective of his status as a materialist philosopher in the Marxian tradition. It 
also differentiates him from those who would imagine meaning to emerge from the playful 
gestures of free-floating signifiers. Indeed a major point of difference between Adorno and 
poststructuralists is how he eschews any solution that lies in a simple reversal of the 
hierarchical system that governs the subject and object in idealist philosophy.4XI) By the same 
token he does not advocate a complete jettisoning of conceptual thought. In words that 
harkens back to Kant, the Frankfurt scholar proclaims that, ‘it is not the purpose of critical
478Richard Bernstein, ‘Fred Dallmayr's critique of Habermas’. Political Theory, Vol.6, No.4, (November 1998) 
p. 590.
474 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 134-207.
480 Ibid, p. 136. According to Peter Dews, this has been a poststructuralist tendency. For a discussion on Derrida 
and Adorno see Peter Dews, Logics o f  Disintegration, pp. 46-54.
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thought to place the object on the orphaned throne once occupied by the subject. On that 
throne the object would be nothing but an idol’ .481
The object, for him, is the substrate indispensable to any form of conceptual thinking.482 It 
follows therefore that the object must be given preponderance in thought processes. 
Following Kant, Adorno posits that the object, as a rule, can never be fully comprehended or 
‘captured’ by its concept. That is, there is always a leftover surplus; a nonidentity that lies 
‘outside’ the cognitive matrix of classifying categories. As a consequence, all forms of 
knowledge that lay claim to a ‘total’ comprehension of reality are spurious; that is these 
knowledge-bases can only give an account of a ‘false state of affairs’. Politically this can be 
interpreted as a call for a new politics based on the awareness or recognition of the idea of 
‘nonidentity’ .483 As Adorno noted, ‘[T]he object’s preponderance is solely attainable for 
subjective reflection, and for reflection on the subject’ .484 This reflexivity on the nature of 
conceptual thought and its limitations in articulating the ‘concrete particulars’ of the other 
could be the perfect foil to the omissions generated by the concept of intersubjective 
symmetry. The existence of difference, therefore, signifies the limitations of reason in its 
current form and not the lack of it as Habermas claims. Thus to let identitarian, classificatory, 
or even communicative reason (dis)solve difference is, in fact, to perpetuate the status quo 
which, in turn, gives rise to a wrong kind of life. The point, according to Adorno, is not to 
dissolve differences but to teach reason to fully appreciate the other.
5.4 From Epistemology to Society: Intersubjective Symmetries as Exchange Relations.
The social counterpart to the hegemonic forms of modern knowledge is, for Adorno, 
exemplified by the principle of exchange in late capitalism. Just as reason suppresses 
difference in the form of nonidentity, to generate a pseudo-identity, so does the principle of 
exchange, in a bid to generate ‘sameness’, engender false perceptions. This it does by 
enforcing a pseudo form of equivalence between qualitatively different things. 485 In this 
social scheme, money as an approximation of the exchange value of commodities is used to 
mediate between objects. This process renders the use-value associated with the intrinsic
4X1 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 181.
4X' ibid, p. 135.
4X' See for example, Anders Petersen and Rasmus Willig, ‘ An interview with Axel Honneth: The Role of 
Sociology in the Theory of Recognition’, European Journal o f Social Theory, 5(2), (2000) pp. 265-277. 
484Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 185.
485 See chapter 4.
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properties of a commodity subservient to the exchange value the same commodity brings in 
market relations. Hence the value of a commodity is severed from its fundamental 
characteristics as a result of the power of market relations in contemporary societies. That is. 
the particularities of the object, in this case, are arbitrarily eliminated as a precondition for 
exchange.m  This dilemma, according to Adorno, lies at the core of what he sees as the 
‘problem of value’ - a historical problem that has taken an emphatic form in modem 
exchange society.
This line of thought is not so much a peculiarly Adornian one as it is a derivation of Marx’s 
argument, in a different context to be sure, encapsulated by his ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Program’. For Marx, the problem of capitalist social reality (read ‘false state of affairs’) is 
best understood in terms o f ‘incommensurable equivalences’. This is to say that Marx views 
capitalist modernity, like its epistemological counterpart, as founded on a set of fundamental 
contradictions. He points out that in order to transcend these contradictions, capitalism as a 
system of commodity-exchange has to ‘level off all forms of incommensurability by a 
process of standardisation. This process abstracts from the particularity of each commodity 
by conjuring up a generalised and therefore non-representational notion of the thing in 
question. This generalised concept of the commodity, bereft of any references to the concrete 
specificity of the object, then allows for an arbitrary value of equivalence (exchange value) to 
be placed on the commodity so that exchange may take place. Marx uses this analysis to 
argue about the fundamental inequality between labour and capital in capitalist modernity. 
He extends this argument by insisting that the notion of ‘equal rights’, that emerges from this 
context would necessarily be bourgeois in nature.487 That is, ‘equality’ demanded by 
commodities (including labour power) succumbs to a law of averages that erases the concrete 
particulars of individual objects of trade. This argument points to the erasure of ‘value 
differences’ as the underlying principle of commodity-exchange. Marx recognises that 
commodity-exchange can only be activated through an exchange of equivalents which is, in 
turn, determined by a principle of averages. This, in turn, necessitates the elimination of 
particularities. Hence equal rights in the process of commodity exchange do not recognise 
‘class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else’ .488 What is
486 The historical trajectory of this process as ratio is mapped out in the Dialectic -  sec chapter 2 of this essay.
487 Karl Marx ‘Critique of the Gotha Program' in The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd ed.) edited by Robert C Tucker, 
(New York: WW Norton &Co„ 1978) p.530.
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recognised instead is ‘unequal individual endowment’ which is then used to explain away 
individual peculiarities such as ‘productive capacity’ as ‘natural privileges’. As such, the 
concept of equality in capitalist modernity is essentially ‘a right of inequality, in its content, 
like every other right’ .489
The affinities between the exchange principle, or ratio, and Habermas’s intersubjective 
symmetry are quite obvious in the lines of reasoning above. Indeed if we relate the logic of 
the principle of exchange to the intersubjective symmetry of the public sphere, we will be 
faced with some fundamental similarities. For instance, we would be exposed to how 
Habermas’s language-use follows the same law of the market in the sense that universal 
pragmatics recognizes no communicative differences between the interlocutors due to its 
levelling effect on the process of dialogue. Universal pragmatics becomes a mechanism that 
specifically generates equivalence between the interlocutors of the public sphere.440 This 
highlights the subterranean link between the logic of the commodity structure and universal 
pragmatics. It also renders obvious the fact that Habermas may have averted a problem -  
namely the performative contradiction that he alleges against the Dialectic -  but only to be 
caught in another. His search for a new alternative which culminates in his theory of 
communicative reason makes him vulnerable to the problem besetting the principle of 
exchange as highlighted by Marx. In other words Habermas has basically redeployed the 
Marxian problematic of commodity exchange (exchange of equivalences) in the lifeworld 
under the guise of ‘intersubjective symmetry’. Just as equivalences by necessity operate on a 
level of abstraction that undermines all other qualitative ‘values’ (such as use value) intrinsic 
to a commodity, so too does intersubjective symmetry iron out the concrete peculiarity of an 
individual. Individual needs and capacities are, in this way, glossed over as a condition for 
rational consensus in real discourse.441 In this way, the Habermasian designation of money as 
a ‘steering mechanism’ becomes, in Adomian parlance, a euphemism for totalitarian 
tendencies.
Commentators more sympathetic to Habermas have already pointed to the lacuna in 
Habermas’s notion of universal pragmatics. Benhabib for instance encourages a ‘radical
489 Ibid.
4911 The affinities between Habennas’s model here and the works on of Adam Smith on the 'invisible hand’ of 
the market has been noted by commentators sueh as Deborah Cook -  see Deborah Cook, ‘A Response to 
Finlayson’, Historical Materialism, Volume 11:2 (2003) p. 190.
491 Nancy S Love, 'Epistemology and Exchange’, p. 93.
146
intersubjective symmetry’ to take the place of intersubjective symmetry in the public sphere. 
This adoption of a radicalised notion of intersubjective symmetry is aimed at transcending 
the aporia associated with the ‘exchange of equivalence’ implicit in Habermas’s universal 
pragmatics. For example, universal pragmatics require all interlocutors to leave behind 
experiences, emotions and standpoints that are peculiar to each of them, whereas Benhabib 
aims to come up with a communicative ethics that takes into account the ‘standpoint of the 
concrete other’. In so doing, she reverses the ‘levelling’ telos of speech acts to allow for the 
re-articulation of difference in a way that will take into account some of the criticism levelled 
against the Habermasian communicative philosophy. In her own words ‘[0]ur differences ... 
must complement rather than exclude one another’.492 She does not, however, intend this 
new development to supplant the ‘generalised other’ of the public sphere that thrives only in 
universal principles. For her, the new radicalised notion of intersubjective symmetry is a 
corrective mechanism to the principle of universalisation inbuilt within language
493pragmatics.
Marion Young, while generally agreeing with the broad contours of Benhabib’s position in 
relation to Habermas, nevertheless, disputes the efficacy of a radicalised intersubjective 
symmetry that Benhabib employs to address certain shortcomings that the latter sees in 
Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’.494 Young maintains that the usage of ‘intersubjective 
symmetry’ by Benhabib, however radicalised, can never achieve its expressed goals: an 
adequate account of ‘difference’ and a more ‘authentic’ form of political practice. This is 
because any fonn of deliberation based on ‘intersubjective symmetry’, by its own internal 
logic, would de-emphasise the ‘concrete particulars’ or personal endowments of individuals. 
Intersubjective symmetry would also gloss over the real differences that emerge between 
individuals as a result of living in a socially structured environment. This, for her, has grave 
implications in the quest for consensus.495 In a nutshell, consensus in such scenarios cannot 
really mean respect for difference. What she espouses in place o f ‘intersubjective symmetry’ 
instead is ‘asymmetrical reciprocity'. Let us briefly summarise what she means by this.
492 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, p. 341.
4,4 Scyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, 
(Routlcdge: New York, 1992) pp 148-177. Thus Benhabib, by espousing a framework that operates on a 
dialectical coupling of universality and particularity, returns to Adorno.
414 Iris Marion Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’. 
Constellations Volume 3, No. 3 (1997) pp. 340-363.
495 ibid. p. 343.
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In an engrossing discussion, Iris Marion Young, points out that, rhetoric aside, the aporias 
associated with ‘symmetrical reciprocity’ in Habermas's philosophy of language cannot be 
obviated by resorting to a radicalised version of the same thing. This, in her view, is what 
Benhabib does. Benhabib agrees wholeheartedly with Habermas on how ‘modern 
universalist norms of egalitarian reciprocity make explicit norms embedded in everyday 
speech’ but in recognition of the weaknesses of this stance ‘wishes to supplement it with 
activities of judgement that preserve the “standpoint of the concrete other’” .496 Young, 
however, argues that this path cannot be fully followed if you share, together with Habermas, 
his basic precept of symmetry. What is needed, instead, is the development of an account of, 
‘moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity that depends less on unity and consensus and 
attends more to the specific differences among people.497 This new way of relating to each 
other is unavoidably asymmetrical because of the specific history that each individual has 
and how this affects their worldviews. What she seems to indicate here echoes what has been 
raised before: that any form of consensus would, by necessity, undermine differences that are 
underpinned by alternative forms of cognition. In such a situation, a consensus is not so 
much rational as contrived. A contrived consensus, for Young, would be based on a form of 
understanding between all concerned as to how differences simultaneously animate and 
mediate between their respective positions. What both agreed on, though, is that the problem 
of ‘intersubjective symmetry’ in the public sphere can only be averted by undermining the 
subterranean links between the principle of exchange and intersubjective symmetry. This can 
only be done by transcending the concept of capitalist exchange as the exclusive basis from 
which a public sphere is theorised.49S In this way, deliberation in the public sphere will, 
instead of seeing differences as a hurdle to equitable deliberation, positively consider the 
unique insights and strengths ‘difference’ brings into public deliberations. Needless to say, 
these revisionist attempts at Habermas’s communicative theory, through their emphasis on 
the corporeal being with distinct needs, capacities and temperaments, have a distinct 
Adornian ring to them.
In a related development, Jay Bernstein, in a search for an ethics to combat the moral morass 
of the contemporary age, has turned back to what he terms the ‘ethic of nonidentity’ in 
Adorno’s philosophy.4"  The whole exercise is enabled by an ingenious blending of Weber's
496 ibid, p. 341.
497 ibid, p. 343.
49S ibid. Young refers to the dynamics of gift-giving as an instance of this transcendence.
499 Jay M Bernstein, Adorno.
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notion of disenchantment with Adorno's concept of the ‘damaged life’. This re-appropriation 
sterns from Bernstein's Adornian conviction that even though Habermas has clearly 
identified the root of the moral problems besetting the modern age as revolving around the 
‘colonisation of the life-world’, this aporetic situation cannot be countered by universal 
pragmatics. 500 This is because of the natural tendency of reason to devalue meaning as well 
as truth and, hence, to usher in a sense of disenchantment. This disenchantment in turn 
removes the motivation that is needed to pursue certain ethical goals that are deemed 
important in society. Indeed, as Bernstein puts it, ‘[Bjecause what is undermined is the worth 
of our highest values, their meaningfulness for us, there arises the question of why we should 
pursue these values -  what conceivably could motivate us to do so’ . 501 Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, viewed from this vantage point, is helpless in the face of reification 
By excluding, ‘ethical substance, affects, and sensual appearances,’ communicative reason, 
with its emphasis on moral rationalism, obfuscates the conditions that would give rise to the 
emergence of motivations that will, in turn, spur people to break through the reified screen of 
capitalist logic. 502 This aporia necessitates, amongst other things, a revision of the current 
Habermasian conception of philosophy as a modest endeavour in mediating between ‘the 
logics of expert cultures and the lifeworld’ . 503 Adorno explicates this need by alluding to a 
new categorical imperative that comes into effect after the holocaust of the Second World 
War: an imperative that dictates that the aporias of capitalist modernity can only be 
legitimately critiqued from the vantage point of autonomy or freedom of the species being. 504 
This argument has been echoed by Axel Honneth who is of the view that Habermas’s theory 
of communication is restricted by its overriding concern with the linguistic rules governing 
the ‘ideal speech situation’. These rules suppress the individuality, or personal endowment, 
of the interlocutors leading them to:
experience an impairment of what wc can call their moral experiences, that is, 
their “moral point of view”, not as a restriction of intuitively mastered rules of 
language, but as a violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation.505
500 This view is also shared by other sympathisers such as Albrecht Wcllmer and others like Agnes Heller. For 
an account sec Bent Flyvberg, ‘Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers of Civil Society? The British Journal o f  
Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1998) p. 218.
501 Jay M Bernstein, Adorno, p. 6. Also sec Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Back to Adorno? Critical Social theory between 
Past and Future’, Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April, 2004) p. 248.
502 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘ Back to Adorno?’, p. 248.
505 Dieter Freundlich, ‘Rethinking Critical Theory', p. 81.
504 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 365.
5()5Axel Honneth, ‘The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today’, 
Constellations 1 (1994) p. 261.
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Hence the problems of the concept of intersubjective symmetries that Habermas presupposes 
in his ‘ideal speech situation’ have grave implications to the way in which we may attempt to 
rectify deficiencies in contemporary democratic societies.
Adorno is aptly sensitised to Marx’s insight into the problematical nature of exchange, or 
ratio, in bourgeois society. Where he differs is in his insistence that the problem besetting 
value is not exclusively a characteristic of modem society. Its origin, in fact, can be traced 
back to the emergence of identity-thinking as a means to the successful mastery of nature by 
humans. 506 As such, the problem is as old as humanity itself:
[W]hat has become known as the value problem became constituted in a phase 
in which means and ends were tom asunder in order to dominate nature without 
difficulty; in which rationality of means progressed by unreduced or where 
possible increasing irrationality of ends.5"7
For him the problem of value lies in its defacement by the principle of exchange that 
undergirds conceptual thought itself. Indeed Adorno sees modem exchange as the 
secularisation of sacrificial worship symptomatic of pre-modern society: a form of worship 
that is at the same time a mechanism that humans use to control the deities. 505 That is, 
exchange, as sacrifice before it, is enabled by a forced symmetry between unlike values. 
They both stand, as a result, for the ‘false state of affairs’ that links the mythical mindset of 
the past with the bourgeois consciousness of the present.
Adorno would, thus, attempt to address the anomalies associated with intersubjective 
symmetries by pointing to a similar dilemma arising out of the pretensions of a 
‘correspondence theory of truth’. For him, all articulations of truth that equate conceptual 
validity with the absolute suffer from a form of moral blindness. This is because they all fail 
to respect the uniqueness of concrete beings. Modern exchange society epitomises this lack 
of moral respect. The subversion of this state of affairs, for Adorno, means an emphatic 
acknowledgement of nonidentity although this must not be at the expense of conceptual 
reason. 600 Preserving the dignity of the object would mean keeping track of all the insights 
about the object that are generated from its concept by means of a constellation. 510 The whole 
point however is to continuously show the inadequacy of our concepts to capture their
506 See chapter 2.
51)7 Cited in David Frisby, 'The Popper-Adorno Controversy’, p. 115.
508 Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, 'Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’ p. 122. Also see chapter 2 for 
a fuller account.
5<w The reasons for this are covered in chapter 4.
51(1 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 149.
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objects -  our social reality. This realisation will, in turn, become the basis of a new and more 
honest relation between the concept and its object. As he puts it ‘[Ljiving in the rebuke that 
the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept’s longing to become identical with 
the thing’ . 511 In other words, a new categorical imperative bordering on a moral respect for 
difference becomes the way in which Adorno hopes to subvert the status quo. The absence of 
this appreciation for difference in Habermas’s theory renders its claims for a more rational 
society dubious. In fact, far from subverting the status quo, Habermas ends up defending a 
truncated version of modernity.
5.4.1 Reaffirming the Neo-Liberal Order.
The incorporation of the exchange principle by Habermas, under the rubric of an 
intersubjective symmetry within the lifeworld, also brings to the fore an accusation often 
levelled at him as being an apologist of the status quo. This allegation came about as analysts 
became conversant with the methodological affinities that lie between the concept of Tree 
market’ and Habermas’s notion of the lifeworld.51“ The way that Habermas defines the 
dynamics of the lifeworld -  that is, as a site of open and rational debate between participants 
well grounded in the intricacies of universal pragmatics -  bears an uncanny resemblance to 
the ideology that grounds the concept of Tree’ market. Universal pragmatics guides the 
debate in the same way that the ‘Invisible Hand’ ensures that everything is at equilibrium in 
the market at all times. 513 In fact Habermas has never denied the historical links between the 
liberal public sphere and the market. 514 The reason for this may lie in Gestrich’s observation 
of the specific way in which the subterranean link between the public sphere and economy is 
fashioned by the way Habermas ‘reduces the underlying forces of historical change to 
economic development’ . 515 This runs in direct contrast to the way Habermas explains the 
system as being anchored in the lifeworld.5Ul In light of the links established between the 
public sphere and the economy, Habermas's designation of the lifeworld as a site of social 
reproduction based on fair and free exchanges becomes quite problematic. As Young puts it
511 Ibid.
512 This is a reference to the 'parallels' (strictly on a methodological level) that is apparent between the two 
concepts.
513 Deborah Cook, ‘A Response to Finlayson’, Historical Materialism, Volume 11:2 (2003) p. 190.
514 Jürgen Habermas, Structural transformation o f the Public Sphere, p. 74.
515 Andreas Gcstrich 'The Public Sphere and the Habermas Debate’, German History, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2006) p. 
416.
516 See chapter 3.
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Many contexts of moral interaction and political conflicts involve members of 
socially and culturally differentiated groups that also stand in specific relations 
to privilege and oppression with respect to one another. 17
This is to say that what happens outside the public sphere often determines the kinds of 
outcome that are generated from within. The link, established by Habermas, between the 
system and the lifeworld means that the colonisation of the latter is a given. His method of 
curbing the vagaries of systemic logic on the lifeworld is, in light of this, akin to closing the 
paddock gates after the horses have bolted. The capitalist system and its reifying effects 
cannot be undone by a theoretical sleight of hand in the hope of establishing an enclave of 
‘freedom’ that is more or less detached from the vicissitudes of modern life. The implications 
of this are worth considering: first and foremost is the glaring fact that universal pragmatics 
cannot achieve the goals that Habermas has set for it -  the emergence of equitable outcomes 
based on intersubjeetive consensus. Second is that the social environment under which 
universal pragmatics operates has the capacity, albeit one that Habermas does not recognise, 
to negate its emancipatory aims. This suggests that Habermas may have misread the 
historical trajectory of the development of capitalist modernity. Indeed his analysis of the 
evolution of modern society runs in the face of current orthodoxies. For instance, in the field 
of economics, reputable experts have long realised that the ‘free market’ model is based on 
the untenable assumption of the availability of perfect information in the market. Joseph E 
Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the World Bank, in an insightful foreword to Karl 
Polanyi’s classic, The Great Transformation, observes that,
[T]oday there is no respectable intellectual support for the proposition that 
markets, by themselves, lead to efficient, let alone equitable outcomes.
Whenever information is imperfect or markets are incomplete - that is, 
essentially always - interventions exist in principle [to] improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation.518
This is the economic context in which deliberations within the lifeworld (or for that matter 
the public sphere) take place. Perfect information does not arise exclusively from market 
processes -  in fact the opposite occurs much more often. The corollary to this is that, given 
the intrinsic links established above between the economy and the lifeworld, one would 
conclude that the dynamics of universal pragmatics is not enough to create perfect 
symmetries within the lifeworld, and by extension, the public sphere. This critique is not 
limited to economics alone. Postructuralist philosophers, as well as those sympathetic to
’l7 Iris Marion Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity’, p. 349.
Ms Karl Polanyi The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Oar Time (2nd edition), 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) p. viii.
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Habermas's communicative ethics, have problematised the dynamics of the ‘lifeworld’, 
governed as they are by universal pragmatics, as too truncated. For both, intersubjective 
symmetry cannot adequately account for the polyvalent nature of sociality. As a consequence 
any consensus in the public sphere would always be an incomplete one. This is to say that far 
from its stated intention of symmetrical contestations between interlocutors, any consensus is 
a form of coercion as ‘incommensurable language games’, shorn of any relation to grand 
discourses, fight for their place in the sun. Either way, distorted communication, far from 
being averted, is the order of the day. 519 The ‘ideal speech situation’, in fact, misrepresents 
intersubjective interaction in the lifeworld by erroneously assuming that given the telos of 
universal pragmatics, the lifeworld can be safeguarded from communicative distortion. Just 
as the economic differences between classes lead to hegemonic worldviews, the socially 
structured differences between interlocutors, given their particularities, mean that any 
consensus arising out of the public sphere will be a lopsided one. In other words rational 
consensus, given the above, may potentially be a euphemism for the perpetuation of the 
status quo.
As is made clear from his discussion of the object and its nonidentity, Adorno would have 
accused any model premised on intersubjective symmetry of dismissing as inconsequential 
what it cannot account for. By assuming that the levelling of all particularities associated 
with the interlocutors in the public sphere is a desirable outcome, universal pragmatics 
renders itself blind to the way in which historical circumstances, patterned by capitalist 
forces, are complied in the production of uneven outcomes. To be fair, Habermas might 
respond, in a Kantian vein, that the intersubjective symmetry of an ideal discourse allows the 
particularities of different individuals to be expressed and ultimately incorporated into 
general norms that are acceptable to all parties. If this is the case, then it seems that the power 
of reflection over contingency, or mind over matter, that both Frankfurt scholars found 
problematic in the dialectic of Hegel has been reinstated by default through the notion of 
universal pragmatics. For Habermas, this reflection is presupposed in the actual discourse 
within the public sphere. 520 The fundamental differences between these Frankfurt scholars 
are, perhaps, better illuminated by viewing them through the lens of another debate that took 
place before this: the polemical exchanges between Adorno and Heidegger on the aporias of 
subject-centred reason.
519 David West, Introduction to Continental Philosophy, p. 199.
520 In this way he differs from Kant who posits that his transcendental subject can identify universal moral 
principles through solitary reflection.
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5.4.2 The problem o f 'pure' Subjectivity: The Dilemmas o f Fundamental Ontology.
The fault-lines between the accounts of Adorno and Habermas on the nature of contemporary 
realities can be illuminated by the dispute between critical theory of the Frankfurt School and 
fundamental ontology on the problems surrounding true understanding. To be sure, the 
dilemma that is at the heart of our (mis)understanding is quite well known in western 
philosophical traditions. This is nowhere more apparent than in the problems of idealism and 
positivism: one valorises the subject while the other glorifies the object (empiricism). It is in 
light of this polarised, hence one dimensional, nature of understanding that Heidegger tries to 
‘escape’ from the subject-object relations of our knowing. Indeed, faced with the antimonies 
of subject-centred knowledge, Heidegger felt that it is only through a process of 
transcendence that we can approach truth. In other words, authentic understanding, for him, 
comes only via the bypassing of subject-object dynamics. This is made possible by means of 
appealing directly to the ‘object’ . 521 Adorno, however, vehemently denies the legitimacy of 
fundamental ontology, pointing out in the process that the only compelling way out is to 
work your way through this difficulty. For him, bypassing the subject-object problematic is 
at the same time turning a blind eye on the dialectical ways in which the two poles engage 
with each other. Appealing directly to the ‘thing’ or ‘being in the world’ is to forget that the 
‘thing’ is already mediated. Therefore uncritical acceptance of it is a reversion to unmediated 
consciousness (philosophy of consciousness). This is to say that Heidegger’s ‘escape’ from 
subject-object relations is a fight directly into ‘pure’ subjectivity. As Adorno ironically
52^
observed, the Heideggerian ‘escape’ was simply one that leads him back ‘into the mirror’. 
Brian O’Connor sums this up succinctly:
the failure to work within dialectical epistemology means that it will be 
impossible to recognize the real role of the object as prior to the subject. 
Consequently, implicit rejection of Adorno’s epistemology means reverting to a 
‘pre-dialectical’ position ... For Adorno, quite simply, a pre-mediational 
position amounts to an unmediated subjectivity: a subject that is not explained 
by reference to objects.523
In other words, Heidegger’s attempt to circumvent subject-object relations in the cognitive 
process lands him squarely within the aporias associated with rampant idealism.
521 Brian O’Connor, ‘Adorno, Heidegger and the critique of epistemology’, Philosophy & Social Criticism , Vol. 
24, No. 4 (1998) pp. 43-62.
522 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 84.
523 Brian O’Connor, ‘Adorno, Heidegger and the critique of epistemology’, p. 56.
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This critique can also be applied in the case of the linguistic turn as this paradigm shift was 
seen by Habermas as the ‘exit’ out of the aporias associated with the philosophy of 
consciousness. For Habermas, one of the major revisions of his new critical theory was the 
jettisoning of dialectics.52^ The major impetus that drove him to this was the conviction that 
we are no longer living in an age where universal ideologies reign. Instead we are living in a 
post-ideological age where people are increasingly determining through dialogue the issues 
that were once the domain of world-views. Thus the adoption of a philosophy of language 
based on universal pragmatics simply removed the need for ideology critique. Indeed the 
presence of symmetrical inter-subjectivities in the Habermasian schema means that all 
validity claims are based on non-dialectical discourse between subjects.
As Adorno points out to Heidegger, a non-dialectical approach to reasoning blinds us to the 
way in which the subject and object interact in processes of understanding. The 
epistemological subject in the Habermasian public sphere is therefore a subject that is 
severed from its somatic nature. The severing of the subject from its corporeal dimension is, 
in Habermas’s view, the precondition to symmetry in discourse. As such all validity claims 
would reflect the unmediated subjectivities in the public sphere. This is to say that, when 
counter-posing Habermas’s model of communicative competence with the polemics mounted 
by Adorno against fundamental ontology, it becomes clear that the so-called exit out of 
subject-centred philosophy directly leads to a form of pure subjectivity in lifeworld 
processes. Discourse, under the guise of rational deliberation, in this way becomes a ‘will to 
power’.
5.4.3 The Invisible hence 'Invincible’ subject’: The absence o f corporeality.
The problem of severing subjective thought from its somatic character exposes the Kantian 
legacy in Habermas’s interlocutor. The ‘sensuous being’ with all its passions and 
idiosyncrasies seems to have been erased to make way for subjective symmetries. Agnes 
Heller describes this condition by cynically pointing out that the interlocutor in Habermas’s 
public sphere is bereft of feelings, let alone a body. The Habermasian subject is the mind or 
spirit, since its personality structure ‘is identified with cognition (and) language’. 
Furthermore, Heller continues, the Aristotelian idea of the ‘good life’ becomes, for 
Habermas, something that ‘consists solely of rational communication’. In putting forward a
524 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (II), pp. 353-355.
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conception of the subject with neither body nor passion, Habermas seems to be arguing ‘that 
needs can be argued without being felt’ . 525 The subject, in not feeling any pain, loss, grief or 
ecstatic moments of joy, love and happiness becomes rationally invincible. The price of this 
invincibility is well accounted for in the Dialectic.
Adorno, on the other hand, views human needs, such as freedom, as grounded in the 
corporeal dimension of subjectivity. That is, Adorno’s subject is an embodied one. The 
insistence on the intertwinement of thought with its somatic dimension has been a constant 
theme in the works of both Adorno and Horkheimer. In an earlier essay, the authors of the 
Dialectic attempt to demonstrate the intertwinement of abstract thought and emotional 
responses arising out of the existential experiences of being, by noting how emotions, such as 
suffering, have given impetus to the emancipatory character of subjective thought. Indeed it 
was Horkheimer who, in a move reminiscent of Marx, first mooted the connection behind 
suffering and emancipation by insisting that ‘[P]ain has always been the most reliable teacher 
of reasoning’ . 528 What he means by this is that the experience of physical pain compels our 
consciousness to seek ways of alleviating it. This became a thematic statement for Adorno’s 
subsequent work as is encapsulated in his dialectical intertwinement of hope and despair.
In a recent publication, Lambert Zuidervaart pointed out the centrality of passion in Adorno’s
philosophical pursuit of truth. 527 Citing from Negative Dialectics, Zuidervaart argued that for
Adorno, ‘the key to avoiding philosophy’s avoidance of societal evil is also a key to
philosophy’s pursuit of truth’ . 528 Moreover, this key to truth can only be realised if we give a
voice to suffering so that it may express itself. 529 As Zuidervaart explains:
[T]he need to express suffering is a primary motivation for Adorno’s critique of 
identitarian thought, his insistence on nonidentity, his emphasis on 
conceptualising the nonconceptual, and the stress his philosophy places on 
linguistic presentation and conceptual constellations.530
525 Agnes Heller, ‘Habermas and Marxism’ in Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by John B Thompson and 
David Held (London: Macmillan Press, 1982) p. 22. This argument is reminiscent of Aristotle who, in some of 
his writings, asserts that the ideal life seems to be one of rational contemplation.
526 Cited in Ben Morgan, ‘The Project of the Frankfurt School’, p. 82.
''27 Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno, pp. 61-64.
52s ibid, p. 61.
520 ibid. For the original quotation see Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 17-18.
5,0 Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno, p. 61.
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Adorno’s insistence on the twin notions o f ‘suffering’ and ‘hope' is a distillation of his belief 
in the efficacy of human passions to subvert the status quo and transform society. 531 Adorno 
himself expounded on this theme in Negative Dialectics, noting that the ‘physical moment 
tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, (and) that things should be different’ . 532 
Suffering in this context is to be understood in both its existential as well as metaphorical 
sense. Existentially, it stands for the forced separation of the mind from the body giving rise 
to melancholy of both body and spirit. This, for Adorno, is exemplified by the existence of 
damaged life-forms in capitalist societies. Metaphorically it points to an identitarian logic 
wreaking havoc on epistemological categories through its suppression of nonidentity. Both 
meanings, because of their common premise, are a call for a wholesale transformation of 
society. In this way the dialectical intertwinement of suffering and hope becomes a mainstay 
of Adorno’s political philosophy, with the former becoming the condition of possibility for 
the latter. The importance of this guiding principle cannot be overstated as far as Adorno is 
concerned. For him, letting ‘suffering’ express itself first (through feelings of unhappiness) 
before trying to understand it conceptually makes philosophy capable of averting the twin 
dangers of ‘forgetting and perpetuating suffering’ . 533 Resistance to suffering is then 
‘occasioned by a corporeal feeling of abhorrence towards suffering’ .534 The fundamental 
supposition that animates Adorno’s oeuvre therefore is that: it is only through experiencing 
suffering and anguish that we can reinstate our hope in the emergence of a better society 
where mindless misery has no place.
This passion is not at all obvious in Habermas’s rules of language-use. In fact Habermas 
tends to view passions as aporetic and self-defeating. 535 The absence of passion renders 
Habermas’s normative grounding of critical theory in universal pragmatics inadequate. This 
is especially so in the face of the vicissitudes of living in a secular world, whose framework 
of rationality tends to be self-undermining. 536 Will ‘rational agreement’ in the public sphere 
have the same impetus or motivation as the corporeal abhorrence of suffering in changing the 
status quo? This is a question that we need to grapple with in light of the challenges that face 
us.
531 This duality o f ‘suffering’ and ‘hope’ is also a central thesis o f Marx. Marx in fact saw progression as a 
derivative o f ‘suffering’ -  see Agnes Heller, ‘Habermas and Marxism’, pp. 22-23.
532 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203.
333 Lambert Zuidcrvaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno, p. 61.
5iAibid, p. 62.
333 This is a feature that separates Habermas from Adorno and Marx. Marx has always been concerned with the 
plight of the species being. For an account of this, see Agnes Heller, ‘Habermas and Marxism’, p. 22.
'36 Jay M Bernstein, Adorno, p. 4.
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5.5 Conclusion.
A number of problems are associated with the theory of communicative competence. The 
first one relates to how the political dimension of Habermas’s communicative theory is based 
on the view that the pragmatic suppositions of the lifeworld are the same ones that regulate 
the discourse ethics of his public sphere. The objective of these rules of discursive 
engagement is to ensure a symmetrical equivalence between the interlocutors of the public 
sphere. This leads to a condition of ‘symmetrical intersubjectivity’ . 537 The importance of 
establishing this condition cannot be overstated for Habermas. Yet we have seen how this 
condition has been problematised even by authors who are sympathetic to Habermas's 
philosophy. The basic argument, posed by protagonists and antagonists alike, is that 
Habermas’s delineation of universal pragmatics fails, in a nutshell, to give an adequate 
account of the pluralities of the social. It follows, therefore, that any such consensual 
outcomes arising out of symmetrical deliberations are suspect. This raises an urgent question: 
do all consensus models, like the one that Habermas advocates, have the effect of throttling 
the effective articulation of ‘difference’?
Secondly, the difference between the Adorno’s and Habermas’s exegeses on the problematic 
of the ‘Enlightenment project’ boils down to their conception of the nature, texture and 
nuances of reason itself. What Adorno deems as a deformity of reason, reflected in the 
capitalist commodity structure, Habermas sees as a legitimate form of reason (purposive 
rational) that in his two tier theory of society is intrinsic only to the ‘system’. The principle of 
exchange, that Adorno critically castigates, is therefore viewed as unproblematic by 
Habermas, since he associates its drives with processes that are linked to the survival of the 
species. What this means is that the model of the commodity structure, for Habermas, is not 
at all symptomatic of a social pathology. Yet if the commodity structure erases the 
particularity of the commodity for exchange, in the way that universal pragmatics generate 
intersubjective symmetries for consensus, then Habermas’s lifeworld and, by extension, the 
public sphere can no longer be the site of rational agreement. In light of this, nothing short of 
a radicalisation of the public sphere can salvage it for contemporary needs. This 
radical isation, of course, presupposes the transformation of the status quo.
537 Nancy Love, ‘Epistemology and Exchange’, pp 92-94.
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It is the contention of the next chapter that if we are to reanimate the public sphere along 
Adornian lines, this will first and foremost entail paying careful attention to how 
intersubjective symmetries, like Hegel’s dialectic, dismiss what they cannot account for as 
inconsequential: namely, the somatic dimension of thought. The unproblematic way that 
intersubjective symmetries negate all particularities brought by the interlocutors into the 
public sphere is a cause for concern. Indeed, if we are to allow this, then it seems the power 
of reflection over contingency that Habermas and Adorno find problematic in the dialectics 
of Hegel has been reinstated by default through the notion of universal pragmatics. This 
ultimately brings to mind Adorno’s point about the relationship between society and 
knowledge and his view that a critique of one is also a critique of the other. In fact, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the elision of particularity in intersubjective discourse proves to 
be problematic for Habermas’s moral philosophy as well as his concept of freedom.
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C h a p t e r  6
Negative Dialectics and the idea of Autonomy.
6.0
This chapter outlines the main ways in which a public sphere, predicated on a negative 
dialectic, illuminates some of the more ostensible weaknesses of Habermas’s model of 
deliberative democracy. As has been shown in the previous chapters, the concept of the 
public sphere undergirds Habermas’s theory of democracy. Thus a revision of the dynamics 
of the public sphere would entail a corresponding reconsideration of the main motifs of his 
procedural model concerning the democratisation of society. The chapter continues from the 
last in the sense that it reworks the aporias surrounding his theory of communicative action to 
problematise his concept of the public sphere. Hence the chapter, in delineating the 
difficulties surrounding Habermas’s political philosophy, suggests that the second generation 
scholar from Frankfurt must turn back to Adorno if his theory of democracy is to be more 
relevant given our contemporary realities. The way the chapter goes about this is through a 
critical examination of Habermas’s notion of freedom and how this concept, generated by the 
public sphere, is rendered problematic from an Adornian viewpoint. In other words, the 
weaknesses apparent in Habermas’s model of democracy are embedded in his conception of 
freedom arising out of the public sphere. The chapter, therefore, delineates ways in which the 
deliberative model of democracy, espoused by Habermas, can be improved: improvements 
that would go some way to circumventing the debilitating effects of contestations guided by 
discourse ethics.53s
This chapter, therefore, begins by identifying the epistemological markers, from which a 
negative dialectic articulates a politics of freedom and emancipation. Apart from this being a 
corrective to the weaknesses associated with the failure of discourse ethics to transform 
society, this section also aims to correct the erroneous claim that Adorno's political 
philosophy is tainted with nihilistic tendencies, thus, unable to sustain an emancipatory 
theory of society (6.1). Needless to say, this section is the culmination of a defence as well as 
a restatement of the political saliency of Adorno’s negative dialectic and its insistence on a 
politics based on the concept of nonidentity: a defence that was first sketched out in chapter 2 
and continued in chapter 4 of the dissertation. The next section (6.2) seeks to further
See chapter 5.
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consolidate Adorno’s contemporary relevance through a discussion of how the somatic 
character of thought provides a warrant for the search of a better society. This section is 
important as it suggests how a stronger notion of truth is open to Adorno as a result of his 
linking of thoughts to their somatic origins. The ultimate presupposition of this section stems 
from the conviction that a weak notion of truth gives rise to a corresponding notion of 
freedom in the public sphere. This does not augur well for the fate of the already truncated 
notion of freedom that Habermas offers. The overall aim is to tease out how the absence of 
corporeality in Habermas’s theory of communicative competence blinds it to the world of 
realpolitik. This further underpins the difficulties inherent in Habermas’s linguistic turn. 
Section 6.3 argues that the incorporation of the dialectical method into Habermas’s public 
sphere would ensure its continued relevance in a world marked by radical forms of pluralism. 
The guiding principles of the discussion in this section revolve around the attempt to rectify 
some of the deficiencies pertaining to Habermas's political philosophy, hence making the 
public sphere more relevant to contemporary forms of sociality. This is then followed by 
some concluding remarks (6.4).
6.1 Nonidentity as Transformative Political Praxis: From Theory to Practice.
Some commentators argue that Adorno’s political oeuvre is bereft of any political 
commitments.539 The views that Adorno’s politics have been completely overwhelmed by a 
sense of foreboding bordering on defeatism have relied mostly on two unrelated 
developments. The first emerged as a backlash on the part of Frankfurt University students 
on what they saw as Adorno’s conservatism during the 1968 student revolt in Germany. The 
crisis, which was initially aimed at the university as a learning institution, took an ugly turn 
when Adorno, the author of a radical form of criticism based on a negative dialectic, which, 
by then, was widely appropriated by various groups, refused to be a mentor for the student 
dissidents. The series of disruptions to his classes as well as on his personal well-being took 
its toll on the Frankfurt philosopher.540 His presumed failure to live up to the callings of his 
own theory led to the dubious allegations that negative dialectic was a mere shell, lacking in 
substance.
549 Paul Piccone, ‘From Tragedy to Farce: The Return o f Critical Theory’, New German Critique, No. 7,
(Winter 1976)pp. 100-104.
540 This is quite clear in his correspondence with Herbert Marcuse around the time -  sec Theodor Adorno 
‘Correspondence on the German Student Movement’, New Left Review, No. 1 (Jan-Feb, 1999) pp. 123-124.
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The second development came about as a consequence of the heated debate between 
Habermas and the French poststructuralists. In order to highlight that the nihilistic tendencies 
embedded within poststructuralism have always been known to German critical scholarship, 
Habermas argued that the philosophical weaknesses inherent in poststructuralist thought are 
the same as those that afflict the Dialectic. For Habermas, the radical critique of society is 
both irrational and defeatist: irrational in the sense that it has no remaining normative 
yardstick to gauge itself on while, defeatist because it revolves around the fact that critique 
turns in on itself thus becoming a radical strain of, to use Ricoeur’s term, the ‘hermeneutics 
of suspicion’ . 541 How, Habermas wonders, can emancipation be realised if the tools of its 
realization are rendered complied in the suppression of emancipatory potentials? This so- 
called sceptical outlook in relation to transformative practice is well documented and is why 
Adorno’s Negative Dialectics has also been castigated as sterile and incoherent. 542
The irony of these accusations becomes obvious when one takes into account what a negative 
dialectic stands for in terms of transformative politics. Indeed, if one evaluates the 
philosophical and political saliency of the concept of nonidentity, one would not fail to 
conclude that allegations of defeatism against Adorno are spurious. A closer perusal of this 
concept will help us understand the utopian moment embedded within negative dialectics 
and, by extension, Adorno’s political commitments to a better society. A ‘better society’, for 
Adorno, would be one that is qualitatively different to the one currently existing under the 
aegis of positivism, idealism and capitalism. Admittedly Adorno does not allow the contours 
of this new society to be defined in positive terms. This however is not a result of any 
political inhibitions on his part but rather the consequence of him being a dialectician: 
‘[T]hose schooled in dialectical theory are reluctant to indulge in positive images of the 
proper society’, since history has shown that ‘all social utopias since Plato’s merge in a 
dismal resemblance of what they were devised against’ . 543 The call for a better society, in 
this way, turns out to be a lament against the existing state of affairs. As such, nonidentity 
becomes a reminder that the social totality conjured up by identity-thinking is necessarily 
false. The pseudo-nature of freedom in contemporary society is, thus, revealed.
'4I Paul Ricouer, Freud amt Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) 
p. 32. See especially his discussion of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud as the three ‘masters of suspicion’. 
s'42 On accusation of sterility see Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents o f  Marxism, translated by PS Falla 
(London: WW Norton & Co., 2008/1978) p. 1080. For the accusation of philosophical as well as political 
incoherency (perfonnative contradictions) see chapters 2 & 3 above.
S43 Theodor Adorno, ‘Messages in a Bottle’ New Left Review, 1/200 (July— August, 1993) p. 12.
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To fully appreciate the philosophical as well as the political valences of Adorno’s concept of 
nonidentity, one has to grasp his account of the dynamics of what he terms ‘identity thinking’ 
and how this entails the wilful suppression of difference. 544 By reminding us of the 
limitations of identitarian thought, nonidentity serves as a clarion call for the recognition of 
the structural limitations embedded within the status quo and the need to transform them. 
That is, only a knowledge that seeks to faithfully and truthfully represent its object would 
free humanity from the mental dyspepsia that has blinded it to the real need of modem 
society -  the attainment of a right form of life. A right kind of life will be, for him, one that is 
based on freedom.
Adorno indeed observes that, as a method, negative dialectics espouses knowledge 
‘coinciding with the object’ . 545 In other words, he sees the quest for truth and the emergence 
of the right kind of life as being inextricably linked. Truth, in this way becomes the basis of 
all transformative praxis. Its absence leads to a sociality devoid of real freedom, hence the 
emergence of a modern society that perverts the idea of truth by making it subservient to 
reigning social interests. 546 The contradictions inherent in this kind of society are summed up 
by Marcuse’s concept of ‘repressive tolerance’ -  a condition that subverts all possible forms 
of resistance against it by means of an ideological smokescreen that falsely assures everyone 
that their real needs are being met. 547 Adorno’s position is consistent with the stance he took 
against Sir Karl Popper, in the ‘Positivist Dispute’ . 548 It is here that Adomo maintains, contra 
Popper, that the idea of truth cannot be treated in isolation from the revolutionary practice 
that will lead to a true society. In fact any analysis of society that is content with the status 
quo reveals its conservative bias in imagining that nothing can be better than what currently 
exists. 544 For Adorno, a true reconciliation between truth and society necessitates the 
transformations of contemporary ‘guidelines’ that regulate human relations and actions. In 
other words, what Habermas took for granted -  the steering media of bureaucratic power and 
money (for the system), as well as the universal pragmatics that regulates the lifeworld -  
Adorno problematises and, subsequently, demands their transformation. In this way the
544 See chapter 4.
545 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 160.
S46Theodor Adorno, ‘Messages in a Bottle', p. 7.
47 In an interview in 1978, Marcuse insists that the essay that goes by the same name, ‘already presupposes, at 
least politically, a very different society' -  see Myriam Malinovich, ‘Marcuse in 1978’, p. 363.
S4X Sec chapter 4.
549 Theodor Adorno et al, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adcy and David 
Frisby, (London: Heinemann, 1976) p. 76.
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continuity between Adorno’s philosophical writings and his political philosophy is mide 
apparent.
It is, thus, obvious that despite the sense of melancholy that informs Adorno's politcal 
writings, his theory of negative dialectics remains fused to a vision of a better society -  a 
warrant that animates the Frankfurt School. Indeed Adorno uses melancholy to remind uj of 
the historical nature of social change and how, in our historical development, we have cane 
to valorise a certain logic that has removed us further and further away from the ability to 
discern things as they really are. The main crux of Habermas critique of Adorno as tha: of 
defeat is, therefore, misplaced.
6.1.1. The conception o f Truth and the fate o f Freedom in an Action-theoretic model.
A related problem that arises from the discussion above concerns the notion of autonomy, 
because freedom, as a concept, is irrevocably linked to ideas of truth. In other words, without 
a notion of truth, the concept of autonomy becomes an empty signifier. This is not to argue 
that Habermas’s theory of communicative action evades the issue of truth -  far from it in 
fact. Habermas’s claim of the context-transcending moment inherent in speech acts in itself 
as a truth-claim. The issue is not so much the existence of truth in Habennas’s work per se 
but how it is derived in his paradigmatic framework. Truth, for Habermas, canno: be 
separated from the raising of validity-claims within the public sphere. That is, truth can mly 
be derived from a situation that is defined as that of a rational consensus: a situation tint is 
governed by the ideals of speech pragmatics. 550 Since Habermas is of the view that there is a 
context-transcending moment in all speech acts, it therefore follows that the truth that arises 
out of rational consensus is also assumed to transcend the contexts of each individual truth- 
claim raised within the public sphere. Indeed Habermas himself has succinctly endorsed the 
linkage between his discourse theory of truth and the formal characteristics of the ‘ideal 
speech situation’ . 551
Albrecht Wellmer, however, has pointed out the provisional nature of this truth. By insisting 
on the contingent nature of all rational agreements, Habermas in effect puts forward a weak 
notion of truth. 552 Indeed the provisional nature of rational consensus in the public sphere 
renders it inadequate as a theory of truth at the same time. When you combine this weak
"" See chapter 3.
”  Jürgen Habennas, Truth and Justification, translated by Barbara Fultner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) pp. 
249-252. Also see Jürgen Habennas, Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 162.
552Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence o f Modernity, translated by David Midgley (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991) p. 65.
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notion of the truth with his view about the asymmetries in rational stocks that are the bases 
for parity in deliberations, then what comes out is a concept of freedom that is quite 
controversial553. This is to say that the concept of autonomy, arising out of the context 
regulated by a weak notion of truth and the universalisation of a notion of truth that 
strategically favours a specific geographical space, is robbed of its own semantic potentials 
and runs contrary to what Habermas has in mind. 554
Wellmer notes that the solution to this problem lies in the development of a more adequate 
notion of consensus-based truth. To do this however would entail supplementing the existing 
mechanisms of the public sphere with an additional ‘standard' or criterion that would result 
in a ‘stronger’ notion of truth. This is to say that, for him, discourse ethics do not have any 
other means of ensuring rational outcomes in discourse other than by appealing to reason. In 
relation to this difficulty he argues that:
this problem can only be circumvented in Habermas’s version of consensus 
theory by including among the structural characteristics of an ideal speech 
situation a sufficient competence to judge on the part of all participants.55'
In other words, rationality as the primary arbitrator in the public sphere is inadequate for the
purpose Habermas has in mind. The reason is that a weak notion of truth empties rational
consensus of its juridical and emancipatory potentials. This, in hindsight, is one of the latent
reasons behind the reconceptualisation of freedom in Habermas’s discourse ethics: that
autonomy is an outcome of a truth that is decided by the universalisation principle. 556
Habermas's notion of truth is thus inseparable from the contestation of competing validity
claims within the public sphere. In order to make truth include all truth-claims that are laid
out within the arena of deliberation, a rational consensus has to be achieved. This form of
consensus in turn is premised on the idea of universal equality, or what Benhabib terms
symmetrical reciprocity between the interlocutors. 557 The is problematic, as is highlighted by
the German social commentator Matthias Fritsch, who observes that:
553 See footnote 466 above for an account of the unequal rational resources available to people from different 
regions in the world.
554 Peter Dews also recognises this problem when he argues that ‘Habermas's whole conception o f a discourse 
ethics ultimately rests on specific, albeit culturally deep-rooted, commitments to freedom and autonomy’ which 
in their turn ‘ cannot be derived from the nonnative structure of the speech-situation as such' -  see Peter Dews, 
The Limits o f  Disenchantment, p. 274.
555 Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence o f Modernity, p. 165.
556 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, pp. 120-121.
557 Seyla Benhabib, ‘ The Utopian dimension in Communicative Ethics’, p. 93.
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Modern egalitarianism is characterized by the double claim that first, equality is 
fundamental in that it is not itself grounded in, and thus limited by, other norms, 
but rather grounds and conditions all others. And, secondly, equality enjoys 
priority over non-egalitarian norms of singularity, such as solidarity, loyalty, 
friendship, love, pity, compassion, care and so forth.v S
Furthermore he agrees with the argument that according a ‘fundamental priority’ to equality, 
in this way, at the expense of ‘non-egalitarian norms of singularity’ is erroneous since what is 
to be justified (i.e. equality’s fundamental priority) ‘is already presupposed in the very 
concept of nonnative justification’ . 559 In fact the assertion of priority that is bestowed on 
equality neglects the fact that in order to realise its objective, equality needs to engage with 
other ‘non-egalitarian norms of singularity’ in a way that will not render these nonns 
redundant. That is, equality has to take on each specific norm of singularity using the very 
yardstick of that particular norm. Yet by doing so, equality engages in a non-egalitarian 
process itself. 560
Adorno, on the other hand, is fully aware of the asymmetrical nature of modern forms of 
mediation. He puts this down to the different natures of the subject and object themselves. 
The difference, in his observation, lies in that the subject has a substrate and in this way is 
also an object while ‘[A]n object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains 
other than the subject’ . 561 These fundamentally different natures of subject and object mean 
that in any form of mediation ‘the subject enters into the object altogether differently from 
the way the object enters into the subject’ . 562 The point that he is trying to convey is that 
concepts such as universal equality cannot realize their true form unless they are open to the 
particular and contingent. As such, any form of positive universal truth can only come about 
through the suppression of particularity. This robs truths of their content, rendering them 
provisional in the process. A provisional concept of truth arising out of free and equal 
deliberations within a public sphere may have an adverse impact on the idea of freedom. This 
difficulty is related to the problematic nature of language-use in a social context defined by 
the principle of exchange. Indeed, given this context, communication succumbs to identity 
thinking and hence deviates from its ideal presuppositions by ‘falsifying truth and selling it
Matthias Fritsch, ‘Equal consideration of all -  an aporetic project?’ Philosophy and Social Criticism , no.32 
(2006) p. 302.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
561 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 183.
M,J Ibid, p. 183. He further explains on page 186 that ‘Mediation of the object means that it must not be 
statically, dogmatically hypostatized but can only be known as it entwines with subjectivity; mediation o f the 
subject means that without the object it would be literally nil’.
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out’ . 563 From an Adornian standpoint, when truth is robbed of its semantic potentials to 
critique social reality an apotheosis of the status quo immediately ensues. This occurs in two 
ways; either through an abstraction process (as in liberal political philosophies) or via a 
process of deconstruction (as in poststructuralism especially in Derrida). Habermas's 
deontological discourse ethics, as a result of the severance of questions of validity and 
legitimacy from those of the good life, is only possible via a process of abstraction. This is 
linked directly to the actual dynamics of exclusion at work in a public sphere moored in 
universal pragmatics. Given this, any form of insistence on an abstract equality between 
interlocutors in a deliberative setting serves only to prop up all reigning interests in society.
In light of this, Adorno puts forward a notion of truth that comes about through an authentic 
reconciliation between subject and object. To be sure, he does not offer a positive conception 
of truth outright but reworks it in a negative dialectical fashion taking into consideration both 
the historicity of conceptual language and the somatic character of thought. In other words, 
the existence of nonidentity is, for him, the condition of possibility of the ‘concreteness’ of 
historical truth. However one needs to approach this negatively; that is, by showing the 
untruth that resides in a thought that claims to know the whole truth. 564 Indeed a positive 
affirmation of truth, for him, presupposes a radically different social reality than the one in 
which we currently live. This version of truth, as opposed to the provisional nature of the one 
arising out of Habermas’s discourse ethics, is premised on how thought itself is a sensuous 
activity; that is, it cannot avoid, and indeed is derived from, human drives and temperaments 
(read ‘inner nature’) which even though they are socially conditioned, nevertheless do exert 
their particular character on thought. Truth therefore, for him, is not only epistemological but 
a practical condition for a right kind of life.
The search for truth, in this way, becomes inseparable from the quest for the right form of 
life. Implicit in this project is the pursuit of a more substantive and ‘enlightened’ form of 
reason: a reason that has freed itself from the spell of subjective thought. The task of a 
negative dialectics then is to infer the truth through a relentless critique that seeks to 
illuminate the conditions of a ‘damaged’ form of life. An admission of truth in this way must 
also be, from Adorno’s viewpoint, an acknowledgement of the existence of the ‘particular’ 
by the ‘universal’. At face value, Adorno seems, like Habermas, to be also advocating a weak 
notion of truth. However there is an important qualification -  and this is where Adorno's
563 ibid, p. 4 1.
564 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralin, p. 50.
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concept of truth finds firmer epistemological grounding. Whereas both Adorno and 
Habermas advance an idea of truth in terms of a philosophy of language, the former 
supplements this notion by attributing a somatic character to thought. In so doing, a stronger 
notion of truth emerges: one that derives its character from the specificity of the object itself. 
It is to this we are turning to next, since the somatic character of thought and its relation to 
‘truth’ is clearly suppressed in Habermas's concept of intersubjective symmetries. 565 The 
next section, which follows logically from the discussion above, argues for a return to 
Adorno if Habermas is to develop a ‘stronger’ and more stable concept of truth that is linked 
to the transformation of social reality.
6.2 The Somatic Character of Thought.
The epistemological hurdle that obscures the link between thought and its somatic origins is 
quintessentially captured by the coercive estrangement of the subject and the object in 
modem discourses. This tension between subject and object, universal and particular; identity 
and nonidentity; lies at the core of Adorno’s dialectical philosophy of negativity. In fact, their 
decoupling leads to a tautology in subjective thought, which robs it of any insight into the 
nature of its own nonidentity. In other words, what has been left on the wayside in the 
dynamics that subjective thought employs in the construction of identity or meaning is the 
mediation that takes place between subject and object in the generation of knowledge. 
Knowledge, in this way, becomes simply what is known. 666 The problem relating to the 
composition of identity in a cognitive framework that is premised on the active estrangement 
of the subject and object is that:
[A]s soon as it is fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology, its 
normal form. Mind then arrogates to itself the status of being absolutely 
independent - which it is not: mind’s claim to independence announces its claim 
to domination.567
To him, Hegel, although right in his dialectical approach to knowledge and reality, was too 
impatient to painstakingly unfold the fixed meanings of the different trajectories highlighted 
by his dialectics. This led, as a consequence, to him subordinating the object to conceptual 
thought in the construction of meaning. By announcing that ‘what is rational is actual and
565 See chapter 5.
566 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 184.
567 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, p. 246.
168
what is actual is rational’, Hegel illegitimately allows subjective thought the power to 
suppress its nonidentity for the sake of achieving the absolute,568 External reality becomes 
once more, in this way, a handmaiden of the realm of ideas.
By way of contrast, Marx, in his haste to salvage the insights of the dialectical approach for a 
materialistic reinterpretation of social reality, paid scant attention to the epistemological 
moorings of thought and, as a result, is indicted by Adorno as akin to a raging bull in a china 
shop.569 This is to say that Marx was also oblivious of the necessity of mediation between 
subject and object in fixing identity. By proclaiming in his 111,1 thesis against Feuerbach that 
‘[T]he philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however is to 
change it’, Marx was simply shifting the semiotic register pertaining to the construction of 
meaning from its idealistic moorings to one based on materialism.570 In this way subjective 
thought became an epiphenomenon of objective reality, hence the reduction of theory to 
praxis.
Both approaches, for Adorno, unduly supress the tension between subject and object that in 
turn obfuscates the truth that lies at the core of any society. The call therefore is to reopen the 
dialectical mediation between the two without falling victim to the temptation of ‘closure’. 
This means that the mediation has to be an open-ended one in which meaning is continuously 
enabled and redefined by the concept as the object simultaneously attempts to fulfil its 
concept. In a compelling account, Susan Buck-Morss notes that, against the grain of all 
objectivist as well as subjectivist accounts, the Frankfurt scholar posits that knowledge 
accumulation must not be
at the cost of giving up the non-identity between subject and object. Instead, be 
saw them as necessary co-determinates: neither mind nor matter could dominate 
the other as a philosophical first principle. Truth resided in the object, but it did
order to
Given the above, one could easily fall into the erroneous perception that the same aporetic 
concept of truth propagated by poststructuralists finds similar expression in Adorno. Peter 
Dews, however, argues that there is a seminal difference and that this difference lies in 
Adorno’s insistence on how historical truth is generated by the mediation between its own 
concept and the concrete experiences arising out of an antagonistic social reality at any given
not lie ready at hand; the material object needed the rational subject in 
release the truth which it contained’.571
568 Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 10.
569Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 206.
570 Robert C Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 145.
571 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics, p.81.
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moment in time. 572 As such truth is not at all chimerical, not based on the playful gestures of 
free-floating signifiers as the deconstructionists would have us believe. 572 Max Pensk/ puts 
this process of truth-making in Adorno’s work succinctly when he observes that:
The constellation, the centerpiece of Adorno’s historiography was to have been 
non-arbitrary; its point was the representation of historical truth from within the 
shattered material of used up textualities, and not the spectacle of the free play 
of liberated textual elements.574
This suggests that, unlike the radicalism of poststructuralism, there is, for Adorno, a material 
(object) ‘point of reference’ for all subjective processes of comprehension. As such, thought 
cannot be true to itself if it excludes the material basis of its origins. This materialist 
disposition enables Adorno to adopt a pragmatic approach to the problems of modern society. 
Whereas poststructuralist thought approaches and critiques social reality in terms of a 
philosophy of language, Adorno talks about a transformative knowledge of society borne out 
of the sufferings of the concrete individual in a bourgeois setting. Indeed in his own words, 
‘[T]he smallest trace of senseless suffering in the empirical world belies all the identitarian 
philosophy that would talk us out of that suffering’ . 575 This misery is a perpetual reminder 
that thought has not reconciled itself with its somatic origins and continues to wilfully 
(vrns)represent social reality. A turn to Adorno, in this way, would mean reuniting thought 
with its somatic character. It would mean a more reflective approach to rational agreements 
based on the realisation of the inability of language to define our authentic needs. This will 
prevent discourse ethics from drowning out the voice of the oppressed. Adorno, on this 
particular point, sardonically remarks that ‘instead of splashing around in the linguistic 
cascade, a philosopher reflects on it’ .'576
Adorno himself explains the somatic origins of thought in various accounts, the most explicit 
being through an examination of art forms. It is worth quoting at some length his description 
of the ability of art to retain the emancipatory potentials that has been lost in modern society:
The authentic cultural object must retain and preserve whatever goes by the 
wayside in that process o f increasing domination over nature which is reflected 
in expanding rationality and ever more rational fonns of domination. Culture is
772 Peter Dews, Logics o f  Disintegration, pp. 46-54.
7^1 An example o f this poststructuralist tendency of conjuring ‘free floating signifiers’ is captured neatly in 
Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press I976)p. 19.
’74Max Pensky, ‘Editor’s Introduction: Adorno’s Actuality’ p. 11. Indeed the gulf that separates the two groups 
has already been established in Jean-Francois Lyotard, ‘Adorno as the Devil’.
575 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203.
576 Ibid, p. 56.
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the perennial protestation of the partieular against the general as long as the 
latter remains irreconcilable with the particular/77
The point here for Adorno is that cultural objects are the repositories of the emancipatory 
potential that has been lost in the process of rationalisation. 578 What this means is that, 
contrary to Habermas’s allegation that Adomo’s dialectics have nothing to stand on, the 
author of Negative Dialectics sees culture as a necessary means of resisting the encroachment 
of the universal. The problem, for him, is that classificatory reason has deeply suppressed 
culture’s truth claims, hence suppressing the emancipatory potential of Art as a cultural 
object. It is quite apparent from this view that, apart from acknowledging the emancipatory 
element that is present in society, Adorno was also alluding to the demented nature of the 
modem subject. Since the subject is both a subject and an object, living in a bourgeois 
society causes an unbridgeable tension between the subject and its nonidentity. The only 
way, therefore, of stabilizing this pathological state of being is through the suppression of the 
object, or in other words the concrete part of the subject which generates the somatic origins 
of subjective thought. In this way, the cool, poised and collected modern subject emerges -  
devoid of passion, desires and spontaneity -  as it strives to control its own uncertainties in 
the face of an ever changing, fluid, and rationalized world. Suppressed as the nonidentity 
may be, it nevertheless cannot be totally extinguished as it is an irrevocable part of the 
subject itself. The tension this creates within the subject tears it apart. In this way the modern 
subject’s life in a society premised on the principle of exchange is a ‘damaged’ one, 
deformed beyond recognition. Implicit in this account of the subject’s damaged form is the 
argument that the unity between the subjective and objective dimensions of the subject 
presupposes the transfonnation o f ‘outer’ nature; that is, life in its bourgeois manifestation.
It is Adorno’s contention that this process of demystification, between the exchange principle 
as a way of life and positivism as a way of knowing, can only be negated by a relentless 
negative dialectical critique of society. In other words, the ideological veneer that shields the 
truth from the subject can be destabilized, by the merest suggestion of a truth that is 
generated by a constellation that accords preponderance to the somatic nature of thought.
577 Cited in Andreas Huyssen ‘Introduction to Adorno’, New German Critique No.6 (Autumn 1975) p. 6.
<’78 Habermas's conception of art is, comparatively, more ambivalent. On one band he acknowledges the critical 
potentials embedded within art works. For instance, the avant-garde of the last century, is a reflection of deep 
seated reactions against the process of societal modernization. Under the pressure of the dynamics of economic 
growth and the organisational accomplishments of the state, this social modernization penetrates deeper and 
deeper into previous forms of human existence -  Jürgen Habermas, ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity,’ New 
German Critique, 22 (Winter 1981) p. 7.
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This is possible only if identitarian thought sheds its pretensions to totalizing knowledge and 
liberates itself from the positivistic yoke that enslaves its inner nature and blinds it to the 
price it is paying as an exchange for its mastery of the world. In so arguing, the link between 
the somatic character of thought and the transfonnation of the status quo is rendered explicit. 
These differences in how each theorist approach language as a tool of cognition are carried 
over into their competing claims as to the ability of the public sphere to address the needs of 
a plural social world. This is the theme that is discussed in the next section.
6.3 Towards a new Public Sphere: Redeeming Adorno’s Dialectical Philosophy of 
Language.
Habermas’s conceptualization of the political public sphere is an attempt to retain the ideals 
of the bourgeois public sphere without assuming its historical form. 579 The location of this 
public sphere in the “lifeworld’ directly ensues from his conviction that the conditions that 
give rise to the ‘ideal speech situation’ are exclusively present in this social domain. It is here 
that the institutional dynamics of the public sphere are combined with the philosophical 
requirements of speech, epitomised by discourse ethics. Yet much remains unsaid of just how 
different is the new ‘ideal type’ apart from the explicit shift to language. In fact the 
‘linguistic turn’, remains the most distinctive feature of the political public sphere. By 
contrast, Adorno does not see the ‘linguistic turn’ as a legitimate exit out of the aporias of the 
philosophy of consciousness: he is, in fact, ambivalent about the capability of language to 
delineate truth. What this means is that, for Adorno, any form of communicative reason is 
tainted by the problematic nature of language. Granted that they both posit the existence of a 
mimetic quality in conceptual thought, Adorno however goes further in raising the problem 
of language-use in communicative reason. This is the other side to language-use that 
Habermas fails to examine.
From this stand point, it is possible to make an argument that the problematic of language- 
use is transferred by means of intersubjective contestations to rational consensus. Rational 
consensus, in effect, becomes a guise for the search of ‘first principles’ in the sphere of 
language. Thus, according to Adorno, we simply slip back into the aporias of subjectivity
574 For instance, membership is limited only to the bourgeois class.
4,8(1 Habermas’s concept o f the public sphere actually predates his philosophical move to language as the ba sis of 
his critical theory of society.
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that we were trying to escape from. 5*1 In this way, the Ilabermasian method of using 
universal pragmatics, to guide language towards consensus, is problematised by Adorno. 
Hence the problem of a language-based reason, for Adorno, is intrinsic to the properties of 
language itself vis-ä-vis the articulation of reality. Granted that without language, reason 
cannot be deployed, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind the way in which language 
and reality are dialectically entwined. Both show up the inadequacy of the other. Adorno 
maintains that language is not only poorer than the reality it strives to express, it is also more. 
This conviction is implicit in his observation on the indispensability of language despite its 
shortcomings. In this paradoxical way, language enables and simultaneously limits the 
capability of reason to grasp reality. Reaffirming this latter sense of language, Müller 
remarks:
[I]t is weil known, for example, that it is possible to perceive many more colours 
than can be articulated in language. One must only try to give a precise 
description of the rich palette of the fall foliage in order to experience, in a flash, 
the poverty of language'.582
Adorno highlights this conceptual problematic in his discussion of the nonidentity; that is, 
Negative Dialectics, as the ontology of the dismal state of things (wrong state of things), 
advances the view that abstraction is the inevitable way in which language suppresses the 
facticity or concreteness of the object while in the same breath insists on the indispensability 
of language itself in thought.
The advantages that a dialectical method brings to the public sphere cannot be understated. 
Contrary to the current orthodoxy that views Habermas's and Adorno’s works as mutually 
exclusive, a close examination of the dynamics of Adorno’s negative dialectics helps to 
reinforce Habermas’s central premises concerning the public sphere. For instance, Adorno’s 
dialectics, in pointing out the dialectical nature of language and thought, puts an undeniable 
emphasis on the need as well as the limitation of classificatory logic. The other side of the 
dialectic, however, suggests the need to break through the power of conceptual thought by 
means of the concepts themselves. That is, the incorporation of a dialectics in the public 
sphere means a revision of discourse ethics in light of the fact that language itself has become 
ideological. This is evinced by the way it maintains that truth resides in the subject and not in 
its object of representation. For Adorno, breaking the power of subjectivity is achieved by a
581 Heidegger, according to Adorno, tried to do this by appealing directly to the object. Little did he know that 
the object is already mediated. By accepting object in its supposed immediacy, Heidegger breaks right hack into 
a ‘transcendental delusion" associated with the subject. See chapter 4.
582Harro Müller, ‘Mimetic Rationality', p. 95.
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mimetic condition that is generated by constellational thinking. This has been, in recent 
times, highlighted by Wellmer and indeed Habermas himself as sharing close affinity with 
communicative reason and the ideal speech situation.583 The difference lies in the fact that 
Adorno uses this power to harness the necessary moral imperatives for an assault on the 
forces that seek to colonise the lifeworld/N4 What Negative Dialectics, therefore, also brings 
to Habermas’s two-tier model of society are the nonnative grounds for a relentless critique of 
contemporary life under the aegis of bourgeois society. This admittedly is not as succinct in 
Habennas’s formulation.
It is quite clear from above that Habermas’s jettisoning of the dialectic has blunted the 
critical edge of his concept of the political public sphere. In fact the ambiguity surrounding 
Habennas’s conception follows directly from his separation of deontological issues of justice 
and morality from notions of The good life’ or ethics. Lacking a normative impetus for 
discourse ethics, Habennas relies on ‘boundary maintenance’ as the way to prevent the 
colonization of the lifeworld and by extension the public sphere. This seems to be a poor way 
of nurturing social life in light of the encroachments of capitalism to virtually all spheres of 
contemporary society.
6.3.1 Introducing Dialectics: Reanimating the Public Sphere.
Applied to the Habermasian public sphere, a dialectics that offers nothing but negativity 
would highlight the need to recognize the costs of a capitalist form of life. This searing 
critique, admittedly, is missing from Habermas’s formulations. However the critique must 
also, at the same time, maintain the distinctions made by Habennas between purposive- 
rational and communicative-rational reason. A close examination of the works of these 
Frankfurt philosophers would show, prima facie, that there are a lot of commonalities in this 
quarter at the very least. What for Habermas are the distinctions between purposive-rational 
reason and communicative-rational reason are described in Adornian parlance as the 
differences between conceptual and constellational thinking. Wellmer reinforces this view by 
pointing to the elective affinities between mimetic reason and Habennas’s communicative 
rationality, noting that mimesis for Adorno is that ‘realm of communicative behaviour that
M Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence o f  Modernity, p. 13. 
xX4 Jay Bernstein. Adorno.
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exists outside the territory of conceptual thought’ . 585 Yet the fundamental differences must 
also be taken into consideration if we are to radicalise the public sphere.
What distinguishes the works of the two authors from each other is their respective stances as 
to the fate of mimesis in the conceptual articulation of the object. For Habermas, the two 
forms of reason, although linked to each other on one level, nevertheless are confined to 
different spheres of integration in society. Purposive-rational reason operates within the 
‘system’ and guides systemic integration via non-normative steering media of money and 
administrative power, while communicative reason is embedded within the dynamics of the 
lifeworld and becomes the impetus for social integration. The link between the two spheres 
of integration, however tenuous it may be in his fonnulation, lies in the ‘system’ and its 
purposive-rational reason finding anchorage in the lifeworld and communicative-rational 
reason. 586 This does not in any way imply that the two forms of reason can access each 
other's operational area with complete impunity. Indeed for Habermas, system-driven 
impulses in the lifeworld increase the likelihood of the latter’s colonisation. Implicit in 
Habermas’s model is the view that the colonisation process can only occur in the lifeworld. 
That is, it is a one way process. So while he thinks that our current predicament can be 
averted by a balancing of the two forms of rationality, this ‘balancing’, in effect, is a call for 
a strict demarcation between the two spheres. This is why ‘boundary maintenance’ is so 
pivotal in his theory of society. On the other hand, however unlikely a scenario it may be in 
our current context, colonisation of the system by lifeworld compulsions spells danger of a 
different kind -  the stultification of the material production of societal needs. In other words, 
the first scenario gives rise to a condition that Dürkheim equates with ‘normlessness’, the 
second ends up in material destitution. This simply highlights Habermas’s insistence on the 
need to have both of these reasons in society.
In contrast Adorno sees no need for a strict demarcation, since conceptual thought has all but 
suppressed the emancipatory potential that lies in the condition of mimesis. In this way the 
attempt by Habermas to assiduously keep the two forms of reason separate reeks for him of 
naivety. These ambiguities surrounding the separation between two interrelated spheres, with 
concomitant logics, further compound Habermas’s theory. Why would Habermas insist on 
keeping them separate when he already admits to the existence of a mimetic moment in 
conceptual thought and insists that the system is anchored in the lifeworld? For Adorno, the
w  Albrecht Wcllmer, The Persistence o f Modernity, p. 13.
586 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f Communicative Action (II), p. 154. See chapter 3 for a full discussion.
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problem lies in a different direction. It is not so much, as Habermas would have it, the 
interpenetration of different impulses that leads to regression. The philosophical quandary 
lies squarely in the primacy that Habermas accords to language as exemplified by the 
lifeworld and its communicative reason. This is to say that for Habermas, the telos of 
universal pragmatics provides impetus to the rationalisation of communicative reason just as 
purposive-rational reason is honed by system differentiation. That is just as communicative 
reason, on one hand, is regulated by the normative steering media that are defined through 
the rules of discourse, purposive-rational reason, on the other, is regulated by the 'de- 
linguistified media’ of money and power. As a matter of form, the non-normative de- 
linguistified media, as steering mechanisms, bypass 'processes °f consensus-oriented 
communication’ that are so central to the lifeworld. That is, ‘they do not merely simplify 
linguistic communication, but replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and 
punishment. 587 In this way communicative processes of attaining agreements are suppressed 
by the dynamics of de-linguistified media.
Habermas’s two-tier theory of society thus downplays the dangers that Adorno sees lurking 
in the horizon. Perhaps this ambivalence can be put down to the specific way in which the 
former articulates conceptual logic or purposive-rational reason. For him, purposive 
rationality has a legitimate place in society and is, therefore, indispensable. Adorno thinks so 
too as, for him, purposive rationality would be subjective reason. Contrary to Adorno, 
however, Habermas does not see the shortcomings of instrumental reason as inherent within 
itself. For him, pathological effects of this reason can only be determined at the level of 
application. That is, the overwhelming of the lifeworld by instrumental reason is the only 
thing we have to be vigilant against. We cannot afford to adopt a nihilistic form of 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ against reason itself, for this would entail a performative 
contradiction. There can only be a failure in application, not in reason itself. In fact his two- 
tier model is built around this. Communicative reason, therefore, is not derived from the 
weakness of purposive-rational reason -  in the same way as mimesis is linked to the failure 
of conceptual thought for Adorno -  but is a reflection of the two levels on which societal 
integration occurs. This suggests that Habermas’s formulation of the democratisation process 
is bereft of any dialectical mediation between subjective thought and the mimetic element of 
everyday life. This is a controversial omission in light of the many ways in which the
<i87 Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f  Communicative Action (II), p. 183.
176
democratisation agenda embedded within the public sphere can be rejuvenated by Adorno’s 
dialectics.
The linking of democratisation, as a process, with deliberative engagements in the public 
sphere is highly suggestive of Habermas’s attempt to make rationality the chief standard 
against which the concept of autonomy is measured. In other words, the degree of 
democratization is to be determined by the rational content of validity-claims that undergirds 
consensus. This, to be sure, is an example of an ideal that he has salvaged from the bourgeois 
public sphere. In fact the concept of the ‘refeudalisation’ of the public sphere is a reminder of 
the dangers associated with a time when de-linguistified politics, rather than rational 
considerations, held sway in the public sphere. 588 The call for a shift from the political to the 
rational was first mooted in the bourgeois public sphere as a way to make power more 
accountable to the generalized interests of society. In this way, the principle of 
universalisation, which was the impetus behind such a move, would ‘then be guaranteed, 
according to the presuppositions of a society of free commodity exchange’ . 589
In an attempt to redeem the principle of universalisation embedded in the bourgeois public 
sphere, the new political public sphere further shifts the semiotics of the rationalisation 
process from its market underpinnings to discourse ethics. It is the specific way that the 
principles of universalisation, rationalisation and democratisation are uncritically assembled 
in Habermas’s ‘modernity project’ that is proving to be problematic. For instance the 
emphasis placed on democracy and rationality is quite revealing in its congruence with 
Eurocentric development discourses. 590 Just as the subtexts of these development discourses 
highlight the dichotomous nature of the development process, Habermas in a similar vein 
assumes that the biggest obstacle to democracy lies in the uneven development of rational 
potentials between different lifeworlds. In other words he attributes the unevenness of the 
democratization process to the existence of cultures that are ‘lagging’ behind. As a 
consequence interlocutors hailing from these cultures may not be as well equipped, compared 
to others, in raising validity claims. 591 What this means is that non-European societies have a 
‘comparative disadvantage'' when it comes to raising validity claims in the public sphere.
588 This is a direct reference to the dynamics of the medieval public sphere.
589 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere’, p.53. The subterranean link between Exchange principles and 
universal pragmatics is explored in chapter 5.
4^(1 Barry Hindcss, ‘Men Behaving Badly'. Sec also the discussion in the previous chapter on intersubjeetive 
symmetries.
VM Jürgen Habermas, Theory o f  Communicative Action (I), pp. 70-71.
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This is because the relative backwardness of their respective cultures stunts their abilities in 
‘making explicit ... the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions are based’ . 592 
Implicit in this position is the assumption that the ‘rational stocks’ that enable one to 
participate meaningfully in the public sphere are high in the Anglo-US axis. As such 
Habermas unwittingly lets into the deliberation of the public sphere the historical sediments 
of a logo-centric reason. This becomes problematic as far as the realisation of autonomy is 
concerned.
The Adomian thesis about how the subject gives voice to the object is an appropriate 
rejoinder to Habermas’s discourse ethics. 593 When viewed from Adorno’s subject-object 
constellative matrix, the Habermasian guiding principles for deliberation in the political 
public sphere can be seen as fraught with problems. 594 In his delineation of the characteristics 
of the ideal participant in discourse, Habermas establishes a clear rule: ‘[Ejvery subject with 
the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in discourse’ . 595 This qualification, 
tied to membership, hides, in other words, a discriminatory procedure that lies at the heart of 
discourse ethics. That is, apart from shunning the linguistically incompetent, the criterion 
also discriminates against those whose lifeworlds are not rational in the way modern 
discourses understand the term. Discourse ethics, therefore, precludes disparate groups that 
include people suffering from mental disabilities, senility, coma and brain injuries. 596 The 
perverse effects of this weakness in Habermas’s conception of the public sphere are 
highlighted by Meriwether in his problematisation of discourse ethics in relation to the plight 
of unborn babies. In a nutshell, unborn babies cannot plead for their lives, hence a pregnant 
woman’s right to abortion is decided by the fact that she can justify this right linguistically in 
discourse. 597 In limiting the membership, Habermas assumes that the interests of the other 
can be raised via ‘proxy advocacy’. This allows, for instance, the representation of the 
‘disabled’ by rational interlocutors in the public sphere. In fact discourse ethics is premised 
on the ability of interlocutors to ‘exchange’ positions with others. However, what often 
happens is that real ‘exchange’ is thwarted by the fact that, when asked to do so, interlocutors
592 Ibid, p. 71.
593 See discussion on this in chapters 4 and 5.
594 This is a reference to Adorno’s attempt in using the power of the subject to break through the veil of 
subjectivity.
395 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 89.
v,<’ Nicholas Meriwether, 'Discourse Ethics and the Problem of Oppression’, Telos (Spring 2001) p. 102. He 
further adds (p. 103) that even if we allow those who are not competent linguistically to take part in discourse, 
it does not mean the integration and 'recognition o f their desires into discourse’.
~'n Nicholas Meriwether, 'Discourse Ethics and the Problem of Oppression’, p. 102.
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‘do not imagine the point of view of others; rather they project onto those others their own 
fears and fantasies about themselves’.54X This raises the real possibility that those who may 
represent us through proxy may not have our interest at heart. The worst case scenario is 
highlighted by Meriwether, who raises the historical spectre of atrocities being ‘perpetrated 
on the weak and defenceless by those who fail to take their needs into consideration’ . 544 In 
fact discourse ethics allows instances of injustice due to the insistence on a positive 
affirmation of what constitutes validity. Its appeal to reason is rendered impotent in the 
absence of checks and balances against atrocities committed in the name of reason itself.
This raises the question whether Habennas’s dialogical communicative process allows for 
moral imperatives. That is, since the primary and only yardstick in the public sphere is 
rationality, the question one may ask is whether there is a moral imperative for discourse. 
Judging by the above, it is obvious that Habermas thinks so. Yet he would insist, in the same 
vein, that any moral imperative can only be a product of discourse itself. 6110 The appeal for 
moral validity arising out of contestation also raises the question of how to ascertain the 
validity of any moral imperative for discourse. 601 This circularity of reasoning prompts 
Wellmer to appeal for a competent standard to supplement discourse ethics in the process of 
adjudication.602 Indeed, it seems highly feasible that we have to go outside discourse to 
justify the moral imperatives for it; that is we need to rely on non-discursively validated 
reflection. 603 In other words, it is possible to decide what is valid outside discourse, as Kant 
would have us believe. 604 More importantly, however, this move opens up avenues of 
reasoning outside the rational parameters of the lifeworld, contrary to the deontological 
procedures that Habermas rigidly adheres to. That is, it runs contrary to Habermas’s 
insistence that nonnative validity must be adjudicated within the public sphere. This 
emphasises the difficulties pertaining to Habennas’s answer as to what motivates people to 
come together to seek rational consensus and indeed whether this consensus is possible at all.
598 Iris Marion Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity’, p. 344.
599 Nicholas Meriwether, ‘Discourse Ethics and the Problem of Oppression’, p. 102.
600By appealing to discourse, Habennas’s moral theory comes close to mirroring Kant’s position on the subject. 
The difference lies in the fact that for the former, normative validity arises out of a consensus via a deliberative 
process whereas the latter would locate normative validity within a single reflective process that is guided by 
the categorical imperative.
<>("Jürgen Habermas offers a detailed formulation of his position in his MoraI Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, p. 65.
602 Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence o f Modernity, p. 165.
603 Moral intuition and Adorno's concept of mimesis can be part of this.
604 For a comparison between the two positions sec William Rchg, Insight and Solidarity: A study in the 
Discourse Ethics o f  Jurgen Habermas, (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1994) p. 38.
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6.4 Concluding Remarks.
In light the foregoing discussion it becomes apparent that there is a need to strengthen the 
concept of public sphere that Habermas currently advocates. It is the contention of this thesis 
that Habermas needs to have recourse to Adorno to make his public sphere more robust. 
Specifically the public sphere needs to incorporate a form of dialectics that would preclude 
the excesses emerging from intersubjectivity. This would mean that we are to go beyond 
Hegel and acquire a dialectic that resists Hegelian ‘closure’. Adorno offers a negative 
dialectic as an alternative to the Hegelian one. Because of the specific aims of this negative 
dialectic, a public sphere premised on it would be more effective in tackling the plural nature 
of sociality in contemporary societies. To be sure, Hegelian dialectics is anything but 
simplistic. Solomon notes that it consists of:
a complex interplay of conceptions, some of which are simply improvements on 
others, some of which are indeed opposites demanding synthetic resolution,
(while) others simply represent dead ends, which indicate a need to start over.
Indeed ... Hegel’s dialectic is ... a phenomenological tapestry in which a great 
many ... o f the forms o f human experience and philosophy jostle against one 
another and compete for adequacy.60
The complexity shown here and the way concepts mediate between human experience and 
understanding represents, for Adorno, the kernel of truth in Hegel’s system. 606 Hence, in a 
similar manner, Adorno argues that the dialectics between the universal and the particular 
would mean the engagement of these two variables on a number of levels. For him, this level 
highlights the two basic axes on which thought revolves. The dialectical method, thus, 
manages to simultaneously appeal to universality while protecting its historical, or particular, 
truth-content. The appeal to universality is propelled by the rational character of thought 
itself while the orientation towards the particular is done with an eye towards establishing 
objectivity. The concept of a historical truth-content draws attention to the contingent nature 
of rational consensus, not only because of the rules embedded in discourse ethics but also 
because of the historical character of truth itself. In other words, the context dependency of 
thought has to be taken into account. This allows and creates the space in which the somatic 
dimension of reason can be recognised and accounted for. Indeed the public sphere in this 
way becomes not only a site for rational consensus but simultaneously becomes the crucible
Wh Robert C Solomon, ‘Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit’, p. 200.
606 The problem, for Adorno, is located in Hegel’s idealism thus ensuring that, for all its multifaceted impulses 
that mediate between universal and particular or the subject and object, ‘closure’ or identity remains its ultimate 
objective.
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in which the reconciliation between is and ought can be meaningfully imagined. Only 
conceived in this way can the public sphere provide the basis for an emancipatory 
transformation of society.
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C h a p t e r  7
Writing Poetry after Auschwitz: Radicalising the Public Sphere.
7.0
The Greek philosopher Plato, in his ruminations on the subject of the ‘philosopher-king' 
manages to bring to the forefront the matrix in which notions of truth and pcwer are 
irrevocably intertwined (the fate of one is dependent on the other) in society. His irsistence 
that social problems can only be addressed if philosophers become kings or if kings practice 
true philosophy is an attempt to create a positive synergy between the intertwintment of 
thought and society, or between historical beings and the contexts in which they live. 607 For 
him, these two concepts are inseparable. As ‘seers of the truth' philosophers are engaged in a 
search for a totality.
Adorno approaches power and truth in a somewhat similar fashion. This is evinced in his 
discussion of the ways in which subject and object come together to produce knowledge. 
However he differs from Plato in his insistence that knowledge and meanings are created 
from a cognitive matrix that is vulnerable to historical as well as interpretive contingencies. 
What this means is that ‘truth’ is not a totality but a product of an ‘unsutured moment’, as the 
postmarxist Chantal Mouffe puts it, arising out of the historical, hence fleeting constellation 
that positions concepts around their object to procure meaning608. In this way knowledge or 
truth can only be understood in terms of a dialectical critique that seeks to uncover the veil 
imposed by ideological fallacies. As Adorno puts it:
[T]he difference between the dialectical view of totality and the positivist one 
rests primarily on the fact that in the dialectical concept of totality ‘objective’ is 
intended actually to produce an understanding of each and everyone of its 
individual manifestations whilst the positivistic system of theories would like, 
solely by choosing, categories which are as general as possible, to include 
determinations in as uncontradicting (sic) manner as possible in a single logical 
continuum without recognising the highest concept of structure as a precondition 
of the facts which are subsumed under them.609
Each constitutive element, as illuminated by its concept, can only be understood in a totality 
that emerges from a constellation of the concepts that owes its genesis to individual 
moments. In this way the power of the subject is made to acknowledge the truth residing in
607 Plato, Republic, translated by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 190-226. This 
critical insight acts as the bedrock to schools of thought such as Critical Theory as well as Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics.
608 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
609 Cited in David Frisby, ‘The Popper-Adorno Controversy’, p. 116.
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the corporeal dimensions of life. Truth, therefore, cannot be divorced from the power of the 
subject. Without the latter, the former becomes mute hence not accorded its due recognition. 
By the same token, however, power without its object of mediation becomes synonymous 
with identitarian logic. In lieu of this Adorno redirects the power of subjective thought 
against the idealistic veil that suppresses the truth from seeing the light of day. This is to say 
that for the co-author of the Dialectic, the power of the subject can be used to unlock the 
truth via a dialectical process of unveiling the facade of subjectivity. The new understanding 
that ensues from this is built on the absence of the conventional systemic rules that govern 
the process of knowledge production in contemporary society. Negative Dialectics ensures 
that the specific contribution of subject and object are reflected in the kind of knowledge that 
emerges. As power unlocks the truth, the latter reminds the former of the inadequacies of its 
system of representations. This is the dialectic that must be preserved and incorporated by 
Habermas, if we are to have any chance in redeeming contemporary life-forms in capitalist 
modernity.
7.1 The spectre of an ‘objectless’ universality and the ‘turn’ to Adorno.
As stated from the outset, this thesis is an attempt to rectify some of the inherent weaknesses 
in the work of Jürgen Habermas. The aim, as mentioned in the introduction, is to aide in the 
realisation of the course set out by his two-tier theory of society. It continues the grand 
tradition of the Enlightenment in this particular sense. In the course of my research, the 
suspicion that the programme designed by Habermas will definitely benefit from the insights 
offered by negative dialectics became a conviction. This conviction stems from the belief that 
Adorno provides a better platform from which to account for difference in contemporary 
society. The intertwinement of suffering and hope provides a normative warrant from which 
to reanimate a critical theory of society in our time. This will entail empowering 
contemporary knowledge from its, arguably, emasculated position so that it becomes relevant 
to contemporary needs. One of the underlying reasons behind our current predicament, 
despite our best efforts at ameliorating the human condition, is basically the loss of 
motivation to envision something ‘better’ than the present. It is the contention of this thesis 
that to do this, one has to feel the suffering that results from a life conditioned by capitalist 
modernity. In this way the dialectical axis on which suffering and hope continue to turn is the 
best guarantee of keeping alive the search for a better horizon.
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To be sure, Habermas is aware of the problem of life under contemporary conditions, dis 
notion of the public sphere is designed to protect that sphere of symbolic reproduction that 
gives meaning to our humanness. He introduces the ‘ideal speech situation’ in order to 
remind us that there is an alternative to the social predicament that has been tied to the 
rationalised processes of reification and bureaucratisation. Yet in his haste to extrapolate cn a 
universal pragmatics and the intersubjectivity that is assumed to be the basis of a raticnal 
consensus, Habermas glosses over the instinctual meansthat drive people to think and act n a 
way that would transform the status quo. It is argued in this dissertation that the turr to 
language and discourse ethics cannot by itself correct this anomaly. That is, the deliberatbns 
in the public sphere and the claims inherent in all speech acts are not enough to counter the 
totalitarian pretensions of conceptual thought. As Wellmer reminds us, there has to be 
another standard that can act in conjunction with discourse ethics in making the piolic 
sphere a truly democratising influence in a world that is becoming all too singular again in its 
essence.
This is especially so in view of the challenge that faces democracy at the turn of the new 
millennium. Democratisation, as well as what it means to be democratic, is becoming a 
conceptual minefield. This ensues directly from two sources. The first is the emphasis on the 
subjective component of the concept at the expense of the object of the concept: freedom As 
a consequence, the ‘objectless’ dimension of such concepts highlights the fact that 
democracy can easily become a conceptual portmanteau for a lot of things. Indeed, without 
an ‘object’ to guide the discussions, the resulting agreement becomes a consensus amongst 
subjectivities; that is, the power of the subject to think can become an end in itself in the 
Habermasian paradigm. This makes the model of the public sphere vulnerable to the 
philosophy of consciousness it was meant to have averted in the first place. It seems, in this 
way, that the power of subjective thought, with all its aporias, is reintroduced in an 
intersubjective agreement that lacks the mediating influence of the object ofthat engagement. 
This is probably why we can safely imagine a democratic arrangement where atrocities 
against segments of the population may legitimately take place. 610 This, from the vantage 
point of Adorno, is the natural consequence of an ‘objectless’ universality. In such a world, 
any consensus in the public sphere is an outcome generated intersubjectively -  between
610 Habermas himself would see these divergences of interpretations as symptomatic of the ‘open’ processes 
embedded within discourse ethics. True democracy is, in other words, the inevitable result of rationally 
engaging within a public sphere.
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subjects whose capacities to reason have been diminished in bourgeois society. Any true 
reconciliation taking place, therefore, between damaged life-forms cannot be authentic. 
Albrecht Wellmer succinctly sums up this contradiction by sardonically noting that, ‘[T]he 
presence of a reconciling spirit in an unreconciled word is something that can only be 
conceived in tenns of an aporia’ .611
In this matter, Habennas may usefully learn, once again, from his erstwhile mentor. In fact 
the searing dialectical critique that Adorno offers can rectify some debilitating weaknesses 
within the Habennasian scheme/ ’12 Reintroducing a dialectic actually imposes on the 
impartial deontological procedures of the public sphere a new ‘openness’ to the other: an 
openness that extends beyond the scope of the ideal speech situation. In this way the public 
sphere would allow for direct intervention to stand against the grain of ‘fair and equitable 
contestations’ based on a context defined by capitalist modernity. It means that those whose 
lifeworlds lag in terms of rationalisation do not have to be perpetually at a disadvantage in 
their quest for autonomy until such time as they gain equality with others in the public 
sphere. This suggests independence from all sorts of imperial and neo-imperial yokes under 
the aegis of capital. A thinking based on these premises would allow greater recognition of 
the moral claims of the disadvantaged. Currently these claims can easily be circumvented by 
the deontological procedures of the public sphere. A turn to Adorno would, therefore, usher 
in an extra standard where practices such as the recognition of pluralities are rooted in the 
awareness of their innate dignity. The dialectic in the public sphere would, thus, generate a 
yearning for unity: a call to unite what is with what ought to be. It assumes, in other words, a 
measured anticipation for a total transformation of social reality.
7.2 From Habermas to Adorno.
The problems surrounding the concept of the public sphere are not exclusive only to the 
priority accorded to language-based agreement in its processes. The other spectre afflicting 
this model revolves around the jettisoning of Ideology Critique from the theory of 
communicative action. 613 This came about as a result of Habermas’s uncritically endorsing a 
two-tier model of society with corresponding systems of integration. The specific way in
611 Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity, p.5.
612 These were raised in the last three chapters.
613 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (II), pp. 353-355.
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which the model is theorised left Habermas with no choice but to unhinge notions of freedom 
and autonomy from their epistemological bedrock as understood by Marx, Lukäcs and the 
first generation of Critical theorists. By reconceptualising freedom in terms of linguistic 
distortions, Habermas is unable to provide a philosophical critique of capitalist intrusion 
within and over the structure of our consciousness. For him, this state of affairs amounts to a 
‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ -  the point where we lay down arms against the impersonal 
forces arrayed against our collective fate. In doing so, the fate of human beings becomes 
more ambivalent in his model. The best that he can come up with given this lamentable 
situation is to acknowledge that the contemporary age is marked by both human freedom and 
unfreedom at the same time. Within this social matrix, as Deborah Cook succinctly 
eloquently puts it,
individuals are simultaneously free and unfree, unconstrained by material 
concerns in their leisure activities and denatured by the struggle to survive in the 
workplace, fully human in their social intercourse and dehumanised in their 
labour.614
This is to say that the distinction between freedom and unfreedom becomes obscure. As a 
consequence, we become more accepting of our social conditions. Freedom, given this, 
becomes a silhouette of its old self. Instead of it becoming a barometer attuned to the fate of 
humanity as a whole, it is now reduced to gauging distortions within the public sphere, as a 
symptom of coercive structural forces at play.
In the ‘master-slave’ narrative, Hegel points out that the dialectic between the two 
presupposes a mutual recognition of the other.6l:> For him, the intricacies surrounding the 
mediation within the narrative become the basis of a ‘better’ truth. Adorno points out that this 
mutual recognition expresses a yearning to be one with the other -  a yearning that is thwarted 
constantly by the vagaries of modern life and identitarian thought. Following Hegel, Adorno 
is of the view that the dialectical relationship between the universal and the particular clearly 
shows the irrevocable nature of their intertwinement -  one cannot be itself without the other. 
In other words, the universal needs the remedial effect of the particular in order for it to own 
up to its complicity with the world, while the particular needs the universal for the protection 
and dissemination of its truth content. In this way historicity and rationality become the axes 
from which notions of autonomy are perpetually interpreted and decoded. Just as the master 
lords over the slave, it is the slave who allows the master to be what he is. This, again,
614 Deborah Cook, ‘The Sundered totality of System and Lifeworld’, p. 71.
'’’’Robert C Solomon, The Age o f  German Idealism, p. 203.
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reminds us that thought is dependent on the material of life and not coeval with it. It sums up, 
in a nutshell, Adorno’s position as a materialist philosopher.
7.3 Concluding Remarks.
The radicalisation of the public sphere and the concomitant transformation in society is a 
theme that is suffused with Adornian motifs. By insisting on the preponderance of the object, 
Adorno suggests that idealist thought is unable to account for nonidentity and, as a result, is 
unable to uncover what is amiss in society. In other words, a radical critique of our thought 
system and the overhauling of our social system presuppose each other. This recognition can 
rejuvenate the Habennasian public sphere in ways that are not possible on the basis of the 
limitations imposed upon it by discourse ethics. Adorno’s negative dialectics is instructive if 
we are to purge these debilitating characteristics of the public sphere. Critical theory’s 
primary warrant, for Adorno, is the search for the conditions that would engender the ‘right 
form’ of life. To be sure this ‘right form' of life can only be understood negatively within our 
current context. The determinate negation that, unlike Hegel, leads to more negativity holds 
the key to this. The right form of life cannot be posited in any actual sense; however, a 
determinate negation of the current fonn of life can give us an outline of its essence/ ’16 This 
is the implicit impulse behind works such Minima Moralia. To do this does not entail a call, 
as some argue, for a wholesale abandonment of reason as incoherent. Indeed incoherence can 
only come about from a denial of the emancipatory potentials in society. Adorno’s warning 
against going down this path is worth quoting:
to act radically in accordance with this principle would be to extirpate with the 
false, all that was true also, all that, however impotcntly, strives to escape the 
confines o f universal practice, every chimerical anticipation of a nobler 
condition, and so to bring about directly the barbarism that culture is reproached 
with furthering indirectly.617
In other words, Adorno is fully aware that to deny the truth-potential in society is to disable 
the very conditions that would allow us to transcend the present and conceive of a better 
future.
616 Wellmer eloquently describes this process as the elimination of non-sense rather than the affirmation of 
sense.
617 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.44.
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The deployment of a negative dialectics is essential, therefore, not because of the absence of 
emancipatory potentials in society but because these potentials are so embedded within a 
distorted reality. This is to say that the aporetic nature of truth in modern society means fiat 
it cannot be accessed in a direct fashion: any exaltation of its presence runs the risk of 
regressing into an apotheosis of the status quo. Claims to a direct access would, whether by 
way of a Hegelian dialectical format, hermeneutics or a consensus model, necessarily email 
some form of abstraction. In the first and second instances, it would be an abstraction that 
subsumes the particular (nonidentity) to the universal, while this would mean, in the ast 
example, that the opacity of language and by extension, conceptual thought, is glossed over 
for the sake of rational consensus.
7.3.1 Enabling Continuities.
fhe aim of this dissertation to incorporate Adornian insights into the theory of 
communicative action stems from the conviction that the arguments espoused by Adorno and 
Habermas, despite some fundamental divergences, do share a common concern for a better 
society. For instance, Habermas’s communicative model is an attempt to hold action and 
system paradigms together in a two-tier theory of society. This for him has been the main 
preoccupation of the classical sociologists in their quest to come up with a model of sociality 
that would be faithful to society as well as the future aspirations of its members618. The 
failure of these different attempts to reconcile the two models of integration has resulted in 
exercises in reductionism; Marx, Weber and Dürkheim have all been guilty of gravitating 
towards either pole -  the society or self. Negative Dialectics addresses a similar problem 
within the area of epistemology. This attempt is guided by an interest in the symmetrical 
mediation between the subject and the object in the production of knowledge. The problem, 
for Adorno, is that philosophies such as existentialism, fundamental ontology as well as 
idealism reduce this dialectical mediation to a simplistic correspondence between 
understanding and social reality.
Constellation works in much of the same way, for Adorno, as universal pragmatics would 
later for Habermas; that is, as a guide to truth or validity. Unlike Habermas however, Adorno
618 Jürgen Habennas, Autonomy und Solidarity, p. 88.
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insists that language is subjectively created, whereas the former assumed that it is coeval 
with society. 619 Habermas sees language as a proper mediator of competing validity claims 
whereas Adorno would remind us of its problematic nature; that is conceptual language 
suppresses the material content of it cognitive processes leading to deformities in our 
understanding. The answer, for both, however lies not outside language but in the way 
language is deployed to aid in the object’s attempt to illuminate itself. The specific way they 
approach language is what sets them apart.The fundamental differences between Adorno and 
Habermas, as noted above, have their roots in their differing perceptions of the nature of 
conceptual thought and its relationship with truth (or validity). To be sure, Habermas, on one 
hand, does recognise the problematic nature of language. However the problems, according 
to him, are solved by the ethics that regulate discourses of mediation between competing 
validity claims. Adorno, on the other hand, denies that a discourse ethics can work in the way 
that Habermas advocates. For him, language has its own logic, hence any discourse, of any 
kind, is simply a tautological exercise in which language reaffirms its ability to define 
through the systematic elimination of nonidentity. This is the point of difference between the 
two. As Wellmer admits, both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses and 
could not be used as a basis to adjudicate on which one is better than the other. Indeed he 
notes that:
Perhaps we might speak of an implicit philosophy o f  language or theory of 
rationality in Adorno. But whatever we decide to call it, 1 doubt whether the 
reformulation of Critical Theory in terms of language pragmatics is sufficient to 
supersede the philosophy of Adorno.620
These affinities are also manifested in Habermas's claim that there is a mimetic element in 
all fonns of conceptual thought as expressed in language (everyday speech), which follows 
closely from Adorno’s insistence that all human practices and fonns of thought contain a 
mimetic or non-conceptualised corporeal moment.621 In fact Habennas’s suggestion that the 
‘system’ must be anchored in the social sphere of reproduction is, from this point of view, an 
attempt to address his mentor's claim that the mimetic moment in conceptual thought is 
ignored, because classificatory or identity thinking seeks complete mastery over its object. 622 
Indeed, the only difference seems to be that in Habennas’s view, this mimetic moment is
619 See chapter 3 for an extended discussion on this.
620Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein: On The Difficulties o f  Receiving His Philosophy and Its Relation 
to the Philosophy of Adorno,’ in Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature o f  Modernity: Essays and Lectures, 
trans. David Midgley (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) p. 259.
621 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 150.
622Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence o f Modernity, p.5. For Habermas this move would preclude the 
‘colonisation of the lifeworld'.
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preserved rather than being ignored in conceptual thinking. The preservation of the mimetic 
moment becomes a cornerstone of Habermas’s belief in the possibility of salvaging the 
project of modernity. In other words he recognises that the works of Adorno can still inform 
the broad contours of his theorization on the Enlightenment promise. As such there is no 
valid basis, on this point at least, to mount an argument about the superiority of 
communicative competence.
Adorno, in maintaining that we are living a ‘damaged life’ in capitalist modernity seems to 
indicate a direct continuity between justice and the right kind of life: one that is rooted in 
freedom itself. Hence the normative grounds necessary for critique are derived from the 
recognition that the current hegemony of conceptual reason and its socio-economic 
counterpart, exchange relations, are symptomatic of the rise of a specific type of society that 
further entrenches these. In light of this, ideas of freedom and justice are inseparable from a 
transformative change to the type of society we live in. Just as Adorno gave preponderance to 
the object, Habermas talks about the way in which the system is rooted within the lifeworld. 
Yet it is also here that Habermas’s problems start. By giving precedence to the lifeworld, 
Habermas reintroduces the aporias that are associated with subjective thought. In the end, 
people with various disabilities are simply excluded from the processes of the public sphere. 
Habermas can be sensitised to the inner logic of his discourse ethics via an Adornian turn.
This ultimately leads back to the major argument of this thesis: that a re-appropriation of 
Adornian insights will mitigate some of the weaknesses in Habermas. Indeed the thematic 
statement of this dissertation is that the rationalisation of the world will not eliminate all 
forms of societal evils. This is precisely where Habermas is found lacking. To be sure, the 
resistance against societal evils marks a shift of Adorno’s philosophy from the Kantian 
position on the pursuit of moral goodness. This shift was propelled by the former’s personal 
anguish over the horrors of the Second World War to which he laconically lamented that ‘to 
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’.623 It also reflects Adorno’s conviction that the task 
of the Enlightenment project is not so much to expand reason in our society as to critique and 
eliminate unreason. Given this insight, it is critical that Adorno is rehabilitated and his works 
included within the pantheon of contemporary critical theorising. This is essential if the 
tradition of the Frankfurt is to be of continued relevance for us.
Theodor Adorno, Prisms, p. 34.
190
In an eloquent passage in the Dialectic, Adorno poignantly reminds us of the current 
contradictions inherent in the social fabric of capitalist modernity, contradictions which 
continue to be the biggest hurdle to the emancipation of humankind. For him, the law of 
equivalence has become the modern byword for freedom. Equivalence has become an end in 
itself, turning a blind eye to the idea of incommensurability. It is in this way that he argues 
‘[T]he blindfold over the eyes of Justitia means not only that justice brooks no interference 
but that it does not originate in freedom’ . 624 Despite its sense of melancholy, Adorno’s 
oeuvre is animated by the familiar theme of a perpetual quest for a better society. For 
Habennas, the concept of the public sphere is a tangible manifestation of this yearning to 
realise the project of the Enlightenment: a state where, for Adorno, writing poetry becomes a 
celebration of being free.
624 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic, p. 12.
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